fsverity: Fix bpf_get_fsverity_digest() dynptr assumptions
21Vexday Risk Score
No sign of exploitation. No public exploitation artifact known so far.
ssvc Trackcvss 7.8epss 0.2%
exploitation probability
0.2%top 94% of all CVEs
observed exploitation
nono source reports it
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fsverity: Fix bpf_get_fsverity_digest() dynptr assumptions
The BPF verifier and the dynptr abstraction ensure that the memory space
referenced by a dynptr remains valid. They do not, however, provide any
guarantee that the contents of the memory are stable. kfuncs are
expected to remain memory-safe even if concurrent modifications occur.
bpf_get_fsverity_digest() didn't follow that: it could crash if
arg->digest_size was concurrently modified.
Fix that by using the known-good value hash_alg->digest_size instead.
Also widen 'dynptr_sz' and 'out_digest_sz' to u64 to match the return
type of __bpf_dynptr_size(). It doesn't appear that it can actually be
more than INT_MAX currently (since __bpf_dynptr_data_rw() excludes
file-based pointers), but the correct type might as well be used.
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Affected products
Linux · Linux