Telnyx MCP Server through 6.83.0 Missing Authentication on Streamable HTTP Transport
28Vexday Risk Score
No sign of exploitation. No public exploitation artifact known so far.
ssvc Trackcvss 9.3epss 0.7%
exploitation probability
0.7%top 48% of all CVEs
observed exploitation
nono source reports it
The Telnyx MCP server exposed its HTTP transport on every interface and did not require a caller credential. packages/mcp-server/src/http.ts served MCP on the root path with a listener bound to all interfaces and parsed the caller's authentication headers in a mode that did not fail when they were absent, so a request without any credential completed initialisation and dispatched tools. Dispatch forwarded the server's own stored credentials, the Telnyx API key and client secret together with the code-execution key, to the upstream endpoint, so an unauthenticated caller able to reach the port acted with them. The current code defaults the host to loopback, requires a server API key, and enforces it in middleware.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Affected products
team-telnyx · telnyx-mcpReferences
https://github.com/team-telnyx/telnyx-nodehttps://github.com/team-telnyx/telnyx-node/pull/450https://github.com/team-telnyx/telnyx-node/security/advisories/GHSA-46jp-xr2h-fw7hhttps://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/telnyx-mcp-server-through-6.83.0-missing-authentication-on-streamable-http-transport