Klever-Go Account takeover: `kleverUpdateAccountPermission` authorizes on attacker-controlled `RecipientAddr` instead of the authenticated caller
21Vexday Risk Score
No sign of exploitation. No public exploitation artifact known so far.
ssvc Trackcvss 8.7epss 0.3%
exploitation probability
0.3%top 84% of all CVEs
observed exploitation
nono source reports it
Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. Prior to 1.7.20, the KleverUpdateAccountPermission built-in authorizes replacement of a target account's permissions by checking attacker-controlled vmInput.RecipientAddr instead of authenticated vmInput.CallerAddr. An attacker-controlled contract can choose a victim account with configured permissions as RecipientAddr, and contractHasValidPermission can accept the victim's default self-signer as authorization. UpdatePermission can then replace the victim's entire permission set with attacker-supplied Owner permissions, enabling asset theft or permanent lockout without a victim key or signature. Accounts without stored permissions and the native transaction path are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.20.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Affected products
klever-io · klever-goReferences
https://gist.github.com/mabdullah22/a41f90aa5ba86bbebf121f739bd5f5e9https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/commit/c58740eb74d7ee8f07db1e18a7d6214b5559ba32https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/releases/tag/v1.7.20https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/security/advisories/GHSA-97cv-x867-6xhm