pac4j-saml before 6.5.6 Session Destruction via Unsigned LogoutRequest
13Vexday Risk Score
No sign of exploitation. No public exploitation artifact known so far.
ssvc Trackcvss 6.9epss 0.2%
exploitation probability
0.2%top 92% of all CVEs
observed exploitation
nono source reports it
pac4j-saml before 6.5.6 does not require signature validation of SAML LogoutRequest messages in SAML2LogoutValidator.validateLogoutRequest(). When an IdP sends no SessionIndex, a session can be destroyed based solely on the NameID, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to submit an unsigned LogoutRequest with a guessed identifier (e.g., an email address used as NameID) to terminate a victim's SAML session.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Affected products
pac4j · pac4jReferences
https://github.com/pac4j/pac4jhttps://github.com/pac4j/pac4j/blob/pac4j-parent-6.5.5/pac4j-saml/src/main/java/org/pac4j/saml/logout/impl/SAML2LogoutValidator.javahttps://github.com/pac4j/pac4j/commit/2270c3ff70e93cc43831e75702acd5135531237ehttps://www.pac4j.org/blog/security-advisory-pac4j-core-oidc-saml.htmlhttps://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/pac4j-saml-before-6.5.6-session-destruction-via-unsigned-logoutrequest