Home Assistant: mDNS Server-Side Request Forgery
13Vexday Risk Score
No sign of exploitation. No public exploitation artifact known so far.
ssvc Trackcvss 5.4epss 0.3%
exploitation probability
0.3%top 77% of all CVEs
observed exploitation
nono source reports it
Home Assistant is open source home automation software focused on local control and privacy. Prior to 2026.2.3, the IPP integration automatically processed unauthenticated _ipp._tcp.local mDNS announcements in homeassistant/components/ipp/config_flow.py, where async_step_zeroconf passed attacker-controlled host, port, and base_path values to validate_input for printer metadata retrieval. Because the shared HTTP client followed attacker-controlled cross-origin redirects without blocking loopback targets, a local-network attacker could redirect the request to 127.0.0.1 or another internal service without user interaction or prior IPP configuration. This issue is fixed in version 2026.2.3.
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
Affected products
home-assistant · coreReferences
https://github.com/home-assistant/core/commit/0f3c7ca2772b605c0f3c09c88f35e527ea6ea560https://github.com/home-assistant/core/commit/815c708d19aa0c7f59f9ee318b613a5e481a42b3https://github.com/home-assistant/core/pull/162941https://github.com/home-assistant/core/releases/tag/2026.2.3https://github.com/home-assistant/core/security/advisories/GHSA-4ghv-53cq-7wp3