Cocos AI: Intra-handshake attested TLS implementation is vulnerable to session-misbinding attacks for Intel TDX verifier path
48Vexday Risk Score
No sign of exploitation. It has a public proof of concept.
ssvc Attendcvss 9.1epss 0.2%
from disclosure to weapon0 days
Published on NVDSep 18
1st PoCJul 6
exploitation probability
0.2%top 87% of all CVEs
observed exploitation
nono source reports it
1 public exploit(s)
Cocos AI is a confidential computing system for running AI workloads inside trusted execution environments. In versions up to and including 0.8.2, the intra-handshake attested TLS (aTLS) Intel TDX verification path does not copy the expected current-session freshness value into the TDX quote-body policy before quote validation, so structurally valid TDX QuoteV4 Evidence is accepted without checking that its REPORT_DATA field matches the reportData expected for the current session. A relying party using this path can therefore accept Evidence with a mismatched or reused reportData and release application data after the handshake, enabling session-misbinding to an unintended attestation context. The issue is fixed in version 0.9.0.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Affected products
ultravioletrs · cocospublic PoCs found — 1
githubgithub.com/muhammad-usama-sardar/intra-handshake-fail★ 3⚠ Public resources, to assess the exposure of systems you control or are authorized to test. Test only with authorization.