net: dsa: bcm_sf2: bound the CFP rule dump by the caller's buffer size
21Vexday Risk Score
No sign of exploitation. No public exploitation artifact known so far.
ssvc Trackcvss 7epss 0.1%
exploitation probability
0.1%top 98% of all CVEs
observed exploitation
nono source reports it
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: dsa: bcm_sf2: bound the CFP rule dump by the caller's buffer size
bcm_sf2_cfp_rule_get_all() walks the whole cfp.unique bitmap into
rule_locs[] without consulting nfc->rule_cnt, which is how many entries
the caller had room for. ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLALL requires no CAP_NET_ADMIN
and the ioctl sizes the buffer from the rule_cnt userspace passes in, so
once an admin has installed CFP rules any user can ask for fewer slots
than there are rules and run off the end of the allocation. A rule_cnt
of 0 leaves the buffer pointer NULL and the walk dereferences it.
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Affected products
Linux · Linux