ProLock
Alert when a public recovery tool comes out, when compatibility changes and when a new variant appears.
Summary
PwndLocker is a ransomware that was observed in late 2019 and is reported to have been used to target businesses and local governments/cities. According to one source, ransom amounts demanded as part of PwndLocker activity range from $175k USD to $650k USD depending on the size of the network. PwndLocker attempts to disable a variety of Windows services so that their data can be encrypted. Various processes will also be targeted, such as web browsers and software related to security, backups, and databases. Shadow copies are cleared by the ransomware, and encryption of files occurs once the system has been prepared in this way. Executable files and those that are likely to be important for the system to continue to function appear to be skipped by the ransomware, and a large number of folders mostly related to Microsoft Windows system files are also ignored. As of March 2020, encrypted files have been observed with the added extensions of .key and .pwnd. Ransom notes are dropped in folders where encrypted files are found and also on the user's desktop.
Text from the open source (public malware catalogue or MITRE ATT&CK), unedited: it may be outdated or cover only one variant.
Recovery
No known public tool
Before any tool
- Preserve the encrypted files, the ransom note and any backups before trying anything.
- Test the tool on a copy of the files, in an isolated environment, following the vendor's instructions.
- A decryptor for the family does not guarantee recovery for every variant.
Recovery guide
General guidance for the first hours, valid for any family. It does not replace an incident response team.
1. Contain
- Disconnect the affected machines from the network (cable and Wi-Fi). If you cannot isolate them, shut them down to stop the spread.
- Disconnect the backups too and check that they were not encrypted.
- Change the passwords of administrative, VPN and service accounts from a clean machine: attackers usually hold stolen credentials.
2. Preserve the evidence
- Do not delete the encrypted files or the ransom note. They identify the family, and a tool may appear later.
- Keep the logs (firewall, VPN, domain controller, antivirus or EDR) and, if possible, a copy of the disks and memory of the affected machines.
- Write down what happened and when: the timeline helps the investigation and the notifications.
3. Identify the family
- Look the family up in the Vexday search by file extension, ransom note file name or sample hash.
- Check whether a free tool exists on No More Ransom and on the vendor's official page.
- A tool works for the family and sometimes only for some variants. Always test it on a copy of the files, in an isolated environment, following the vendor's instructions.
4. Recover safely
- Restore from verified backups, only after removing the attacker's access. Restoring earlier can reinfect the environment.
- When in doubt, rebuild the compromised machines from a trusted image.
- Paying the ransom does not guarantee that the data comes back or that it will not be published.
5. Report the incident
- Personal data: check your country's data protection law; many require notifying the authority and the data subjects within short deadlines.
- National CSIRT: report the incident to your country's CSIRT or CERT.
- Police: file a report with the cybercrime unit.
- Cyber insurance: tell the insurer before hiring incident response; many policies require it.
Under attack: who to call
- Personal data involved: notify the ANPD. Under the LGPD (art. 48), the controller notifies the ANPD and the data subjects of an incident that may cause relevant risk or harm, within 3 business days (ANPD Resolution CD/ANPD No. 15/2024). The data protection officer files it through SEI!ANPD. How to notify the ANPD
- File a police report. Ransomware is a crime. Many states have police units specialized in cybercrime; keep the ransom note and the encrypted files as evidence.
CSIRTs · Brazil
The country's incident response teams (CSIRTs), from the ENISA and FIRST lists. Each one serves a constituency: check it before writing.
- CERT.br · Computer Emergency Response Team BrazilFIRST
- Apura CSIRT · Apura DFIR / CSIRT TeamFIRSTServes: Companies
- CAIS/RNP · Brazilian Academic and Research Network CSIRTFIRSTServes: Research and education
- CSIRT-INTER · Banco Inter Computer Security Incident Response TeamFIRSTServes: Financial sector
- CSIRT PETROBRASFIRSTServes: Industrial sector
- CSIRT Soow Sigma · CSIRT Soow Sigma - Computer Security Incident Response TeamFIRSTServes: Government, Public and private sectors
- CTIR Gov-BR · Cyber Incident Prevention, Handling and Response Center of Brazilian GovernmentFIRSTServes: Government, Public and private sectors
- NTTDATA-BR-CERTFIRSTServes: Companies
- Nubank CSIRT · Nu CSIRTFIRSTServes: Financial sector
Another country: Argentina · Chile · Colombia · Costa Rica · Dominican Republic · Ecuador · Spain · Guatemala · Mexico · Panama · Peru · Portugal · El Salvador · Uruguay · Venezuela
Source: ENISA and FIRST lists · updated on 16 Nov 2026
Variants
No variant cataloged.
Extensions and ransom notes
No extension or note cataloged.
Groups using the family
- prolock operates the family · corroborated, high confidence
Detection
The detection packages of the groups that operate or use the family: the indicators (IOCs) and YARA rules from open intelligence, to hunt for the group in your own environment. The package is published per group, not per family.
- prolock: 1 only in the package · 1 YARA rule(s) — see the group's detection
Source: open intelligence on the groups. The YARA rules and the full package are on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans.
Techniques (MITRE ATT&CK) 7
The techniques MITRE ATT&CK documents for this family. Each links to the technique page on ATT&CK, with detection and mitigation guidance.
ATT&CK 20.1. © The MITRE Corporation. S0654
Indicators
No indicator linked to this family.