vanhelsing
Alert when a public recovery tool comes out, when compatibility changes and when a new variant appears.
Summary
Designed to target Windows systems, this ransomware employs advanced encryption techniques and appends a unique file extension to compromised files. Its stealthy evasion tactics and persistence mechanisms make detection and removal challenging. This highlights the need for proactive cybersecurity measures and a robust incident response strategy to safeguard data integrity and minimize breach risks.
Text from the open source (public malware catalogue or MITRE ATT&CK), unedited: it may be outdated or cover only one variant.
Recovery
No known public tool
Before any tool
- Preserve the encrypted files, the ransom note and any backups before trying anything.
- Test the tool on a copy of the files, in an isolated environment, following the vendor's instructions.
- A decryptor for the family does not guarantee recovery for every variant.
Recovery guide
General guidance for the first hours, valid for any family. It does not replace an incident response team.
1. Contain
- Disconnect the affected machines from the network (cable and Wi-Fi). If you cannot isolate them, shut them down to stop the spread.
- Disconnect the backups too and check that they were not encrypted.
- Change the passwords of administrative, VPN and service accounts from a clean machine: attackers usually hold stolen credentials.
2. Preserve the evidence
- Do not delete the encrypted files or the ransom note. They identify the family, and a tool may appear later.
- Keep the logs (firewall, VPN, domain controller, antivirus or EDR) and, if possible, a copy of the disks and memory of the affected machines.
- Write down what happened and when: the timeline helps the investigation and the notifications.
3. Identify the family
- Look the family up in the Vexday search by file extension, ransom note file name or sample hash.
- Check whether a free tool exists on No More Ransom and on the vendor's official page.
- A tool works for the family and sometimes only for some variants. Always test it on a copy of the files, in an isolated environment, following the vendor's instructions.
4. Recover safely
- Restore from verified backups, only after removing the attacker's access. Restoring earlier can reinfect the environment.
- When in doubt, rebuild the compromised machines from a trusted image.
- Paying the ransom does not guarantee that the data comes back or that it will not be published.
5. Report the incident
- Personal data: check your country's data protection law; many require notifying the authority and the data subjects within short deadlines.
- National CSIRT: report the incident to your country's CSIRT or CERT.
- Police: file a report with the cybercrime unit.
- Cyber insurance: tell the insurer before hiring incident response; many policies require it.
Under attack: who to call
- Personal data involved: notify the ANPD. Under the LGPD (art. 48), the controller notifies the ANPD and the data subjects of an incident that may cause relevant risk or harm, within 3 business days (ANPD Resolution CD/ANPD No. 15/2024). The data protection officer files it through SEI!ANPD. How to notify the ANPD
- File a police report. Ransomware is a crime. Many states have police units specialized in cybercrime; keep the ransom note and the encrypted files as evidence.
CSIRTs · Brazil
The country's incident response teams (CSIRTs), from the ENISA and FIRST lists. Each one serves a constituency: check it before writing.
- CERT.br · Computer Emergency Response Team BrazilFIRST
- Apura CSIRT · Apura DFIR / CSIRT TeamFIRSTServes: Companies
- CAIS/RNP · Brazilian Academic and Research Network CSIRTFIRSTServes: Research and education
- CSIRT-INTER · Banco Inter Computer Security Incident Response TeamFIRSTServes: Financial sector
- CSIRT PETROBRASFIRSTServes: Industrial sector
- CSIRT Soow Sigma · CSIRT Soow Sigma - Computer Security Incident Response TeamFIRSTServes: Government, Public and private sectors
- CTIR Gov-BR · Cyber Incident Prevention, Handling and Response Center of Brazilian GovernmentFIRSTServes: Government, Public and private sectors
- NTTDATA-BR-CERTFIRSTServes: Companies
- Nubank CSIRT · Nu CSIRTFIRSTServes: Financial sector
Another country: Argentina · Chile · Colombia · Costa Rica · Dominican Republic · Ecuador · Spain · Guatemala · Mexico · Panama · Peru · Portugal · El Salvador · Uruguay · Venezuela
Source: ENISA and FIRST lists · updated on 16 Nov 2026
Variants
No variant cataloged.
Extensions and ransom notes
extension: .vanhelsing
Groups using the family
- VanHelsing operates the family · corroborated, high confidence
Victims of the groups
1 known victim of the groups that operate or use the family, 0 in Brazil.
The leak site publishes the victim with the group, not the family. A group that runs more than one family shows up on all of them: the victim belongs to the group, and the family used in that attack is not reported.
Here, the victims' names are hidden: the list shows the group, the sector, the country and the attack date.
These plans unlock the raw intelligence that stays closed on the site:
- the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
- the victims' names;
- the full negotiation chat;
- each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
- the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.
They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.
See the plansFinancial Services (1)
Detection
The detection packages of the groups that operate or use the family: the indicators (IOCs) and YARA rules from open intelligence, to hunt for the group in your own environment. The package is published per group, not per family.
- VanHelsing: 9 open IOC(s) · 3 only in the package · 1 YARA rule(s) — see the group's detection
Source: open intelligence on the groups. The YARA rules and the full package are on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans.
Indicators
9 indicators linked to this family
- md5_hash · 97150d47ea7779101be6582fc329c2cd · group leak site
- md5_hash · 6dc5021a0cbdbe6dea26d78afb43ebb3 · group leak site
- md5_hash · 084deb26cd9d8eff3f972e8e0c4adfe6 · group leak site
- ip · 193.37.69.162 · group leak site
- ip · 193.37.69.225 · group leak site
- md5_hash · 5b28a0fc21ba079b380effb30e853132 · group leak site
- md5_hash · d7ad18e63064ef80cc6b98db54516f6f · group leak site
- md5_hash · 3e063dc0de937df5841cb9c2ff3e4651 · group leak site
- md5_hash · 5c254d25751269892b6f02d6c6384aef · group leak site