Medusa Group
También conocido como: medusa
Aviso por correo de CVE nueva atribuida, víctima nueva en Brasil e incidente verificado.
Sobre el grupo
Medusa Group has been active since at least 2021 and was initially operated as a closed ransomware group before evolving into a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operation. Some reporting indicates that certain attacks may still be conducted directly by the ransomware’s core developers. Public sources have also referred to the group as “Spearwing” or “Medusa Actors.” Medusa Group employs living-off-the-land techniques, frequently leveraging publicly available tools and common remote management software to conduct operations. The group engages in double extortion tactics, exfiltrating data prior to encryption and threatening to publish stolen information if ransom demands are not met. For initial access, Medusa Group has exploited publicly known vulnerabilities, conducted phishing campaigns, and used credentials or access purchased from Initial Access Brokers (IABs). The group is opportunistic and has targeted a wide range of sectors globally.
Nombres parecidos y otras marcas
- No confundir con medusalocker. Nombres parecidos, operaciones distintas: según el FBI, el ransomware Medusa no tiene relación con MedusaLocker. [fuente]
Cadena de ataque
Escenario plausible montado a partir de las técnicas reales del grupo, ordenadas por las fases de un ataque. Cada etapa muestra cómo suele actuar el grupo.
Cadena ilustrativa derivada de las técnicas documentadas en MITRE ATT&CK — no representa un ataque específico ya ocurrido. La severidad resume el arsenal conocido (cobertura de la cadena, CVEs en explotación activa, técnicas).
Técnicas (MITRE ATT&CK) 57
Cómo opera el grupo, mapeado por la matriz MITRE ATT&CK y organizado por las fases de un ataque.
Arsenal y tácticas
Lo que el grupo usa y cómo ataca, según el perfil público del grupo, compilado a partir de informes públicos. Las CVE de ese perfil están en la sección de CVE, con la fuente al lado.
Herramientas
Cómo ataca el grupo
El detalle de cada técnica es el texto de la fuente, en inglés.
- Initial Access TA0001
- T1078 Valid Accounts: Initial access through brute force or compromised credentials of legitimate RDP accounts.
- T1133 External Remote Services: Accesses the victim's network via an RDP service.
- T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has leveraged public facing vulnerabilities in their campaigns against victim organizations to gain initial access.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware January 2024)(Citation: Broadcom Medusa Ransomware Medusa Group March 2025) [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has also utilized CVE-2024-1709 in Screen
- T1566 Phishing: Initial access through phishing email attachments.
- Execution TA0002
- T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation: Uses a series of Windows commands, such as bcdedit.exe and vssadmin.
- T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Uses a series of Windows commands, such as bcdedit.exe and vssadmin.
- T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has leveraged PowerShell for execution and defense evasion.(Citation: Check Point Medusa Ransomware April 2025)(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)(Citation: Intel471 Medusa Ransomware May 2025) [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has also utilized PowerShell to execute a bitsadmin transfer from file host
- T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has used Windows Command Prompt to control and execute commands on the system to include ingress, network, and filesystem enumeration activities.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)
- T1072 Software Deployment Tools: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has utilized software deployment and management solutions to deploy their encryption payload to include BigFix and PDQ Deploy.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)
- T1106 Native API: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has leveraged Windows Native API functions to execute payloads.(Citation: Security Scorecard Medusa Ransomware January 2024)
- T1559.001 Inter-Process Communication: Component Object Model: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has leveraged Component Object Model (COM) to bypass UAC.(Citation: Intel471 Medusa Ransomware May 2025)
- T1569.002 System Services: Service Execution: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has utilized [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) to execute scripts and commands within victim environments.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware January 2024)(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)(Citation: Broadcom Medusa Ransomware Medusa Group March 2025) [Medusa Group](https://attack.
- T1675 ESXi Administration Command: Medusa actors abuse ESXi administration services to force root passwords to Medusa-controlled passwords on Linux machines.
- Persistence TA0003
- T1112 Modify Registry: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has modified Registry keys to elevate privileges, maintain persistence and allow remote access.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)
- T1136.002 Create Account: Domain Account: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has created a domain account within the victim environment.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)
- T1505.003 Server Software Component: Web Shell: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has utilized webshells to an exploited Microsoft Exchange Server.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware January 2024)
- T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has used vulnerable or signed drivers to modify security solutions on victim devices.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)
- Privilege Escalation TA0004
- T1484.001 Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification: Medusa actors made changes to Active Directory Default Domain Policy settings to override Group Policy settings.
- T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has used vulnerable or signed drivers to modify security solutions on victim devices.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)
- T1548.002 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has attempted to bypass UAC using Component Object Model (COM) interface.(Citation: Intel471 Medusa Ransomware May 2025)
- Stealth TA0005
- T1006 Direct Volume Access: Medusa actors use vssadmin to bypass Windows file access controls and file system monitoring tools to obtain copies of registry hives.
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information: Medusa actors obfuscate a string by slicing it into pieces and referencing it via a variable.
- T1027.002 Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has packed the code of dropped kernel drivers using the packer ASM Guard.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware January 2024)
- T1027.010 Obfuscated Files or Information: Command Obfuscation: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has obfuscated PowerShell scripts with Base64 encoding.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025) [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has also obfuscated the code of dropped kernel drivers using a software known as Safengine Shielden which randomized the code through code mutations and then leveraged an embedde
- T1027.013 Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File: Medusa actors use a well-known stealth technique that executes a base64 encrypted command.
- T1070 Indicator Removal: Medusa actors delete their previous work and tools installed.
- T1070.003 Indicator Removal: Clear Command History: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has cleared command history by running the PowerShell command `Remove-Item (Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath`.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)
- T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has deleted previously installed tools.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)
- T1218.014 System Binary Proxy Execution: MMC: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has leveraged Microsoft Management Console (MMC) to facilitate lateral movement and to interact locally or remotely with victim devices using the command `mmc.exe compmgmt.msc /computer:{hostname/ip}`.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)
- T1564.003 Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has utilized the `ShowWindow` API function to hide the current window.(Citation: Security Scorecard Medusa Ransomware January 2024)
- T1564.012 Hide Artifacts: File/Path Exclusions: Medusa actors operate in pre-existing excluded folders within Windows Defender.
- Credential Access TA0006
- T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has leveraged [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) to dump LSASS to harvest credentials.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)
- T1003.003 OS Credential Dumping: NTDS: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has accessed the ntds.dit file to engage in credential dumping.(Citation: Broadcom Medusa Ransomware Medusa Group March 2025)
- T1110 Brute Force: Uses brute force on local RDP account passwords.
- T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Medusa actors steal credentials by copying Windows database files and using them to create forged Kerberos tickets.
- Discovery TA0007
- T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has obtained host network details utilizing the command `cmd.exe /c ipconfig /all`.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)
- T1018 Remote System Discovery: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has used PDQ Inventory to get an inventory of the endpoints on the network.(Citation: Broadcom Medusa Ransomware Medusa Group March 2025)
- T1033 System Owner/User Discovery: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has utilized [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) to execute `quser` to discover the user session information.(Citation: Broadcom Medusa Ransomware Medusa Group March 2025)
- T1046 Network Service Discovery: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has the capability to use living off the land (LOTL) binaries to perform network enumeration.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025) [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has also utilized the publicly available scanning tool SoftPerfect Network Scanner (`netscan.exe`) to discover device hostnames and network
- T1049 System Network Connections Discovery: Medusa actors use the command netstat -a to gather a listing of network connections.
- T1057 Process Discovery: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has utilized a hard-coded security tool process list that identifies and terminates using an undocumented IOCTL code 0x222094.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware January 2024)
- T1069.002 Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has utilized the `net group` command to query domain groups within the victim environment.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)
- T1082 System Information Discovery: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has leveraged `cmd.exe` to identify system info `cmd.exe /c systeminfo`.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)
- T1083 File and Directory Discovery: Queries specified files, folders, and file extensions.
- T1087.001 Account Discovery: Local Account: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has leveraged `net user` for account discovery.(Citation: Broadcom Medusa Ransomware Medusa Group March 2025)
- T1135 Network Share Discovery: Enumerates network shares.
- T1518.001 Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has detected security solutions for termination or deletion within the victim device using hard-coded lists of strings containing security product executables.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware January 2024)
- T1652 Device Driver Discovery: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has queried drivers on the victim device through the command `driverquery`.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)
- Lateral Movement TA0008
- T1021 Remote Services: Uses remote services for login and lateral movement via RDP and SMB.
- T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has used RDP to conduct lateral movement and exfiltrate data.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025) [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has also utilized the Windows executable `mstsc.exe` for RDP activities through the command `mstsc.exe /v:{hostname/ip}`.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware Marc
- T1072 Software Deployment Tools: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has utilized software deployment and management solutions to deploy their encryption payload to include BigFix and PDQ Deploy.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)
- T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has utilized legitimate software services such as PDQ Deploy to transfer malicious binaries and tools to other victimized hosts within the target environment.(Citation: Broadcom Medusa Ransomware Medusa Group March 2025)
- Exfiltration TA0010
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel: Transfers data to attacker-controlled servers via an existing command-and-control (C2) channel.
- T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltrates data using alternative protocols, such as FTP/SFTP, to avoid detection by traditional methods.
- T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltrates data using web services like cloud services (e.g., Google Drive, Dropbox, etc.).
- T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has utilized [Rclone](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1040) to exfiltrate data from victim environments to cloud storage.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)(Citation: Broadcom Medusa Ransomware Medusa Group March 2025)
- Command and Control TA0011
- T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has communicated through reverse or bind shells over port 443 (HTTPS).(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)
- T1090.003 Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has used TOR nodes for communications.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware January 2024)(Citation: Check Point Medusa Ransomware April 2025)(Citation: Broadcom Medusa Ransomware Medusa Group March 2025)
- T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer: Uses certutil to download malicious files.
- T1219 Remote Access Tools: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has leveraged Remote Access Software for lateral movement and data exfiltration.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware January 2024)(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)(Citation: Broadcom Medusa Ransomware Medusa Group March 2025)(Citation: Security Scorecard Medusa Ransomware January 2024) [Medusa Gro
- T1573.002 Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has used HTTPS for command and control.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)
- Impact TA0040
- T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact: Uses the AES-256 algorithm to encrypt files on the computer.
- T1489 Service Stop: Terminates processes and services related to database servers, email servers, and backups.
- T1490 Inhibit System Recovery: Deletes shadow copies and disables the Windows System Restore feature.
- T1529 System Shutdown/Reboot: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has manually turned off and encrypted virtual machines.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)
- T1657 Financial Theft: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has stolen and encrypted victims' data in order to extort victims into paying a ransom.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware January 2024)(Citation: Check Point Medusa Ransomware April 2025)(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)(Citation: Intel471 Medusa Ransomware May 2025)(Citation: Broadcom Medusa Ra
- Resource Development TA0042
- T1583.006 Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has utilized a file hosting service named filemail[.]com to host a zip file that contained malicious payloads that facilitated follow-on actions.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware January 2024)
- T1585.001 Establish Accounts: Social Media Accounts: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has created social media accounts including Telegram and X to publicize their activities.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware January 2024)(Citation: Check Point Medusa Ransomware April 2025)
- T1585.002 Establish Accounts: Email Accounts: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has created email accounts used in ransomware negotiations.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)
- T1588.002 Obtain Capabilities: Tool: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has obtained and leveraged numerous RMM services, along with publicly available tools used for scanning.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware January 2024)(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)(Citation: Broadcom Medusa Ransomware Medusa Group March 2025) [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G
- T1608.002 Stage Capabilities: Upload Tool: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has utilized a file hosting service called filemail[.]com to host a zip file that contained a RMM service such as ConnectWise.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware January 2024)
- T1650 Acquire Access: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has purchased user credentials and other sensitive data from Initial Access Brokers (IABs).(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware January 2024)(Citation: Check Point Medusa Ransomware April 2025)(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)(Citation: Intel471 Medusa Ransomware May 2025)
- Defense Impairment TA0112
- T1112 Modify Registry: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has modified Registry keys to elevate privileges, maintain persistence and allow remote access.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)
- T1553.002 Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has utilized vulnerable or signed drivers to kill or delete services associated with endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools: Employs Windows Management Instrumentation (WMIC) command-line to delete shadow copies. Terminates services or processes related to antivirus/security tools. [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has terminated antivirus services utilizing the gaze.exe executable and utilizing `psexec.exe`.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware January 2024)(Citation: CISA Medu
- T1686 Disable or Modify System Firewall: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has utilized [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) to execute batch scripts that modify firewall settings.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025) [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has also enabled and modified firewall rules to allow for RDP connections for lateral movement and device interact
- T1688 Safe Mode Boot: Abuses Safe Mode to evade endpoint detection.
- T1690 Prevent Command History Logging: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has removed PowerShell command history through the use of the PSReadLine module by running the PowerShell command `Remove-Item (Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath`.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)
Fuente: perfil público del grupo, perfil del grupo · actualizado el 16 nov 2026 · actividad de 11 ene 2023 a 13 feb 2026
Vulnerabilidades explotadas 7
CVE que este grupo es conocido por explotar, con la fuente y la confianza de cada una al lado. Ordenadas por la confianza y la gravedad real.
Sitios del grupo
11 sitio(s) conocido(s): 0 en línea, 11 fuera de línea, 0 incautado(s).
| Tipo | Estado | Cambió el | Dirección |
|---|---|---|---|
| negociación (chat) | fuera de línea | visto desde 12 nov 2026 | •••••••• (en el plan SOC) |
| filtración | fuera de línea | visto desde 12 nov 2026 | •••••••• (en el plan SOC) |
| filtración | fuera de línea | visto desde 12 nov 2026 | •••••••• (en el plan SOC) |
| filtración | fuera de línea | visto desde 12 nov 2026 | •••••••• (en el plan SOC) |
| filtración | fuera de línea | visto desde 12 nov 2026 | •••••••• (en el plan SOC) |
| filtración | fuera de línea | visto desde 12 nov 2026 | •••••••• (en el plan SOC) |
| filtración | fuera de línea | visto desde 12 nov 2026 | •••••••• (en el plan SOC) |
| filtración | fuera de línea · pide captcha | visto desde 12 nov 2026 | •••••••• (en el plan SOC) |
| filtración | fuera de línea | visto desde 12 nov 2026 | •••••••• (en el plan SOC) |
| filtración | fuera de línea | visto desde 12 nov 2026 | •••••••• (en el plan SOC) |
| filtración | fuera de línea | visto desde 12 nov 2026 | •••••••• (en el plan SOC) |
Con el plan, ves la dirección de cada sitio del grupo.
Estos planes entregan el contenido bruto de inteligencia:
- las direcciones de los sitios de filtración y de negociación de los grupos;
- el nombre de las víctimas;
- el chat de negociación completo;
- las reglas YARA y el paquete de detección completo de cada grupo;
- los contactos de los criminales (correo, .onion, Tox) sin máscara.
También incluyen las alertas por webhook, Slack y Discord, el MCP para asistentes de IA y más volumen en la API. Enterprise es bajo consulta.
Ver los planesFuente: perfil público del grupo · verificado el 16 nov 2026
Notas de rescate 2
El texto que el grupo deja en las máquinas atacadas, de un acervo público de notas de rescate.
¿Tienes una nota de rescate? Compárala en "¿Qué ransomware me atacó?"
!!!READ_ME_MEDUSA!!!.txt · 4 contacto(s) enmascarado(s)
$$\ $$\ $$$$$$$$\ $$$$$$$\ $$\ $$\ $$$$$$\ $$$$$$\ $$$\ $$$ |$$ _____|$$ __$$\ $$ | $$ |$$ __$$\ $$ __$$\ $$$$\ $$$$ |$$ | $$ | $$ |$$ | $$ |$$ / \__|$$ / $$ | $$\$$\$$ $$ |$$$$$\ $$ | $$ |$$ | $$ |\$$$$$$\ $$$$$$$$ | $$ \$$$ $$ |$$ __| $$ | $$ |$$ | $$ | \____$$\ $$ __$$ | $$ |\$ /$$ |$$ | $$ | $$ |$$ | $$ |$$\ $$ |$$ | $$ | $$ | \_/ $$ |$$$$$$$$\ $$$$$$$ |\$$$$$$ |\$$$$$$ |$$ | $$ | \__| \__|\________|\_______/ \______/ \______/ \__| \__| -----------------------------[ Hello, [snip] !!! ]-------------------------- WHAT HAPPEND? ------------------------------------------------------------ 1. We have PENETRATE your network and COPIED data. * We have penetrated entire network including backup system and researched all about your data. * And we have extracted all of your networks including sub offices and your service clients networks valuable data and copied them to private cloud storage. 2. We have ENCRYPTED some your files. While you are reading this message, it means you found your files and data has been ENCRYPTED by world's strongest ransomware. We have access to all of your sub offices and client service networks but didn't lock them all for your brand and privacy. We can solve this issue sliently and smoothly without 3rd parties and we decided lock only some of your main network only. But don't worry, we can restore everything to the original without harming your business. There is only one possible way to get back your systems and business - CONTACT us via LIVE CHAT and pay for the special MEDUSA DECRYPTOR and DECRYPTION KEYs, Data deletion, Keep silent in media. This MEDUSA DECRYPTOR will restore your entire network, This will take less than 1 business day. WHAT GUARANTEES? --------------------------------------------------------------- We can post your data to the public and send emails to your customers. We have professional OSINTs and media team for leak data to telegram, facebook, twitter channels and top news websites. Have a look about us on twitter. You can suffer significant problems due disastrous consequences, leading to loss of valuable intellectual property and other sensitive information, costly incident response efforts, information misuse/abuse, loss of customer trust, brand and reputational damage, legal and regulatory issues. After paying for the data breach and decryption, we guarantee that your data will never be leaked and this is also for our reputation. YOU should be AWARE! --------------------------------------------------------------- If you're not in main chile office, inform your supervisors and stay calm! We will speak only with an authorized person. It can be the CEO, top management, etc. In case you are not such a person - DON'T CONTACT US! Your decisions and action can result in serious harm to your company! If you do not contact us within 3 days, We will start publish your case to our official blog and everybody will start notice your incident! If you do not contact us within 5 days, We will start publish your case and leak video on all social channels and send emails to your customers! --------------------[ Official blog tor address ]-------------------- Using TOR Browser([enlace] [dirección .onion] CONTACT US! ----------------------[ Your company live chat address ]--------------------------- Using TOR Browser([enlace] [dirección .onion] Or Use Tox Chat Program([enlace] Add user with our tox ID and wait 24h : [Tox ID] Our support email: ( [correo] ) Company identification hash: [snip]
!!!READ_ME_MEDUSA!!!_2.txt · 7 contacto(s) enmascarado(s)
$$\ $$\ $$$$$$$$\ $$$$$$$\ $$\ $$\ $$$$$$\ $$$$$$\ $$$\ $$$ |$$ _____|$$ __$$\ $$ | $$ |$$ __$$\ $$ __$$\ $$$$\ $$$$ |$$ | $$ | $$ |$$ | $$ |$$ / \__|$$ / $$ | $$\$$\$$ $$ |$$$$$\ $$ | $$ |$$ | $$ |\$$$$$$\ $$$$$$$$ | $$ \$$$ $$ |$$ __| $$ | $$ |$$ | $$ | \____$$\ $$ __$$ | $$ |\$ /$$ |$$ | $$ | $$ |$$ | $$ |$$\ $$ |$$ | $$ | $$ | \_/ $$ |$$$$$$$$\ $$$$$$$ |\$$$$$$ |\$$$$$$ |$$ | $$ | \__| \__|\________|\_______/ \______/ \______/ \__| \__| -----------------------------[ Hello, [snip] !!! ]-------------------------- Sorry to interrupt your busy business. WHAT HAPPEND? ------------------------------------------------------------ 1. We have PENETRATE your network and COPIED data. We have penetrated your entire network and researched all about your data. And we have copied all of your confidential data and uploaded to private storage. * You're running a highly valued business and your data was very crucial. 2. We have ENCRYPTED your files. While you are reading this message, it means your files and data has been ENCRYPTED by world's strongest ransomware. Your files have encrypted with new military-grade encryption algorithm and you can not decrypt your files. But don't worry, we can decrypt your files. There is only one possible way to get back your computers and servers, keep your privacy safe - CONTACT us via LIVE CHAT and pay for the special MEDUSA DECRYPTOR and DECRYPTION KEYs. This MEDUSA DECRYPTOR will restore your entire network within less than 1 business day. WHAT GUARANTEES? --------------------------------------------------------------- We can post all of your critial data to the public and send emails to your competitors. We have professional OSINTs and media team for leak data to telegram, facebook, twitter channels and top news websites. You can easily search about us. You can suffer significant problems due to disastrous consequences, leading to loss of valuable intellectual property and other sensitive information, costly incident response efforts, information misuse/abuse, loss of customer trust, brand and reputational damage, and legal and regulatory issues. After paying for the data breach and decryption, we guarantee that your data will never be leaked and make everything silent, this is also for our reputation. YOU should be AWARE! --------------------------------------------------------------- We will speak only with an authorized person. It can be the CEO, top management etc. In case you ar not such a person - DON'T CONTACT US! Your decisions and action can result in serious harm to your company! Inform your supervisors and stay calm! If you do not contact us within 48 hours, We will start publish your case to our official blog and everybody will start notice your incident! --------------------[ Telegram channel ]-------------------- [Telegram] --------------------[ Official blog tor address ]-------------------- Using TOR Browser([enlace] [dirección .onion] [dirección .onion] CONTACT US! ----------------------[ Your company live chat address ]--------------------------- Using TOR Browser([enlace] [dirección .onion] Backup Mirrors: [dirección .onion] --------------------[ Or Use Tox Chat Program([enlace] ]-------------------- Add user with our tox ID : [Tox ID] Our support email: ( [correo] ) Company identification hash: [snip]
Con el plan, ves los contactos de los criminales en las notas, sin máscara.
Estos planes entregan el contenido bruto de inteligencia:
- las direcciones de los sitios de filtración y de negociación de los grupos;
- el nombre de las víctimas;
- el chat de negociación completo;
- las reglas YARA y el paquete de detección completo de cada grupo;
- los contactos de los criminales (correo, .onion, Tox) sin máscara.
También incluyen las alertas por webhook, Slack y Discord, el MCP para asistentes de IA y más volumen en la API. Enterprise es bajo consulta.
Ver los planesFuente: acervo público de notas de rescate · actualizado el 12 nov 2026
Detección 25
El paquete que el equipo de seguridad usa para buscar al grupo en su propio entorno: los indicadores (IOC) y las reglas YARA, de inteligencia abierta sobre el grupo.
MD5 18
- 0067679c7033139bcbb273840494b324
- 0168a4daa9598e991e140057e59438f6
- 10911494fa52daee0279972f91fded01
- 24ccd142ff83e8622f00f5443ea5cb2d
- 4fe99e5dc101170750d8ece6ea066155
- 600371ebab1e29429f06a5b1909056e5
- 602d720f1184d2ad739568cbf6403331
- 6be23d5a1ff1e9cbe99fe7f7c49a5607
6 indicador(es) quedan solo en el paquete completo: los contactos de los criminales (correo, Tox, Session, Telegram, PGP), las direcciones .onion, los servidores FTP y las billeteras.
medusa.yar
Con el plan, descargas las reglas YARA y el paquete completo, con todos los indicadores.
Estos planes entregan el contenido bruto de inteligencia:
- las direcciones de los sitios de filtración y de negociación de los grupos;
- el nombre de las víctimas;
- el chat de negociación completo;
- las reglas YARA y el paquete de detección completo de cada grupo;
- los contactos de los criminales (correo, .onion, Tox) sin máscara.
También incluyen las alertas por webhook, Slack y Discord, el MCP para asistentes de IA y más volumen en la API. Enterprise es bajo consulta.
Ver los planesContenido de defensa: úsalo solo en entornos que tienes autorización para analizar. Fuente: inteligencia abierta sobre el grupo · actualizado el 16 nov 2026
Familias de ransomware
El grupo opera la familia cuando su sitio de filtraciones es la misma dirección que la familia lista en las fuentes; usa la familia cuando MITRE ATT&CK dice que la usa. La recuperación es la de la familia, no la de una víctima: la página de la familia muestra las versiones y las condiciones de cada herramienta.
- Medusa Ransomware · opera la familia (corroborado, confianza alta). Recuperación: No se conoce herramienta pública.Fuentes: catálogo público de familias · Vexday
Impacto y víctimas
El grupo Medusa Group tiene 27 víctimas de ransomware conocidas. Ve los sectores y países más afectados y las víctimas recientes.
Los nombres de las víctimas aparecen en los planes SOC, MSSP y Enterprise. Ver los planes
Infraestructura conocida 10
Indicadores reales (C2, dominios, URLs y hashes) asociados al malware que usa este grupo. Fuente: bases comunitarias de indicadores.
898d994607ccd834cdbddc7fb4cc8242MimiKatzbase comunitaria de indicadores97479f00486752b22b3d19feffde5fc4e23c615fMimiKatzbase comunitaria de indicadores46deeb93c5d7be110d5459abc663ab8edc4bf2d8e098e0d3e96f613205d556f9MimiKatzbase comunitaria de indicadoreshttp://92.127.156.174:8880/master.exeMimiKatzbase comunitaria de indicadoresfec27228340485485f6902f8759bbd62MimiKatzbase comunitaria de indicadores07b35a3b431e653ddcf36cecd49793d538e2aa79MimiKatzbase comunitaria de indicadoresf9d53fdcc12d548e6c9bd395642f30d2b2c6a9a4204bc0948badf8a7c571c072MimiKatzbase comunitaria de indicadoresc5ec7e2ad924e832e49fbac9d0c82719b570e080MimiKatzbase comunitaria de indicadores77c96f339974b65ae435313a8fcc3b35MimiKatzbase comunitaria de indicadores889cc3e793cb39889c7acc8e73a84973e9a08fcd69451f7b546509c74ffdda90MimiKatzbase comunitaria de indicadoresEl grupo Medusa Group usa técnicas y explota fallas reales. El Pentest Autónomo con IA de TrueHacking simula esos ataques en tu infraestructura y aporta más seguridad a tu aplicación.
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