RansomwareTargets BrazilG1051

Medusa Group

Also known as: medusa

E-mail alert on newly attributed CVEs, new victims in Brazil and verified incidents.

About the group

Medusa Group has been active since at least 2021 and was initially operated as a closed ransomware group before evolving into a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operation. Some reporting indicates that certain attacks may still be conducted directly by the ransomware’s core developers. Public sources have also referred to the group as “Spearwing” or “Medusa Actors.” Medusa Group employs living-off-the-land techniques, frequently leveraging publicly available tools and common remote management software to conduct operations. The group engages in double extortion tactics, exfiltrating data prior to encryption and threatening to publish stolen information if ransom demands are not met. For initial access, Medusa Group has exploited publicly known vulnerabilities, conducted phishing campaigns, and used credentials or access purchased from Initial Access Brokers (IABs). The group is opportunistic and has targeted a wide range of sectors globally.

Similar names and other brands

  • Not to be confused with medusalocker. Similar names, different operations: per the FBI, Medusa ransomware is unrelated to MedusaLocker. [source]

Attack chain

Plausible scenario built from the group's real techniques, ordered by the phases of an attack. Each step shows how the group typically operates.

Arsenal severity95
Impact: Critical
T1190T1047T1136.002T1548.002T1021.001T1567.002ENTRYInitial accessExploitPublic-Facing App…EXECExecutionWindows ManagementInstrumentationPERSPersistenceDomain AccountPRIVPrivilege escalationBypass UserAccount ControlLATLateral movementRemote DesktopProtocolEXFILExfiltrationExfiltration toCloud StorageIMPACTImpactData Encrypted forImpact

Illustrative chain derived from techniques documented in MITRE ATT&CK — it does not represent a specific past attack. Severity summarizes the known arsenal (kill-chain coverage, actively exploited CVEs, techniques).

Techniques (MITRE ATT&CK) 57

How the group operates, mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK matrix and organized by the phases of an attack.

Arsenal and tactics

What the group uses and how it attacks, from the group's public profile, compiled from public reporting. The CVEs in that profile are in the CVEs section, with the source next to them.

Tools

Credential theft
Mimikatz
Discovery
Advanced IP ScannerNavicatPDQ InventoryRoboCopySoftPerfect NetScan
Defense evasion
EDRSandBlastKillAVThrottleStop driver
Built-in system tools (LOLBAS)
BITSAdminProcess ExplorerPsExec
Remote access (RMM)
AnyDeskAteraHCL BigFixN-AblePDQ DeployScreenConnectSimpleHelpSplashtopeHorus
Tunneling and networking
CloudflaredFRPLigoloPuTTYRevSocks
Exfiltration
RClone

How the group attacks

  • Initial Access TA0001
    • T1078 Valid Accounts: Initial access through brute force or compromised credentials of legitimate RDP accounts.
    • T1133 External Remote Services: Accesses the victim's network via an RDP service.
    • T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has leveraged public facing vulnerabilities in their campaigns against victim organizations to gain initial access.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware January 2024)(Citation: Broadcom Medusa Ransomware Medusa Group March 2025) [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has also utilized CVE-2024-1709 in Screen
    • T1566 Phishing: Initial access through phishing email attachments.
  • Execution TA0002
    • T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation: Uses a series of Windows commands, such as bcdedit.exe and vssadmin.
    • T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Uses a series of Windows commands, such as bcdedit.exe and vssadmin.
    • T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has leveraged PowerShell for execution and defense evasion.(Citation: Check Point Medusa Ransomware April 2025)(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)(Citation: Intel471 Medusa Ransomware May 2025) [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has also utilized PowerShell to execute a bitsadmin transfer from file host
    • T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has used Windows Command Prompt to control and execute commands on the system to include ingress, network, and filesystem enumeration activities.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)
    • T1072 Software Deployment Tools: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has utilized software deployment and management solutions to deploy their encryption payload to include BigFix and PDQ Deploy.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)
    • T1106 Native API: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has leveraged Windows Native API functions to execute payloads.(Citation: Security Scorecard Medusa Ransomware January 2024)
    • T1559.001 Inter-Process Communication: Component Object Model: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has leveraged Component Object Model (COM) to bypass UAC.(Citation: Intel471 Medusa Ransomware May 2025)
    • T1569.002 System Services: Service Execution: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has utilized [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) to execute scripts and commands within victim environments.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware January 2024)(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)(Citation: Broadcom Medusa Ransomware Medusa Group March 2025) [Medusa Group](https://attack.
    • T1675 ESXi Administration Command: Medusa actors abuse ESXi administration services to force root passwords to Medusa-controlled passwords on Linux machines.
  • Persistence TA0003
    • T1112 Modify Registry: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has modified Registry keys to elevate privileges, maintain persistence and allow remote access.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)
    • T1136.002 Create Account: Domain Account: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has created a domain account within the victim environment.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)
    • T1505.003 Server Software Component: Web Shell: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has utilized webshells to an exploited Microsoft Exchange Server.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware January 2024)
    • T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has used vulnerable or signed drivers to modify security solutions on victim devices.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)
  • Privilege Escalation TA0004
    • T1484.001 Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification: Medusa actors made changes to Active Directory Default Domain Policy settings to override Group Policy settings.
    • T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has used vulnerable or signed drivers to modify security solutions on victim devices.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)
    • T1548.002 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has attempted to bypass UAC using Component Object Model (COM) interface.(Citation: Intel471 Medusa Ransomware May 2025)
  • Stealth TA0005
    • T1006 Direct Volume Access: Medusa actors use vssadmin to bypass Windows file access controls and file system monitoring tools to obtain copies of registry hives.
    • T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information: Medusa actors obfuscate a string by slicing it into pieces and referencing it via a variable.
    • T1027.002 Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has packed the code of dropped kernel drivers using the packer ASM Guard.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware January 2024)
    • T1027.010 Obfuscated Files or Information: Command Obfuscation: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has obfuscated PowerShell scripts with Base64 encoding.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025) [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has also obfuscated the code of dropped kernel drivers using a software known as Safengine Shielden which randomized the code through code mutations and then leveraged an embedde
    • T1027.013 Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File: Medusa actors use a well-known stealth technique that executes a base64 encrypted command.
    • T1070 Indicator Removal: Medusa actors delete their previous work and tools installed.
    • T1070.003 Indicator Removal: Clear Command History: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has cleared command history by running the PowerShell command `Remove-Item (Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath`.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)
    • T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has deleted previously installed tools.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)
    • T1218.014 System Binary Proxy Execution: MMC: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has leveraged Microsoft Management Console (MMC) to facilitate lateral movement and to interact locally or remotely with victim devices using the command `mmc.exe compmgmt.msc /computer:{hostname/ip}`.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)
    • T1564.003 Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has utilized the `ShowWindow` API function to hide the current window.(Citation: Security Scorecard Medusa Ransomware January 2024)
    • T1564.012 Hide Artifacts: File/Path Exclusions: Medusa actors operate in pre-existing excluded folders within Windows Defender.
  • Credential Access TA0006
    • T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has leveraged [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) to dump LSASS to harvest credentials.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)
    • T1003.003 OS Credential Dumping: NTDS: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has accessed the ntds.dit file to engage in credential dumping.(Citation: Broadcom Medusa Ransomware Medusa Group March 2025)
    • T1110 Brute Force: Uses brute force on local RDP account passwords.
    • T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Medusa actors steal credentials by copying Windows database files and using them to create forged Kerberos tickets.
  • Discovery TA0007
    • T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has obtained host network details utilizing the command `cmd.exe /c ipconfig /all`.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)
    • T1018 Remote System Discovery: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has used PDQ Inventory to get an inventory of the endpoints on the network.(Citation: Broadcom Medusa Ransomware Medusa Group March 2025)
    • T1033 System Owner/User Discovery: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has utilized [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) to execute `quser` to discover the user session information.(Citation: Broadcom Medusa Ransomware Medusa Group March 2025)
    • T1046 Network Service Discovery: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has the capability to use living off the land (LOTL) binaries to perform network enumeration.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025) [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has also utilized the publicly available scanning tool SoftPerfect Network Scanner (`netscan.exe`) to discover device hostnames and network
    • T1049 System Network Connections Discovery: Medusa actors use the command netstat -a to gather a listing of network connections.
    • T1057 Process Discovery: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has utilized a hard-coded security tool process list that identifies and terminates using an undocumented IOCTL code 0x222094.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware January 2024)
    • T1069.002 Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has utilized the `net group` command to query domain groups within the victim environment.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)
    • T1082 System Information Discovery: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has leveraged `cmd.exe` to identify system info `cmd.exe /c systeminfo`.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)
    • T1083 File and Directory Discovery: Queries specified files, folders, and file extensions.
    • T1087.001 Account Discovery: Local Account: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has leveraged `net user` for account discovery.(Citation: Broadcom Medusa Ransomware Medusa Group March 2025)
    • T1135 Network Share Discovery: Enumerates network shares.
    • T1518.001 Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has detected security solutions for termination or deletion within the victim device using hard-coded lists of strings containing security product executables.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware January 2024)
    • T1652 Device Driver Discovery: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has queried drivers on the victim device through the command `driverquery`.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)
  • Lateral Movement TA0008
    • T1021 Remote Services: Uses remote services for login and lateral movement via RDP and SMB.
    • T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has used RDP to conduct lateral movement and exfiltrate data.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025) [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has also utilized the Windows executable `mstsc.exe` for RDP activities through the command `mstsc.exe /v:{hostname/ip}`.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware Marc
    • T1072 Software Deployment Tools: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has utilized software deployment and management solutions to deploy their encryption payload to include BigFix and PDQ Deploy.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)
    • T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has utilized legitimate software services such as PDQ Deploy to transfer malicious binaries and tools to other victimized hosts within the target environment.(Citation: Broadcom Medusa Ransomware Medusa Group March 2025)
  • Exfiltration TA0010
    • T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel: Transfers data to attacker-controlled servers via an existing command-and-control (C2) channel.
    • T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltrates data using alternative protocols, such as FTP/SFTP, to avoid detection by traditional methods.
    • T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltrates data using web services like cloud services (e.g., Google Drive, Dropbox, etc.).
    • T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has utilized [Rclone](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1040) to exfiltrate data from victim environments to cloud storage.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)(Citation: Broadcom Medusa Ransomware Medusa Group March 2025)
  • Command and Control TA0011
    • T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has communicated through reverse or bind shells over port 443 (HTTPS).(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)
    • T1090.003 Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has used TOR nodes for communications.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware January 2024)(Citation: Check Point Medusa Ransomware April 2025)(Citation: Broadcom Medusa Ransomware Medusa Group March 2025)
    • T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer: Uses certutil to download malicious files.
    • T1219 Remote Access Tools: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has leveraged Remote Access Software for lateral movement and data exfiltration.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware January 2024)(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)(Citation: Broadcom Medusa Ransomware Medusa Group March 2025)(Citation: Security Scorecard Medusa Ransomware January 2024) [Medusa Gro
    • T1573.002 Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has used HTTPS for command and control.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)
  • Impact TA0040
    • T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact: Uses the AES-256 algorithm to encrypt files on the computer.
    • T1489 Service Stop: Terminates processes and services related to database servers, email servers, and backups.
    • T1490 Inhibit System Recovery: Deletes shadow copies and disables the Windows System Restore feature.
    • T1529 System Shutdown/Reboot: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has manually turned off and encrypted virtual machines.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)
    • T1657 Financial Theft: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has stolen and encrypted victims' data in order to extort victims into paying a ransom.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware January 2024)(Citation: Check Point Medusa Ransomware April 2025)(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)(Citation: Intel471 Medusa Ransomware May 2025)(Citation: Broadcom Medusa Ra
  • Resource Development TA0042
    • T1583.006 Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has utilized a file hosting service named filemail[.]com to host a zip file that contained malicious payloads that facilitated follow-on actions.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware January 2024)
    • T1585.001 Establish Accounts: Social Media Accounts: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has created social media accounts including Telegram and X to publicize their activities.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware January 2024)(Citation: Check Point Medusa Ransomware April 2025)
    • T1585.002 Establish Accounts: Email Accounts: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has created email accounts used in ransomware negotiations.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)
    • T1588.002 Obtain Capabilities: Tool: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has obtained and leveraged numerous RMM services, along with publicly available tools used for scanning.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware January 2024)(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)(Citation: Broadcom Medusa Ransomware Medusa Group March 2025) [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G
    • T1608.002 Stage Capabilities: Upload Tool: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has utilized a file hosting service called filemail[.]com to host a zip file that contained a RMM service such as ConnectWise.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware January 2024)
    • T1650 Acquire Access: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has purchased user credentials and other sensitive data from Initial Access Brokers (IABs).(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware January 2024)(Citation: Check Point Medusa Ransomware April 2025)(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)(Citation: Intel471 Medusa Ransomware May 2025)
  • Defense Impairment TA0112
    • T1112 Modify Registry: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has modified Registry keys to elevate privileges, maintain persistence and allow remote access.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)
    • T1553.002 Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has utilized vulnerable or signed drivers to kill or delete services associated with endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)
    • T1685 Disable or Modify Tools: Employs Windows Management Instrumentation (WMIC) command-line to delete shadow copies. Terminates services or processes related to antivirus/security tools. [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has terminated antivirus services utilizing the gaze.exe executable and utilizing `psexec.exe`.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware January 2024)(Citation: CISA Medu
    • T1686 Disable or Modify System Firewall: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has utilized [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) to execute batch scripts that modify firewall settings.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025) [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has also enabled and modified firewall rules to allow for RDP connections for lateral movement and device interact
    • T1688 Safe Mode Boot: Abuses Safe Mode to evade endpoint detection.
    • T1690 Prevent Command History Logging: [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has removed PowerShell command history through the use of the PSReadLine module by running the PowerShell command `Remove-Item (Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath`.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)

Source: public group profile, group profile · updated on 16 Nov 2026 · active from 11 Jan 2023 to 13 Feb 2026

Exploited vulnerabilities 7

CVEs this group is known to exploit, with the source and confidence of each next to it. Ordered by confidence and real-world severity.

The group's sites

11 known site(s): 0 online, 11 offline, 0 seized.

TypeStatusChanged onAddress
negotiation (chat)offlineseen since 12 Nov 2026•••••••• (on the SOC plan)
leak siteofflineseen since 12 Nov 2026•••••••• (on the SOC plan)
leak siteofflineseen since 12 Nov 2026•••••••• (on the SOC plan)
leak siteofflineseen since 12 Nov 2026•••••••• (on the SOC plan)
leak siteofflineseen since 12 Nov 2026•••••••• (on the SOC plan)
leak siteofflineseen since 12 Nov 2026•••••••• (on the SOC plan)
leak siteofflineseen since 12 Nov 2026•••••••• (on the SOC plan)
leak siteoffline · captchaseen since 12 Nov 2026•••••••• (on the SOC plan)
leak siteofflineseen since 12 Nov 2026•••••••• (on the SOC plan)
leak siteofflineseen since 12 Nov 2026•••••••• (on the SOC plan)
leak siteofflineseen since 12 Nov 2026•••••••• (on the SOC plan)
Available on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans

With the plan, you see the address of each of the group's sites.

These plans deliver the raw intelligence:

  • the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
  • the victims' names;
  • the full negotiation chat;
  • each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
  • the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.

They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.

See the plans

Source: public group profile · checked on 16 Nov 2026

Ransom notes 2

The text the group leaves on attacked machines, from a public ransom-note collection.

Have a ransom note? Compare it in "Which ransomware hit me?"

!!!READ_ME_MEDUSA!!!.txt · 4 contact(s) masked
$$\ $$\ $$$$$$$$\ $$$$$$$\ $$\ $$\ $$$$$$\ $$$$$$\ 
$$$\ $$$ |$$ _____|$$ __$$\ $$ | $$ |$$ __$$\ $$ __$$\ 
$$$$\ $$$$ |$$ | $$ | $$ |$$ | $$ |$$ / \__|$$ / $$ |
$$\$$\$$ $$ |$$$$$\ $$ | $$ |$$ | $$ |\$$$$$$\ $$$$$$$$ |
$$ \$$$ $$ |$$ __| $$ | $$ |$$ | $$ | \____$$\ $$ __$$ |
$$ |\$ /$$ |$$ | $$ | $$ |$$ | $$ |$$\ $$ |$$ | $$ |
$$ | \_/ $$ |$$$$$$$$\ $$$$$$$ |\$$$$$$ |\$$$$$$ |$$ | $$ |
\__| \__|\________|\_______/ \______/ \______/ \__| \__|
-----------------------------[ Hello, [snip] !!! ]--------------------------

WHAT HAPPEND?
------------------------------------------------------------
1. We have PENETRATE your network and COPIED data.
* We have penetrated entire network including backup system and researched all about your data.
* And we have extracted all of your networks including sub offices and your service clients networks valuable data and copied them to private cloud storage.

2. We have ENCRYPTED some your files.
While you are reading this message, it means you found your files and data has been ENCRYPTED by world's strongest ransomware.
We have access to all of your sub offices and client service networks but didn't lock them all for your brand and privacy.
We can solve this issue sliently and smoothly without 3rd parties and we decided lock only some of your main network only.
But don't worry, we can restore everything to the original without harming your business.

There is only one possible way to get back your systems and business - CONTACT us via LIVE CHAT and pay for the special 
MEDUSA DECRYPTOR and DECRYPTION KEYs, Data deletion, Keep silent in media.
This MEDUSA DECRYPTOR will restore your entire network, This will take less than 1 business day.


WHAT GUARANTEES?
---------------------------------------------------------------
We can post your data to the public and send emails to your customers.
We have professional OSINTs and media team for leak data to telegram, facebook, twitter channels and top news websites. Have a look about us on twitter.

You can suffer significant problems due disastrous consequences, leading to loss of valuable intellectual property and other sensitive information, 
 costly incident response efforts, information misuse/abuse, loss of customer trust, brand and reputational damage, legal and regulatory issues.
After paying for the data breach and decryption, we guarantee that your data will never be leaked and this is also for our reputation.

YOU should be AWARE!
---------------------------------------------------------------
If you're not in main chile office, inform your supervisors and stay calm!
We will speak only with an authorized person. It can be the CEO, top management, etc.
In case you are not such a person - DON'T CONTACT US! Your decisions and action can result in serious harm to your company!


If you do not contact us within 3 days, We will start publish your case to our official blog and everybody will start notice your incident!
If you do not contact us within 5 days, We will start publish your case and leak video on all social channels and send emails to your customers!
--------------------[ Official blog tor address ]--------------------
Using TOR Browser([link]

[.onion address]


CONTACT US!
----------------------[ Your company live chat address ]---------------------------
Using TOR Browser([link]

[.onion address]

Or Use Tox Chat Program([link]
Add user with our tox ID and wait 24h : [Tox ID]

Our support email: ( [email] )

Company identification hash:
[snip]
!!!READ_ME_MEDUSA!!!_2.txt · 7 contact(s) masked
$$\ $$\ $$$$$$$$\ $$$$$$$\ $$\ $$\ $$$$$$\ $$$$$$\ 
$$$\ $$$ |$$ _____|$$ __$$\ $$ | $$ |$$ __$$\ $$ __$$\ 
$$$$\ $$$$ |$$ | $$ | $$ |$$ | $$ |$$ / \__|$$ / $$ |
$$\$$\$$ $$ |$$$$$\ $$ | $$ |$$ | $$ |\$$$$$$\ $$$$$$$$ |
$$ \$$$ $$ |$$ __| $$ | $$ |$$ | $$ | \____$$\ $$ __$$ |
$$ |\$ /$$ |$$ | $$ | $$ |$$ | $$ |$$\ $$ |$$ | $$ |
$$ | \_/ $$ |$$$$$$$$\ $$$$$$$ |\$$$$$$ |\$$$$$$ |$$ | $$ |
\__| \__|\________|\_______/ \______/ \______/ \__| \__|
-----------------------------[ Hello, [snip] !!! ]--------------------------

Sorry to interrupt your busy business.

WHAT HAPPEND?
------------------------------------------------------------
1. We have PENETRATE your network and COPIED data.
We have penetrated your entire network and researched all about your data.
And we have copied all of your confidential data and uploaded to private storage.
* You're running a highly valued business and your data was very crucial.

2. We have ENCRYPTED your files.
While you are reading this message, it means your files and data has been ENCRYPTED by world's strongest ransomware.
Your files have encrypted with new military-grade encryption algorithm and you can not decrypt your files.
But don't worry, we can decrypt your files.

There is only one possible way to get back your computers and servers, keep your privacy safe - CONTACT us via LIVE CHAT and pay for the special 
MEDUSA DECRYPTOR and DECRYPTION KEYs.
This MEDUSA DECRYPTOR will restore your entire network within less than 1 business day.


WHAT GUARANTEES?
---------------------------------------------------------------
We can post all of your critial data to the public and send emails to your competitors.
We have professional OSINTs and media team for leak data to telegram, facebook, twitter channels and top news websites. You can easily search about us.
You can suffer significant problems due to disastrous consequences, leading to loss of valuable intellectual property and other sensitive information, 
 costly incident response efforts, information misuse/abuse, loss of customer trust, brand and reputational damage, and legal and regulatory issues.

After paying for the data breach and decryption, we guarantee that your data will never be leaked and make everything silent, this is also for our reputation.

YOU should be AWARE!
---------------------------------------------------------------
We will speak only with an authorized person. It can be the CEO, top management etc.
In case you ar not such a person - DON'T CONTACT US! Your decisions and action can result in serious harm to your company!
Inform your supervisors and stay calm!


If you do not contact us within 48 hours, We will start publish your case to our official blog and everybody will start notice your incident!
--------------------[ Telegram channel ]--------------------

[Telegram]


--------------------[ Official blog tor address ]--------------------
Using TOR Browser([link]

[.onion address]
[.onion address]


CONTACT US!
----------------------[ Your company live chat address ]---------------------------
Using TOR Browser([link]

[.onion address]

Backup Mirrors:
[.onion address]

--------------------[ Or Use Tox Chat Program([link] ]--------------------
Add user with our tox ID : [Tox ID]

Our support email: ( [email] )

Company identification hash:
[snip]
Available on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans

With the plan, you see the criminals' contacts in the notes, unmasked.

These plans deliver the raw intelligence:

  • the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
  • the victims' names;
  • the full negotiation chat;
  • each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
  • the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.

They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.

See the plans

Source: public ransom-note collection · updated on 12 Nov 2026

Detection 25

The package a security team uses to hunt for the group in its own environment: the indicators (IOCs) and the YARA rules, from open intelligence on the group.

Indicators (IOCs)
MD5 18
  • 0067679c7033139bcbb273840494b324
  • 0168a4daa9598e991e140057e59438f6
  • 10911494fa52daee0279972f91fded01
  • 24ccd142ff83e8622f00f5443ea5cb2d
  • 4fe99e5dc101170750d8ece6ea066155
  • 600371ebab1e29429f06a5b1909056e5
  • 602d720f1184d2ad739568cbf6403331
  • 6be23d5a1ff1e9cbe99fe7f7c49a5607

and 10 more: see them all in the IOC search

6 indicator(s) are only in the full package: the criminals' contacts (email, Tox, Session, Telegram, PGP), .onion addresses, FTP servers and wallets.

YARA rules 1 rule(s)

medusa.yar

Available on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans

With the plan, you download the YARA rules and the full package, with every indicator.

These plans deliver the raw intelligence:

  • the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
  • the victims' names;
  • the full negotiation chat;
  • each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
  • the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.

They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.

See the plans

Defensive content: use it only in environments you are authorized to analyze. Source: open intelligence on the group · updated on 16 Nov 2026

Ransomware families

The group operates the family when its leak site is the same address the family lists in the sources; it uses the family when MITRE ATT&CK says so. Recovery refers to the family, not to any victim: the family page shows the versions and conditions of each tool.

  • Medusa Ransomware · operates the family (corroborated, high confidence). Recovery: No known public tool.Sources: public malware catalogue · Vexday

Impact and victims

The group Medusa Group has 27 known ransomware victims. See the most affected sectors and countries and recent victims.

27known victims
11in Brazil
8sectors hit
Most attacked sectors
Professional Services7
Technology4
Financial Services3
Healthcare3
Retail & E-Commerce2
Agriculture and Food Production2
Transportation1
Education1
Most affected countries
🇧🇷 Brazil11
🇨🇱 Chile4
🇦🇷 Argentina4
🇲🇽 Mexico2
🇵🇪 Peru2
🇻🇪 Venezuela1
🇧🇴 Bolivia1
🇨🇴 Colombia1
Recent victims
Name on the SOC planEducation · BR · 2025-11-24
Name on the SOC planProfessional Services · BR · 2025-11-24
Name on the SOC planEnergy & Utilities · BR · 2025-10-12
Name on the SOC planRetail & E-Commerce · BR · 2025-08-17
Name on the SOC planHealthcare · AR · 2025-01-24
Name on the SOC planProfessional Services · CL · 2024-12-10
Name on the SOC planProfessional Services · BR · 2024-11-07
Name on the SOC planGovernment & Defense · PE · 2024-10-11
Name on the SOC planTechnology · BR · 2024-09-05
Name on the SOC planProfessional Services · BR · 2024-07-24
Name on the SOC planFinancial Services · BR · 2024-07-15
Name on the SOC planTechnology · BR · 2024-07-08
Name on the SOC planProfessional Services · PE · 2024-06-18
Name on the SOC planAgriculture and Food Production · MX · 2024-02-17
Name on the SOC planProfessional Services · VE · 2024-02-02

Victims' names show on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans. See the plans

Known infrastructure 10

Real indicators (C2, domains, URLs and hashes) associated with the malware this group uses. Source: community indicator feeds.

md5_hash898d994607ccd834cdbddc7fb4cc8242MimiKatzcommunity indicator feed
sha1_hash97479f00486752b22b3d19feffde5fc4e23c615fMimiKatzcommunity indicator feed
sha256_hash46deeb93c5d7be110d5459abc663ab8edc4bf2d8e098e0d3e96f613205d556f9MimiKatzcommunity indicator feed
urlhttp://92.127.156.174:8880/master.exeMimiKatzcommunity indicator feed
md5_hashfec27228340485485f6902f8759bbd62MimiKatzcommunity indicator feed
sha1_hash07b35a3b431e653ddcf36cecd49793d538e2aa79MimiKatzcommunity indicator feed
sha256_hashf9d53fdcc12d548e6c9bd395642f30d2b2c6a9a4204bc0948badf8a7c571c072MimiKatzcommunity indicator feed
sha1_hashc5ec7e2ad924e832e49fbac9d0c82719b570e080MimiKatzcommunity indicator feed
md5_hash77c96f339974b65ae435313a8fcc3b35MimiKatzcommunity indicator feed
sha256_hash889cc3e793cb39889c7acc8e73a84973e9a08fcd69451f7b546509c74ffdda90MimiKatzcommunity indicator feed

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