VOID MANTICORE
También conocido como: BANISHED KITTEN, COBALT MYSTIQUE, Handala Hack, Homeland Justice, Karma, Karmabelow80 y 2 más
Aviso por correo de CVE nueva atribuida, víctima nueva en Brasil e incidente verificado.
Sobre el grupo
VOID MANTICORE is a threat group assessed to operate on behalf of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). Active since at least mid-2022, VOID MANTICORE has targeted government entities, critical infrastructure, and private sector organizations across Albania, Israel, and the United States. VOID MANTICORE conducts destructive cyber operations, combining wiper attacks with hack-and-leak campaigns. The group has operated under multiple public-facing personas, including HomeLand Justice in operations against Albania, Karma and Karma Below in campaigns targeting Israeli organizations, and Handala Hack, its current primary persona, which has claimed activity against Israeli and U.S. entities, including a March 2026 attack against Stryker Corporation. VOID MANTICORE has been observed collaborating with Scarred Manticore, which has been linked to initial access operations preceding VOID MANTICORE’s activity.
Nombres parecidos y otras marcas
Cadena de ataque
Escenario plausible montado a partir de las técnicas reales del grupo, ordenadas por las fases de un ataque. Cada etapa muestra cómo suele actuar el grupo.
Cadena ilustrativa derivada de las técnicas documentadas en MITRE ATT&CK — no representa un ataque específico ya ocurrido. La severidad resume el arsenal conocido (cobertura de la cadena, CVEs en explotación activa, técnicas).
Técnicas (MITRE ATT&CK) 63
Cómo opera el grupo, mapeado por la matriz MITRE ATT&CK y organizado por las fases de un ataque.
Arsenal y tácticas
Lo que el grupo usa y cómo ataca, según el perfil público del grupo, compilado a partir de informes públicos. Las CVE de ese perfil están en la sección de CVE, con la fuente al lado.
Cómo ataca el grupo
El detalle de cada técnica es el texto de la fuente, en inglés.
- Initial Access TA0001
- T1078 Valid Accounts: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has leveraged valid accounts to log into VPN infrastructure.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026) [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has used compromised valid credentials to gain access to management infrastructure and enterprise control systems.(Citation: Domain Tools Handala Hack Karma Homeland
- T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has used previously compromised Domain Administrator credentials to maintain persistent access.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has leveraged privileged cloud accounts to access cloud-based management consoles to include Microsoft Intune.(Citation: Palo Alto VOID MANTICORE Iran Cyber Threats March 2026) [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has also compromised existing accounts within the Microsoft Entra ID environment.(Citation: SEC 8-K Stryker Cor
- T1133 External Remote Services: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has leveraged public facing VPN infrastructure to gain initial access to victim environments.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has exploited public facing vulnerabilities within victim environments to include SharePoint CVE-2019-0604.(Citation: DOJ FBI Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1199 Trusted Relationship: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has targeted IT and service providers in an effort to obtain credentials, relying largely on compromised VPN accounts for initial access.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1566 Phishing: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has emailed victims threatening messages.(Citation: DOJ FBI Handala Hack March 2026) [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has used phishing as an initial access vector.(Citation: Domain Tools Handala Hack Karma Homeland Justice MOIS April 2026)
- Execution TA0002
- T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has utilized WMIC to log into the victim host and create a process `process call create “cmd.exe /c copy \\?\\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\windows\system32\config\system c:\users\public”`.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has utilized PowerShell to execute malware in victim environments.(Citation: DOJ FBI Handala Hack March 2026)(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1059.006 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has utilized Python scripts to execute its malicious payloads.(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1072 Software Deployment Tools: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has leveraged legitimate built-in features of cloud-based management platforms to include mobile device management (MDM) and Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) solutions.(Citation: SPECOPS Outpost24 Handala Hack Stryker March 2026)(Citation: Palo Alto VOID MANTICORE Iran Cyber Threats March 2026) [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/
- T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has delivered malicious payloads that initiate through user execution to include interaction with a masqueraded file.(Citation: DOJ FBI Handala Hack March 2026)(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026) [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has used trojanized application lures to induce targets into ex
- T1651 Cloud Administration Command: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has abused built-in remote wipe or factory reset commands to wipe devices managed within an organization’s Cloud management solution impacting laptops, servers, and mobile devices.(Citation: Palo Alto VOID MANTICORE Iran Cyber Threats March 2026)
- Persistence TA0003
- T1078 Valid Accounts: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has leveraged valid accounts to log into VPN infrastructure.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026) [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has used compromised valid credentials to gain access to management infrastructure and enterprise control systems.(Citation: Domain Tools Handala Hack Karma Homeland
- T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has used previously compromised Domain Administrator credentials to maintain persistent access.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has leveraged privileged cloud accounts to access cloud-based management consoles to include Microsoft Intune.(Citation: Palo Alto VOID MANTICORE Iran Cyber Threats March 2026) [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has also compromised existing accounts within the Microsoft Entra ID environment.(Citation: SEC 8-K Stryker Cor
- T1098 Account Manipulation: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has leveraged access to administrative control systems to achieve disruptive effects, consistent with administrative account abuse or privilege escalation within existing access.(Citation: Domain Tools Handala Hack Karma Homeland Justice MOIS April 2026)(Citation: SEC 8K Palo Alto Statement Stryker Corp Handala March 2026)
- T1133 External Remote Services: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has leveraged public facing VPN infrastructure to gain initial access to victim environments.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has created Windows Registry entries to autorun stage two malware payloads to maintain persistence.(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- Privilege Escalation TA0004
- T1078 Valid Accounts: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has leveraged valid accounts to log into VPN infrastructure.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026) [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has used compromised valid credentials to gain access to management infrastructure and enterprise control systems.(Citation: Domain Tools Handala Hack Karma Homeland
- T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has used previously compromised Domain Administrator credentials to maintain persistent access.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has leveraged privileged cloud accounts to access cloud-based management consoles to include Microsoft Intune.(Citation: Palo Alto VOID MANTICORE Iran Cyber Threats March 2026) [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has also compromised existing accounts within the Microsoft Entra ID environment.(Citation: SEC 8-K Stryker Cor
- T1098 Account Manipulation: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has leveraged access to administrative control systems to achieve disruptive effects, consistent with administrative account abuse or privilege escalation within existing access.(Citation: Domain Tools Handala Hack Karma Homeland Justice MOIS April 2026)(Citation: SEC 8K Palo Alto Statement Stryker Corp Handala March 2026)
- T1484.001 Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) had utilized Group Policy logon scripts to distribute the malicious payloads to victim devices through the execution of a batch file.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has created Windows Registry entries to autorun stage two malware payloads to maintain persistence.(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- Stealth TA0005
- T1027.015 Obfuscated Files or Information: Compression: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has compressed their payloads by leveraging zip files.(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1036.004 Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has masqueraded as commonly used programs and services on Windows hosts.(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has masqueraded malicious payloads to resemble legitimate applications.(Citation: DOJ FBI Handala Hack March 2026)(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026) [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has leveraged malicious payloads that use nomenclature associated with common applications that include Picto
- T1078 Valid Accounts: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has leveraged valid accounts to log into VPN infrastructure.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026) [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has used compromised valid credentials to gain access to management infrastructure and enterprise control systems.(Citation: Domain Tools Handala Hack Karma Homeland
- T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has used previously compromised Domain Administrator credentials to maintain persistent access.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has leveraged privileged cloud accounts to access cloud-based management consoles to include Microsoft Intune.(Citation: Palo Alto VOID MANTICORE Iran Cyber Threats March 2026) [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has also compromised existing accounts within the Microsoft Entra ID environment.(Citation: SEC 8-K Stryker Cor
- T1564.003 Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has utilized PowerShell scripts that run without notifying the user of its execution to include `-nop -w hidden- ep bypass -enc`.(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1679 Selective Exclusion: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has avoided interacting with specific directories in order to reduce the likelihood of detection.(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1684.001 Social Engineering: Impersonation: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has impersonated individuals familiar to the victim and technical support associated with social messaging services.(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- Credential Access TA0006
- T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has dumped LSASS credentials using `comsvcs.dll` via `rundll32.exe`.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1110 Brute Force: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has conducted brute-force attempts against organizational VPN infrastructure.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1110.001 Brute Force: Password Guessing: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has conducted password guessing to gain initial access.(Citation: Domain Tools Handala Hack Karma Homeland Justice MOIS April 2026)
- T1110.004 Brute Force: Credential Stuffing: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has utilized credential stuffing attacks to obtain initial access to victim environments.(Citation: Domain Tools Handala Hack Karma Homeland Justice MOIS April 2026)
- T1552.002 Unsecured Credentials: Credentials in Registry: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) had exported credentials from registry hives to include those stored in HKLM.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- Discovery TA0007
- T1082 System Information Discovery: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has gathered system information and disseminated it back to C2.(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1087.002 Account Discovery: Domain Account: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has utilized ADRecon to enumerate the active directory environment.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- Lateral Movement TA0008
- T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has used RDP to move laterally within the victim environment.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1072 Software Deployment Tools: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has leveraged legitimate built-in features of cloud-based management platforms to include mobile device management (MDM) and Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) solutions.(Citation: SPECOPS Outpost24 Handala Hack Stryker March 2026)(Citation: Palo Alto VOID MANTICORE Iran Cyber Threats March 2026) [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/
- Collection TA0009
- T1005 Data from Local System: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has collected cached data and files from within the victim environment.(Citation: SPECOPS Outpost24 Handala Hack Stryker March 2026)(Citation: DOJ FBI Handala Hack March 2026)(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1074 Data Staged: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has staged compressed files in specified locations prior to exfiltration over C2.(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1113 Screen Capture: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has captured screen content during an active Zoom session.(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1114.002 Email Collection: Remote Email Collection: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has gathered victim email-content from victim servers.(Citation: DOJ FBI Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1119 Automated Collection: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) conducted large-scale data exfiltration in the Stryker operation, consistent with automated or scripted collection against enterprise systems.(Citation: Domain Tools Handala Hack Karma Homeland Justice MOIS April 2026)
- T1123 Audio Capture: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has gathered audio during a Zoom session.(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1125 Video Capture: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has collected video from compromised victim devices.(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1213.002 Data from Information Repositories: Sharepoint: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has accessed victim’s public facing SharePoint servers and exfiltrated data.(Citation: DOJ FBI Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1560.001 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has stored collected data in a password protected compressed file prior to exfiltration.(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- Exfiltration TA0010
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) malware has exfiltrated collected data via Telegram bot C2 channels using encrypted communications.(Citation: Domain Tools Handala Hack Karma Homeland Justice MOIS April 2026)
- Command and Control TA0011
- T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has utilized HTTPS for communication to C2 domains.(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1102 Web Service: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has utilized Telegram API for C2.(Citation: DOJ FBI Handala Hack March 2026)(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has deployed additional payloads from dedicated C2 servers.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)(Citation: DOJ FBI Handala Hack March 2026)(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026) [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has also downloaded legitimate tools and software from publ
- T1219.002 Remote Access Tools: Remote Desktop Software: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has installed NetBird on victim devices to create a mesh network that facilitated control of several victim devices at once.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1572 Protocol Tunneling: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has used tunneling tools to facilitate destructive attacks on compromised devices.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- Impact TA0040
- T1485 Data Destruction: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has conducted data wiping attacks on compromised systems.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)(Citation: SPECOPS Outpost24 Handala Hack Stryker March 2026)(Citation: DOJ FBI Handala Hack March 2026)(Citation: Palo Alto VOID MANTICORE Iran Cyber Threats March 2026) [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055
- T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has utilized legitimate disk encryption utilities to increase likelihood of encrypting system drives and reduce system recovery efforts.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)(Citation: DOJ FBI Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1490 Inhibit System Recovery: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has deleted virtual machines directly from the virtualization platform.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1561.001 Disk Wipe: Disk Content Wipe: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has utilized a disk wiping utility to facilitate destructive actions on victim servers.(Citation: DOJ FBI Handala Hack March 2026) [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has also utilized legitimate remote disk wiping commands.(Citation: SPECOPS Outpost24 Handala Hack Stryker March 2026)
- T1561.002 Disk Wipe: Disk Structure Wipe: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has deployed custom wipers that overwrite system files and the host devices master boot records (MBR) to corrupt or destroy files.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1657 Financial Theft: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has conducted data exfiltration and posted stolen information on data leak sites for the purposes of financial and political extortion.(Citation: SPECOPS Outpost24 Handala Hack Stryker March 2026)(Citation: DOJ FBI Handala Hack March 2026) [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has also sold stolen data to prospective buyers
- Resource Development TA0042
- T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has registered domains for messaging purposes.(Citation: SPECOPS Outpost24 Handala Hack Stryker March 2026) [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has created typosquatted domains and sub-domains in attempts to avoid detection or draw suspicion.(Citation: DOJ FBI Handala Hack March 2026)(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE
- T1583.003 Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has utilized VPS solutions for C2.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1583.004 Acquire Infrastructure: Server: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has leveraged backend servers within Iran.(Citation: DOJ FBI Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1583.006 Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has obtained access to commercial VPN services to launch malicious activity.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)(Citation: SPECOPS Outpost24 Handala Hack Stryker March 2026) [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has also leveraged Starlink internet services.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Hand
- T1585.001 Establish Accounts: Social Media Accounts: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has created Telegram Accounts.(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026) [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has also leveraged online personas such as Handala Hack, Karma, and Homeland Justice on social media to include Telegram.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)(Citation:
- T1585.002 Establish Accounts: Email Accounts: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has created email accounts to send threatening messages to victims to include ‘Handala_Team[@]outlook[.]com’.(Citation: DOJ FBI Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1587.001 Develop Capabilities: Malware: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has utilized custom-malware and wipers to include BiBi Wiper.(Citation: DOJ FBI Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1588.001 Obtain Capabilities: Malware: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has developed or obtained trojanized applications used for persistent surveillance of targeted individuals.(Citation: Domain Tools Handala Hack Karma Homeland Justice MOIS April 2026)
- T1588.002 Obtain Capabilities: Tool: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has obtained and utilized commercial VPN services, open-source software and publicly available offensive security tools to facilitate malicious activities.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- Reconnaissance TA0043
- T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has gathered details on their intended victims to aid in social engineering efforts for leveraging tailored themes of attacks.(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1595.002 Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has scanned victim environments for susceptibility to vulnerability exploitation.(Citation: DOJ FBI Handala Hack March 2026)
- Defense Impairment TA0112
- T1484.001 Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) had utilized Group Policy logon scripts to distribute the malicious payloads to victim devices through the execution of a batch file.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1686.003 Disable or Modify System Firewall: Windows Host Firewall: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has disabled Windows Defender protections to allow for follow-on activities within the compromised host.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
Fuente: perfil público del grupo, perfil del grupo · actualizado el 16 nov 2026 · actividad de 05 abr 2024 a 07 abr 2026
Vulnerabilidades explotadas 3
CVE que este grupo es conocido por explotar, con la fuente y la confianza de cada una al lado. Ordenadas por la confianza y la gravedad real.
Sitios del grupo
5 sitio(s) conocido(s): 2 en línea, 2 fuera de línea, 1 incautado(s).
1 sitio(s) del grupo figura(n) como incautado(s) por la policía.
| Tipo | Estado | Cambió el | Dirección |
|---|---|---|---|
| filtración | incautado | visto desde 12 nov 2026 | •••••••• (en el plan SOC) |
| filtración | en línea · pide captcha | visto desde 12 nov 2026 | •••••••• (en el plan SOC) |
| filtración | en línea · pide captcha | visto desde 12 nov 2026 | •••••••• (en el plan SOC) |
| filtración | fuera de línea | visto desde 12 nov 2026 | •••••••• (en el plan SOC) |
| filtración | fuera de línea | visto desde 12 nov 2026 | •••••••• (en el plan SOC) |
Con el plan, ves la dirección de cada sitio del grupo.
Estos planes entregan el contenido bruto de inteligencia:
- las direcciones de los sitios de filtración y de negociación de los grupos;
- el nombre de las víctimas;
- el chat de negociación completo;
- las reglas YARA y el paquete de detección completo de cada grupo;
- los contactos de los criminales (correo, .onion, Tox) sin máscara.
También incluyen las alertas por webhook, Slack y Discord, el MCP para asistentes de IA y más volumen en la API. Enterprise es bajo consulta.
Ver los planesFuente: perfil público del grupo · verificado el 16 nov 2026
Detección 1
El paquete que el equipo de seguridad usa para buscar al grupo en su propio entorno: los indicadores (IOC) y las reglas YARA, de inteligencia abierta sobre el grupo.
handala.yar
Con el plan, descargas las reglas YARA y el paquete completo, con todos los indicadores.
Estos planes entregan el contenido bruto de inteligencia:
- las direcciones de los sitios de filtración y de negociación de los grupos;
- el nombre de las víctimas;
- el chat de negociación completo;
- las reglas YARA y el paquete de detección completo de cada grupo;
- los contactos de los criminales (correo, .onion, Tox) sin máscara.
También incluyen las alertas por webhook, Slack y Discord, el MCP para asistentes de IA y más volumen en la API. Enterprise es bajo consulta.
Ver los planesContenido de defensa: úsalo solo en entornos que tienes autorización para analizar. Fuente: inteligencia abierta sobre el grupo · actualizado el 16 nov 2026
Familias de ransomware
El grupo opera la familia cuando su sitio de filtraciones es la misma dirección que la familia lista en las fuentes; usa la familia cuando MITRE ATT&CK dice que la usa. La recuperación es la de la familia, no la de una víctima: la página de la familia muestra las versiones y las condiciones de cada herramienta.
- handala · opera la familia (corroborado, confianza alta). Recuperación: No se conoce herramienta pública.Fuentes: catálogo público de familias · Vexday
Impacto y víctimas
El grupo VOID MANTICORE tiene 2 víctimas de ransomware conocidas. Ve los sectores y países más afectados y las víctimas recientes.
Los nombres de las víctimas aparecen en los planes SOC, MSSP y Enterprise. Ver los planes
Referencias
El grupo VOID MANTICORE usa técnicas y explota fallas reales. El Pentest Autónomo con IA de TrueHacking simula esos ataques en tu infraestructura y aporta más seguridad a tu aplicación.
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