VOID MANTICORE
Também conhecido como: BANISHED KITTEN, COBALT MYSTIQUE, Handala Hack, Homeland Justice, Karma, Karmabelow80 e mais 2
Aviso por e-mail de CVE nova atribuída, vítima nova no Brasil e incidente verificado.
Análise Vexday
VOID MANTICORE é um grupo de ameaça persistente avançada (APT) de origem iraniana, avaliado como operando em nome do Ministério de Inteligência e Segurança do Irã (MOIS), ativo pelo menos desde meados de 2022. O grupo tem como alvos entidades governamentais, infraestrutura crítica e organizações do setor privado na Albânia, em Israel e nos Estados Unidos, conduzindo operações cibernéticas destrutivas que combinam ataques com wipers e campanhas de hack-and-leak. Para essas operações, o VOID MANTICORE adota múltiplas personas públicas, entre elas HomeLand Justice — utilizada em ações contra a Albânia — e Karma e Karma Below — empregadas em campanhas direcionadas a organizações israelenses. Catalogado no MITRE ATT&CK como G1055, o grupo acumula 63 técnicas documentadas e é associado à exploração de 3 CVEs.
Nomes parecidos e outras marcas
Cadeia de ataque
Cenário plausível montado a partir das técnicas reais do grupo, ordenadas pelas fases de um ataque. Cada etapa mostra como o grupo costuma agir.
Cadeia ilustrativa derivada das técnicas documentadas no MITRE ATT&CK — não representa um ataque específico já ocorrido. A severidade resume o arsenal conhecido (cobertura da cadeia, CVEs em exploração ativa, técnicas).
Técnicas (MITRE ATT&CK) 63
Como o grupo opera, mapeado pela matriz MITRE ATT&CK e organizado pelas fases de um ataque.
Arsenal e táticas
O que o grupo usa e como ataca, pelo perfil público do grupo, compilado a partir de relatórios públicos. As CVEs desse perfil estão na seção de CVEs, com a fonte ao lado.
Como o grupo ataca
O detalhe de cada técnica é o texto da fonte, em inglês.
- Initial Access TA0001
- T1078 Valid Accounts: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has leveraged valid accounts to log into VPN infrastructure.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026) [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has used compromised valid credentials to gain access to management infrastructure and enterprise control systems.(Citation: Domain Tools Handala Hack Karma Homeland
- T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has used previously compromised Domain Administrator credentials to maintain persistent access.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has leveraged privileged cloud accounts to access cloud-based management consoles to include Microsoft Intune.(Citation: Palo Alto VOID MANTICORE Iran Cyber Threats March 2026) [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has also compromised existing accounts within the Microsoft Entra ID environment.(Citation: SEC 8-K Stryker Cor
- T1133 External Remote Services: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has leveraged public facing VPN infrastructure to gain initial access to victim environments.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has exploited public facing vulnerabilities within victim environments to include SharePoint CVE-2019-0604.(Citation: DOJ FBI Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1199 Trusted Relationship: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has targeted IT and service providers in an effort to obtain credentials, relying largely on compromised VPN accounts for initial access.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1566 Phishing: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has emailed victims threatening messages.(Citation: DOJ FBI Handala Hack March 2026) [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has used phishing as an initial access vector.(Citation: Domain Tools Handala Hack Karma Homeland Justice MOIS April 2026)
- Execution TA0002
- T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has utilized WMIC to log into the victim host and create a process `process call create “cmd.exe /c copy \\?\\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\windows\system32\config\system c:\users\public”`.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has utilized PowerShell to execute malware in victim environments.(Citation: DOJ FBI Handala Hack March 2026)(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1059.006 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has utilized Python scripts to execute its malicious payloads.(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1072 Software Deployment Tools: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has leveraged legitimate built-in features of cloud-based management platforms to include mobile device management (MDM) and Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) solutions.(Citation: SPECOPS Outpost24 Handala Hack Stryker March 2026)(Citation: Palo Alto VOID MANTICORE Iran Cyber Threats March 2026) [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/
- T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has delivered malicious payloads that initiate through user execution to include interaction with a masqueraded file.(Citation: DOJ FBI Handala Hack March 2026)(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026) [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has used trojanized application lures to induce targets into ex
- T1651 Cloud Administration Command: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has abused built-in remote wipe or factory reset commands to wipe devices managed within an organization’s Cloud management solution impacting laptops, servers, and mobile devices.(Citation: Palo Alto VOID MANTICORE Iran Cyber Threats March 2026)
- Persistence TA0003
- T1078 Valid Accounts: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has leveraged valid accounts to log into VPN infrastructure.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026) [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has used compromised valid credentials to gain access to management infrastructure and enterprise control systems.(Citation: Domain Tools Handala Hack Karma Homeland
- T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has used previously compromised Domain Administrator credentials to maintain persistent access.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has leveraged privileged cloud accounts to access cloud-based management consoles to include Microsoft Intune.(Citation: Palo Alto VOID MANTICORE Iran Cyber Threats March 2026) [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has also compromised existing accounts within the Microsoft Entra ID environment.(Citation: SEC 8-K Stryker Cor
- T1098 Account Manipulation: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has leveraged access to administrative control systems to achieve disruptive effects, consistent with administrative account abuse or privilege escalation within existing access.(Citation: Domain Tools Handala Hack Karma Homeland Justice MOIS April 2026)(Citation: SEC 8K Palo Alto Statement Stryker Corp Handala March 2026)
- T1133 External Remote Services: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has leveraged public facing VPN infrastructure to gain initial access to victim environments.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has created Windows Registry entries to autorun stage two malware payloads to maintain persistence.(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- Privilege Escalation TA0004
- T1078 Valid Accounts: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has leveraged valid accounts to log into VPN infrastructure.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026) [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has used compromised valid credentials to gain access to management infrastructure and enterprise control systems.(Citation: Domain Tools Handala Hack Karma Homeland
- T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has used previously compromised Domain Administrator credentials to maintain persistent access.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has leveraged privileged cloud accounts to access cloud-based management consoles to include Microsoft Intune.(Citation: Palo Alto VOID MANTICORE Iran Cyber Threats March 2026) [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has also compromised existing accounts within the Microsoft Entra ID environment.(Citation: SEC 8-K Stryker Cor
- T1098 Account Manipulation: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has leveraged access to administrative control systems to achieve disruptive effects, consistent with administrative account abuse or privilege escalation within existing access.(Citation: Domain Tools Handala Hack Karma Homeland Justice MOIS April 2026)(Citation: SEC 8K Palo Alto Statement Stryker Corp Handala March 2026)
- T1484.001 Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) had utilized Group Policy logon scripts to distribute the malicious payloads to victim devices through the execution of a batch file.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has created Windows Registry entries to autorun stage two malware payloads to maintain persistence.(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- Stealth TA0005
- T1027.015 Obfuscated Files or Information: Compression: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has compressed their payloads by leveraging zip files.(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1036.004 Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has masqueraded as commonly used programs and services on Windows hosts.(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has masqueraded malicious payloads to resemble legitimate applications.(Citation: DOJ FBI Handala Hack March 2026)(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026) [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has leveraged malicious payloads that use nomenclature associated with common applications that include Picto
- T1078 Valid Accounts: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has leveraged valid accounts to log into VPN infrastructure.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026) [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has used compromised valid credentials to gain access to management infrastructure and enterprise control systems.(Citation: Domain Tools Handala Hack Karma Homeland
- T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has used previously compromised Domain Administrator credentials to maintain persistent access.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has leveraged privileged cloud accounts to access cloud-based management consoles to include Microsoft Intune.(Citation: Palo Alto VOID MANTICORE Iran Cyber Threats March 2026) [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has also compromised existing accounts within the Microsoft Entra ID environment.(Citation: SEC 8-K Stryker Cor
- T1564.003 Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has utilized PowerShell scripts that run without notifying the user of its execution to include `-nop -w hidden- ep bypass -enc`.(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1679 Selective Exclusion: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has avoided interacting with specific directories in order to reduce the likelihood of detection.(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1684.001 Social Engineering: Impersonation: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has impersonated individuals familiar to the victim and technical support associated with social messaging services.(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- Credential Access TA0006
- T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has dumped LSASS credentials using `comsvcs.dll` via `rundll32.exe`.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1110 Brute Force: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has conducted brute-force attempts against organizational VPN infrastructure.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1110.001 Brute Force: Password Guessing: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has conducted password guessing to gain initial access.(Citation: Domain Tools Handala Hack Karma Homeland Justice MOIS April 2026)
- T1110.004 Brute Force: Credential Stuffing: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has utilized credential stuffing attacks to obtain initial access to victim environments.(Citation: Domain Tools Handala Hack Karma Homeland Justice MOIS April 2026)
- T1552.002 Unsecured Credentials: Credentials in Registry: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) had exported credentials from registry hives to include those stored in HKLM.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- Discovery TA0007
- T1082 System Information Discovery: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has gathered system information and disseminated it back to C2.(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1087.002 Account Discovery: Domain Account: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has utilized ADRecon to enumerate the active directory environment.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- Lateral Movement TA0008
- T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has used RDP to move laterally within the victim environment.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1072 Software Deployment Tools: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has leveraged legitimate built-in features of cloud-based management platforms to include mobile device management (MDM) and Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) solutions.(Citation: SPECOPS Outpost24 Handala Hack Stryker March 2026)(Citation: Palo Alto VOID MANTICORE Iran Cyber Threats March 2026) [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/
- Collection TA0009
- T1005 Data from Local System: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has collected cached data and files from within the victim environment.(Citation: SPECOPS Outpost24 Handala Hack Stryker March 2026)(Citation: DOJ FBI Handala Hack March 2026)(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1074 Data Staged: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has staged compressed files in specified locations prior to exfiltration over C2.(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1113 Screen Capture: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has captured screen content during an active Zoom session.(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1114.002 Email Collection: Remote Email Collection: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has gathered victim email-content from victim servers.(Citation: DOJ FBI Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1119 Automated Collection: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) conducted large-scale data exfiltration in the Stryker operation, consistent with automated or scripted collection against enterprise systems.(Citation: Domain Tools Handala Hack Karma Homeland Justice MOIS April 2026)
- T1123 Audio Capture: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has gathered audio during a Zoom session.(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1125 Video Capture: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has collected video from compromised victim devices.(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1213.002 Data from Information Repositories: Sharepoint: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has accessed victim’s public facing SharePoint servers and exfiltrated data.(Citation: DOJ FBI Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1560.001 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has stored collected data in a password protected compressed file prior to exfiltration.(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- Exfiltration TA0010
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) malware has exfiltrated collected data via Telegram bot C2 channels using encrypted communications.(Citation: Domain Tools Handala Hack Karma Homeland Justice MOIS April 2026)
- Command and Control TA0011
- T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has utilized HTTPS for communication to C2 domains.(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1102 Web Service: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has utilized Telegram API for C2.(Citation: DOJ FBI Handala Hack March 2026)(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has deployed additional payloads from dedicated C2 servers.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)(Citation: DOJ FBI Handala Hack March 2026)(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026) [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has also downloaded legitimate tools and software from publ
- T1219.002 Remote Access Tools: Remote Desktop Software: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has installed NetBird on victim devices to create a mesh network that facilitated control of several victim devices at once.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1572 Protocol Tunneling: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has used tunneling tools to facilitate destructive attacks on compromised devices.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- Impact TA0040
- T1485 Data Destruction: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has conducted data wiping attacks on compromised systems.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)(Citation: SPECOPS Outpost24 Handala Hack Stryker March 2026)(Citation: DOJ FBI Handala Hack March 2026)(Citation: Palo Alto VOID MANTICORE Iran Cyber Threats March 2026) [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055
- T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has utilized legitimate disk encryption utilities to increase likelihood of encrypting system drives and reduce system recovery efforts.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)(Citation: DOJ FBI Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1490 Inhibit System Recovery: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has deleted virtual machines directly from the virtualization platform.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1561.001 Disk Wipe: Disk Content Wipe: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has utilized a disk wiping utility to facilitate destructive actions on victim servers.(Citation: DOJ FBI Handala Hack March 2026) [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has also utilized legitimate remote disk wiping commands.(Citation: SPECOPS Outpost24 Handala Hack Stryker March 2026)
- T1561.002 Disk Wipe: Disk Structure Wipe: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has deployed custom wipers that overwrite system files and the host devices master boot records (MBR) to corrupt or destroy files.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1657 Financial Theft: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has conducted data exfiltration and posted stolen information on data leak sites for the purposes of financial and political extortion.(Citation: SPECOPS Outpost24 Handala Hack Stryker March 2026)(Citation: DOJ FBI Handala Hack March 2026) [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has also sold stolen data to prospective buyers
- Resource Development TA0042
- T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has registered domains for messaging purposes.(Citation: SPECOPS Outpost24 Handala Hack Stryker March 2026) [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has created typosquatted domains and sub-domains in attempts to avoid detection or draw suspicion.(Citation: DOJ FBI Handala Hack March 2026)(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE
- T1583.003 Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has utilized VPS solutions for C2.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1583.004 Acquire Infrastructure: Server: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has leveraged backend servers within Iran.(Citation: DOJ FBI Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1583.006 Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has obtained access to commercial VPN services to launch malicious activity.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)(Citation: SPECOPS Outpost24 Handala Hack Stryker March 2026) [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has also leveraged Starlink internet services.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Hand
- T1585.001 Establish Accounts: Social Media Accounts: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has created Telegram Accounts.(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026) [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has also leveraged online personas such as Handala Hack, Karma, and Homeland Justice on social media to include Telegram.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)(Citation:
- T1585.002 Establish Accounts: Email Accounts: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has created email accounts to send threatening messages to victims to include ‘Handala_Team[@]outlook[.]com’.(Citation: DOJ FBI Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1587.001 Develop Capabilities: Malware: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has utilized custom-malware and wipers to include BiBi Wiper.(Citation: DOJ FBI Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1588.001 Obtain Capabilities: Malware: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has developed or obtained trojanized applications used for persistent surveillance of targeted individuals.(Citation: Domain Tools Handala Hack Karma Homeland Justice MOIS April 2026)
- T1588.002 Obtain Capabilities: Tool: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has obtained and utilized commercial VPN services, open-source software and publicly available offensive security tools to facilitate malicious activities.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- Reconnaissance TA0043
- T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has gathered details on their intended victims to aid in social engineering efforts for leveraging tailored themes of attacks.(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1595.002 Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has scanned victim environments for susceptibility to vulnerability exploitation.(Citation: DOJ FBI Handala Hack March 2026)
- Defense Impairment TA0112
- T1484.001 Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) had utilized Group Policy logon scripts to distribute the malicious payloads to victim devices through the execution of a batch file.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
- T1686.003 Disable or Modify System Firewall: Windows Host Firewall: [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has disabled Windows Defender protections to allow for follow-on activities within the compromised host.(Citation: Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)
Fonte: perfil público do grupo, perfil do grupo · atualizado em 16 nov 2026 · atividade de 05 abr 2024 a 07 abr 2026
Vulnerabilidades exploradas 3
CVEs que este grupo é conhecido por explorar, com a fonte e a confiança de cada uma ao lado. Ordenadas pela confiança e pela gravidade real.
Sites do grupo
5 site(s) conhecido(s): 2 no ar, 2 fora do ar, 1 apreendido(s).
1 site(s) do grupo aparece(m) como apreendido(s) pela polícia.
| Tipo | Situação | Mudou em | Endereço |
|---|---|---|---|
| vazamento | apreendido | visto desde 12 nov 2026 | •••••••• (no plano SOC) |
| vazamento | no ar · pede captcha | visto desde 12 nov 2026 | •••••••• (no plano SOC) |
| vazamento | no ar · pede captcha | visto desde 12 nov 2026 | •••••••• (no plano SOC) |
| vazamento | fora do ar | visto desde 12 nov 2026 | •••••••• (no plano SOC) |
| vazamento | fora do ar | visto desde 12 nov 2026 | •••••••• (no plano SOC) |
Com o plano, você vê o endereço de cada site do grupo.
Estes planos entregam o conteúdo bruto de inteligência:
- os endereços dos sites de vazamento e de negociação dos grupos;
- o nome das vítimas;
- o chat de negociação inteiro;
- as regras YARA e o pacote de detecção completo de cada grupo;
- os contatos dos criminosos (e-mail, .onion, Tox) sem máscara.
Também incluem os alertas por webhook, Slack e Discord, o MCP para assistentes de IA e mais volume na API. O Enterprise é sob consulta.
Ver os planosFonte: perfil público do grupo · conferido em 16 nov 2026
Detecção 1
O pacote que o time de segurança usa para procurar o grupo no próprio ambiente: os indicadores (IOCs) e as regras YARA, de inteligência aberta sobre o grupo.
handala.yar
Com o plano, você baixa as regras YARA e o pacote completo, com todos os indicadores.
Estes planos entregam o conteúdo bruto de inteligência:
- os endereços dos sites de vazamento e de negociação dos grupos;
- o nome das vítimas;
- o chat de negociação inteiro;
- as regras YARA e o pacote de detecção completo de cada grupo;
- os contatos dos criminosos (e-mail, .onion, Tox) sem máscara.
Também incluem os alertas por webhook, Slack e Discord, o MCP para assistentes de IA e mais volume na API. O Enterprise é sob consulta.
Ver os planosConteúdo de defesa: use só em ambientes que você tem autorização para analisar. Fonte: inteligência aberta sobre o grupo · atualizado em 16 nov 2026
Famílias de ransomware
O grupo opera a família quando o site de vazamento dele é o mesmo endereço que a família lista nas fontes; usa a família quando o MITRE ATT&CK diz que usa. A recuperação é a da família, não a de uma vítima: a página da família mostra as versões e as condições de cada ferramenta.
- handala · opera a família (corroborado, confiança alta). Recuperação: Nenhuma ferramenta pública conhecida.Fontes: catálogo público de famílias · Vexday
Impacto e vítimas
O grupo VOID MANTICORE tem 2 vítimas de ransomware conhecidas. Veja os setores e países mais atingidos e as vítimas recentes.
Os nomes das vítimas aparecem nos planos SOC, MSSP e Enterprise. Ver os planos
Referências
O grupo VOID MANTICORE usa técnicas e explora falhas reais. O Pentest Autônomo com IA da TrueHacking simula esses ataques na sua infraestrutura e traz mais segurança para sua aplicação.
Conhecer o Pentest Autônomo com IA →