RansomwareG1030

Agrius

Also known as: AMERICIUM, Agonizing Serpens, Black Shadow, BlackShadow, DEV-0022, Pink Sandstorm and 2 more

E-mail alert on newly attributed CVEs, new victims in Brazil and verified incidents.

About the group

Agrius is an Iranian threat actor active since 2020 notable for a series of ransomware and wiper operations in the Middle East, with an emphasis on Israeli targets. Public reporting has linked Agrius to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).

Attack chain

Plausible scenario built from the group's real techniques, ordered by the phases of an attack. Each step shows how the group typically operates.

Arsenal severity59
Impact: Critical
T1190T1059.003T1505.003T1003.001T1021.001T1005ENTRYInitial accessExploitPublic-Facing App…EXECExecutionWindows CommandShellPERSPersistenceWeb ShellCREDCredential accessLSASS MemoryLATLateral movementRemote DesktopProtocolCOLLCollectionData from LocalSystemEXFILExfiltrationExfiltration OverC2 Channel

Illustrative chain derived from techniques documented in MITRE ATT&CK — it does not represent a specific past attack. Severity summarizes the known arsenal (kill-chain coverage, actively exploited CVEs, techniques).

Techniques (MITRE ATT&CK) 22

How the group operates, mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK matrix and organized by the phases of an attack.

Arsenal and tactics

What the group uses and how it attacks, from the group's public profile, compiled from public reporting. The CVEs in that profile are in the CVEs section, with the source next to them.

How the group attacks

  • Initial Access TA0001
    • T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts: [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) attempted to acquire valid credentials for victim environments through various means to enable follow-on lateral movement.(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023)
    • T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application: [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) exploits public-facing applications for initial access to victim environments. Examples include widespread attempts to exploit CVE-2018-13379 in FortiOS devices and SQL injection activity.(Citation: SentinelOne Agrius 2021)
  • Execution TA0002
    • T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell: [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) uses [ASPXSpy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0073) web shells to enable follow-on command execution via <code>cmd.exe</code>.(Citation: SentinelOne Agrius 2021)
  • Persistence TA0003
    • T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts: [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) attempted to acquire valid credentials for victim environments through various means to enable follow-on lateral movement.(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023)
    • T1505.003 Server Software Component: Web Shell: [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) typically deploys a variant of the [ASPXSpy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0073) web shell following initial access via exploitation.(Citation: SentinelOne Agrius 2021)
    • T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service: [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) has deployed [IPsec Helper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1132) malware post-exploitation and registered it as a service for persistence.(Citation: SentinelOne Agrius 2021)
  • Privilege Escalation TA0004
    • T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts: [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) attempted to acquire valid credentials for victim environments through various means to enable follow-on lateral movement.(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023)
    • T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service: [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) has deployed [IPsec Helper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1132) malware post-exploitation and registered it as a service for persistence.(Citation: SentinelOne Agrius 2021)
  • Stealth TA0005
    • T1036 Masquerading: [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) used the Plink tool for tunneling and connections to remote machines, renaming it <code>systems.exe</code> in some instances.(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023)
    • T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts: [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) attempted to acquire valid credentials for victim environments through various means to enable follow-on lateral movement.(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023)
    • T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information: [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) has deployed base64-encoded variants of [ASPXSpy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0073) to evade detection.(Citation: SentinelOne Agrius 2021)
  • Credential Access TA0006
    • T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory: [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) used tools such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) to dump LSASS memory to capture credentials in victim environments.(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023)
    • T1003.002 OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager: [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) dumped the SAM file on victim machines to capture credentials.(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023)
    • T1110 Brute Force: [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) engaged in various brute forcing activities via SMB in victim environments.(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023)
    • T1110.003 Brute Force: Password Spraying: [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) engaged in password spraying via SMB in victim environments.(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023)
  • Discovery TA0007
    • T1018 Remote System Discovery: [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) used the tool [NBTscan](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0590) to scan for remote, accessible hosts in victim environments.(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023)
    • T1046 Network Service Discovery: [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) used the open-source port scanner <code>WinEggDrop</code> to perform detailed scans of hosts of interest in victim networks.(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023)
  • Lateral Movement TA0008
    • T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol: [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) tunnels RDP traffic through deployed web shells to access victim environments via compromised accounts.(Citation: SentinelOne Agrius 2021) [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) used the Plink tool to tunnel RDP connections for remote access and lateral movement in victim environments.(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023)
    • T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer: [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) downloaded some payloads for follow-on execution from legitimate filesharing services such as <code>ufile.io</code> and <code>easyupload.io</code>.(Citation: CheckPoint Agrius 2023)
  • Collection TA0009
    • T1005 Data from Local System: [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) gathered data from database and other critical servers in victim environments, then used wiping mechanisms as an anti-analysis and anti-forensics mechanism.(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023)
    • T1074.001 Data Staged: Local Data Staging: [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) has used the folder, <code>C:\\windows\\temp\\s\\</code>, to stage data for exfiltration.(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023)
    • T1119 Automated Collection: [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) used a custom tool, <code>sql.net4.exe</code>, to query SQL databases and then identify and extract personally identifiable information.(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023)
    • T1560.001 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility: [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) used 7zip to archive extracted data in preparation for exfiltration.(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023)
  • Exfiltration TA0010
    • T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel: [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) exfiltrated staged data using tools such as Putty and WinSCP, communicating with command and control servers.(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023)
  • Resource Development TA0042
    • T1583 Acquire Infrastructure: [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) typically uses commercial VPN services for anonymizing last-hop traffic to victim networks, such as ProtonVPN.(Citation: SentinelOne Agrius 2021)
  • Defense Impairment TA0112
    • T1685 Disable or Modify Tools: [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) used several mechanisms to try to disable security tools. [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) attempted to modify EDR-related services to disable auto-start on system reboot. [Agrius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1030) used a publicly available driver, <code>GMER64.sys</code> typically used for anti-rootkit functionality, to selective

Source: public group profile, group profile · updated on 16 Nov 2026 · active from 18 Dec 2021 to 18 Dec 2021

Exploited vulnerabilities 3

CVEs this group is known to exploit, with the source and confidence of each next to it. Ordered by confidence and real-world severity.

The group's sites

1 known site(s): 0 online, 1 offline, 0 seized.

TypeStatusChanged onAddress
leak siteofflineseen since 12 Nov 2026•••••••• (hidden)
Available on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans

Here, the address of each of the group's sites is closed.

These plans unlock the raw intelligence that stays closed on the site:

  • the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
  • the victims' names;
  • the full negotiation chat;
  • each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
  • the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.

They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.

See the plans

Source: public group profile · checked on 16 Nov 2026

Detection 1

The package a security team uses to hunt for the group in its own environment: the indicators (IOCs) and the YARA rules, from open intelligence on the group.

YARA rules 1 rule(s)

blackshadow.yar

Available on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans

Here, the YARA rules and the full package download (with every indicator) are closed.

These plans unlock the raw intelligence that stays closed on the site:

  • the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
  • the victims' names;
  • the full negotiation chat;
  • each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
  • the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.

They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.

See the plans

Defensive content: use it only in environments you are authorized to analyze. Source: open intelligence on the group · updated on 16 Nov 2026

Ransomware families

The group operates the family when its leak site is the same address the family lists in the sources; it uses the family when MITRE ATT&CK says so. Recovery refers to the family, not to any victim: the family page shows the versions and conditions of each tool.

  • Blackshadow · operates the family (corroborated, high confidence). Recovery: No known public tool.Sources: public malware catalogue · Vexday
  • Apostle · uses the family (corroborated, high confidence). Recovery: No known public tool.Sources: MITRE ATT&CK
  • Moneybird · uses the family (corroborated, high confidence). Recovery: No known public tool.Sources: MITRE ATT&CK

Known infrastructure 10

Real indicators (C2, domains, URLs and hashes) associated with the malware this group uses. Source: community indicator feeds.

md5_hash898d994607ccd834cdbddc7fb4cc8242MimiKatzcommunity indicator feed
sha1_hash97479f00486752b22b3d19feffde5fc4e23c615fMimiKatzcommunity indicator feed
sha256_hash46deeb93c5d7be110d5459abc663ab8edc4bf2d8e098e0d3e96f613205d556f9MimiKatzcommunity indicator feed
urlhttp://92.127.156.174:8880/master.exeMimiKatzcommunity indicator feed
md5_hashfec27228340485485f6902f8759bbd62MimiKatzcommunity indicator feed
sha1_hash07b35a3b431e653ddcf36cecd49793d538e2aa79MimiKatzcommunity indicator feed
sha256_hashf9d53fdcc12d548e6c9bd395642f30d2b2c6a9a4204bc0948badf8a7c571c072MimiKatzcommunity indicator feed
sha1_hashc5ec7e2ad924e832e49fbac9d0c82719b570e080MimiKatzcommunity indicator feed
md5_hash77c96f339974b65ae435313a8fcc3b35MimiKatzcommunity indicator feed
sha256_hash889cc3e793cb39889c7acc8e73a84973e9a08fcd69451f7b546509c74ffdda90MimiKatzcommunity indicator feed

References

Agrius uses real techniques and exploits real flaws. TrueHacking's AI Autonomous Pentest simulates these attacks against your infrastructure and brings more security to your application.

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