Moses Staff
Also known as: DEV-0500, Marigold Sandstorm, VENGEFUL KITTEN
E-mail alert on newly attributed CVEs, new victims in Brazil and verified incidents.
About the group
Moses Staff is a suspected Iranian threat group that has primarily targeted Israeli companies since at least September 2021. Moses Staff openly stated their motivation in attacking Israeli companies is to cause damage by leaking stolen sensitive data and encrypting the victim's networks without a ransom demand. Security researchers assess Moses Staff is politically motivated, and has targeted government, finance, travel, energy, manufacturing, and utility companies outside of Israel as well, including those in Italy, India, Germany, Chile, Turkey, the UAE, and the US.
Similar names and other brands
- Ransomware brands run by the group: Abrahams_Ax (medium confidence per the source) [source]
Attack chain
Plausible scenario built from the group's real techniques, ordered by the phases of an attack. Each step shows how the group typically operates.
Illustrative chain derived from techniques documented in MITRE ATT&CK — it does not represent a specific past attack. Severity summarizes the known arsenal (kill-chain coverage, actively exploited CVEs, techniques).
Techniques (MITRE ATT&CK) 12
How the group operates, mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK matrix and organized by the phases of an attack.
Arsenal and tactics
What the group uses and how it attacks, from the group's public profile, compiled from public reporting. The CVEs in that profile are in the CVEs section, with the source next to them.
How the group attacks
- Initial Access TA0001
- T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application: [Moses Staff](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1009) has exploited known vulnerabilities in public-facing infrastructure such as Microsoft Exchange Servers.(Citation: Checkpoint MosesStaff Nov 2021)
- Persistence TA0003
- T1505.003 Server Software Component: Web Shell: [Moses Staff](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1009) has dropped a web shell onto a compromised system.(Citation: Checkpoint MosesStaff Nov 2021)
- Stealth TA0005
- T1027.013 Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File: [Moses Staff](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1009) has used obfuscated web shells in their operations.(Citation: Checkpoint MosesStaff Nov 2021)
- Discovery TA0007
- T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery: [Moses Staff](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1009) has collected the domain name of a compromised network.(Citation: Checkpoint MosesStaff Nov 2021)
- T1082 System Information Discovery: [Moses Staff](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1009) collected information about the infected host, including the machine names and OS architecture.(Citation: Checkpoint MosesStaff Nov 2021)
- T1087.001 Account Discovery: Local Account: [Moses Staff](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1009) has collected the administrator username from a compromised host.(Citation: Checkpoint MosesStaff Nov 2021)
- Lateral Movement TA0008
- T1021.002 Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares: [Moses Staff](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1009) has used batch scripts that can enable SMB on a compromised host.(Citation: Checkpoint MosesStaff Nov 2021)
- Command and Control TA0011
- T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer: [Moses Staff](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1009) has downloaded and installed web shells to following path <code>C:\inetpub\wwwroot\aspnet_client\system_web\IISpool.aspx</code>.(Citation: Checkpoint MosesStaff Nov 2021)
- Resource Development TA0042
- T1587.001 Develop Capabilities: Malware: [Moses Staff](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1009) has built malware, such as [DCSrv](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1033) and [PyDCrypt](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1032), for targeting victims' machines.(Citation: Checkpoint MosesStaff Nov 2021)
- T1588.002 Obtain Capabilities: Tool: [Moses Staff](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1009) has used the commercial tool DiskCryptor.(Citation: Checkpoint MosesStaff Nov 2021)
- Defense Impairment TA0112
- T1553.002 Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing: [Moses Staff](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1009) has used signed drivers from an open source tool called DiskCryptor to evade detection.(Citation: Checkpoint MosesStaff Nov 2021)
- T1686.003 Disable or Modify System Firewall: Windows Host Firewall: [Moses Staff](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1009) has used batch scripts that can disable the Windows firewall on specific remote machines.(Citation: Checkpoint MosesStaff Nov 2021)
Source: public group profile, group profile · updated on 16 Nov 2026 · active from 18 Dec 2021 to 18 Dec 2021
Exploited vulnerabilities 2
CVEs this group is known to exploit, with the source and confidence of each next to it. Ordered by confidence and real-world severity.
The group's sites
2 known site(s): 0 online, 2 offline, 0 seized.
| Type | Status | Changed on | Address |
|---|---|---|---|
| leak site | offline | seen since 12 Nov 2026 | •••••••• (on the SOC plan) |
| leak site | offline | seen since 12 Nov 2026 | •••••••• (on the SOC plan) |
With the plan, you see the address of each of the group's sites.
These plans deliver the raw intelligence:
- the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
- the victims' names;
- the full negotiation chat;
- each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
- the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.
They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.
See the plansSource: public group profile · checked on 16 Nov 2026
Detection 1
The package a security team uses to hunt for the group in its own environment: the indicators (IOCs) and the YARA rules, from open intelligence on the group.
mosesstaff.yar
With the plan, you download the YARA rules and the full package, with every indicator.
These plans deliver the raw intelligence:
- the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
- the victims' names;
- the full negotiation chat;
- each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
- the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.
They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.
See the plansDefensive content: use it only in environments you are authorized to analyze. Source: open intelligence on the group · updated on 16 Nov 2026
References
Moses Staff uses real techniques and exploits real flaws. TrueHacking's AI Autonomous Pentest simulates these attacks against your infrastructure and brings more security to your application.
Explore the AI Autonomous Pentest →