CVE-2026-44309: medium-severity vulnerability in sigstore gitsign
gitsign verify accepts signatures over go-git-normalized bytes, enabling trust confusion on malformed commits
Published
E-mail alert when it lands in KEV, gets a public PoC or its score goes up.
13Vexday Risk Score
No sign of exploitation. No public exploitation artifact known so far.
ssvc Trackcvss 5.3epss 0.1%
Gitsign is a keyless Sigstore to signing tool for Git commits with your a GitHub / OIDC identity. Prior to 0.16.0, gitsign verify and gitsign verify-tag re-encode commit/tag objects through go-git's EncodeWithoutSignature before checking the signature, instead of verifying against the raw git object bytes. For malformed objects with duplicate tree headers, git-core and go-git parse different trees: git-core uses the first, go-git uses the second. A signature crafted over the go-git-normalized form (second tree) passes gitsign verify while git-core resolves the commit to a completely different tree. This breaks the invariant that a verified signature, the commit semantics git-core presents to users, and the object hash logged in Rekor all refer to the same content. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.16.0.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Affected products
sigstore · gitsignRelated CVEs — sigstore gitsign
In the same product, most dangerous first.
CVE-2023-47122MEDIUMGitsign's Rekor public keys fetched from upstream API instead of local TUF client.EPSS 0.4%CVE-2026-44310MEDIUMgitsign --verify panics on empty-certificate PKCS7 and exits 0, bypassing exit-code callersEPSS 0.1%CVE-2024-51746LOWUse of incorrect Rekor entries during verification in gitsignEPSS 0.1%