CVE-2026-44310: medium-severity vulnerability in sigstore gitsign
gitsign --verify panics on empty-certificate PKCS7 and exits 0, bypassing exit-code callers
Published
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13Vexday Risk Score
No sign of exploitation. No public exploitation artifact known so far.
ssvc Trackcvss 5.4epss 0.1%
Gitsign is a keyless Sigstore to signing tool for Git commits with your a GitHub / OIDC identity. From 0.4.0 to before 0.15.0, CertVerifier.Verify() in pkg/git/verifier.go unconditionally dereferences certs[0] after sd.GetCertificates() without checking the slice length. A CMS/PKCS7 signed message with an empty certificate set is a structurally valid DER payload; GetCertificates() returns an empty slice with no error, causing an immediate index-out-of-range panic. On the gitsign --verify code path (the GPG-compatible mode invoked by git verify-commit), the panic is silently recovered by internal/io/streams.go's Wrap() function, which returns nil instead of an error. main.go then exits with code 0, causing exit-code-only verification callers to interpret the failed verification as success. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.15.0.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
Affected products
sigstore · gitsignRelated CVEs — sigstore gitsign
In the same product, most dangerous first.
CVE-2023-47122MEDIUMGitsign's Rekor public keys fetched from upstream API instead of local TUF client.EPSS 0.4%CVE-2026-44309MEDIUMgitsign verify accepts signatures over go-git-normalized bytes, enabling trust confusion on malformed commitsEPSS 0.1%CVE-2024-51746LOWUse of incorrect Rekor entries during verification in gitsignEPSS 0.1%