CVE-2026-67543: high-severity vulnerability in heymrun heym
Heym Unsandboxed skill code execution: skills run via a local backend subprocess without the Docker isolation that Python tools mandate
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21Vexday Risk Score
No sign of exploitation. No public exploitation artifact known so far.
ssvc Trackcvss 8.8epss 0.6%
Heym builds and runs agentic systems and business-process automations on self-hosted infrastructure. Prior to version 0.0.70, heym hardens one untrusted-code path but not its sibling. The Python tool executor (python_tool_executor.py) treats user code as untrusted and mandates a Docker sandbox (no network, read-only fs, non-root, no docker socket), failing closed. The skill executor (skill_python_executor.py) runs skill Python via a local backend subprocess with no Docker isolation — only a 512 MB RLIMIT and a 7-key env denylist — so a skill executes inside the backend execution context, with filesystem access, network egress, and non-denylisted environment variables that should not be exposed to untrusted/shared skills. In the shipped Docker config (backend runs as root + /var/run/docker.sock mounted), this escalates to host root. This issue has been patched in version 0.0.70.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Affected products
heymrun · heymRelated CVEs — heymrun heym
In the same product, most dangerous first.
CVE-2026-67544HIGHHeym: Playwright Custom Code Backend RCE via `playwrightCode` FieldEPSS 1.0%CVE-2026-100864HIGHheym before 0.0.91 Remote Code Execution via Expression EngineEPSS 0.9%CVE-2026-130753HIGHheym before 0.0.142 Authenticated RCE via Playwright Step-Mode String FieldsEPSS 0.8%CVE-2026-67546HIGHHeym: Command execution via POST /api/mcp/fetch-tools stdio transport: supplied command is spawned before MCP validationEPSS 0.6%CVE-2026-67545HIGHHeym: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in HTTP Workflow NodeEPSS 0.5%CVE-2026-55376HIGHheym Python Tool Sandbox EscapeEPSS 0.5%