Sodinokibi
Also known as: REvil, Sodin
Alert when a public recovery tool comes out, when compatibility changes and when a new variant appears.
Summary
Attackers are actively exploiting a recently disclosed vulnerability in Oracle WebLogic to install a new variant of ransomware called "Sodinokibi." Sodinokibi attempts to encrypt data in a user's directory and delete shadow copy backups to make data recovery more difficult. Oracle first patched the issue on April 26, outside of their normal patch cycle, and assigned it CVE-2019-2725. This vulnerability is easy for attackers to exploit, as anyone with HTTP access to the WebLogic server could carry out an attack. Because of this, the bug has a CVSS score of 9.8/10. Attackers have been making use of this exploit in the wild since at least April 17. Cisco's Incident Response (IR) team, along with Cisco Talos, are actively investigating these attacks and Sodinokibi.
Text from the open source (public malware catalogue or MITRE ATT&CK), unedited: it may be outdated or cover only one variant.
Recovery
Public tool under conditions
| Tool | Variant | Recovery |
|---|---|---|
| Bitdefender · REvil/Sodinokibi Decryptorverified on 11 Nov 2026 | whole family | conditional — Only some versions: the vendor warns that some are not yet decryptable, without saying which. |
Before any tool
- Preserve the encrypted files, the ransom note and any backups before trying anything.
- Test the tool on a copy of the files, in an isolated environment, following the vendor's instructions.
- A decryptor for the family does not guarantee recovery for every variant.
Recovery guide
A guide to Sodinokibi built from the tools' official pages, read on 11 November 2026. Use it together with the general guide: containing the attack and preserving evidence come before any tool.
1. Confirm it is Sodinokibi
- Different families can use the same extension. If in doubt, check the Vexday search.
2. Free tool
- Bitdefender · REvil/Sodinokibi Decryptor, works under conditions: Only some versions: the vendor warns that some are not yet decryptable, without saying which. Official page
- Limits: Some REvil/Sodinokibi versions are not yet decryptable, and the manual does not say which.
3. Use the tool safely
- Copy the encrypted files to another disk and work only on the copy. Keep the originals untouched.
- Download the tool only from the official page above, never from another site.
- Run the tool on a machine isolated from the network, following the vendor's manual.
- Open a few recovered files to check them before deleting anything.
Warnings the vendor highlights:
- Not all versions are decryptable.
- Only delete the encrypted files after checking that the decrypted ones open.
4. If it does not work
- Do not delete the encrypted files or the ransom note: new keys and tools can come out later. Follow the family on Vexday to be notified.
- Get help from an incident response team and follow the general guide to contain, recover and report the incident.
- Paying the ransom does not guarantee you get your data back.
Under attack: who to call
- Personal data involved: notify the ANPD. Under the LGPD (art. 48), the controller notifies the ANPD and the data subjects of an incident that may cause relevant risk or harm, within 3 business days (ANPD Resolution CD/ANPD No. 15/2024). The data protection officer files it through SEI!ANPD. How to notify the ANPD
- File a police report. Ransomware is a crime. Many states have police units specialized in cybercrime; keep the ransom note and the encrypted files as evidence.
CSIRTs · Brazil
The country's incident response teams (CSIRTs), from the ENISA and FIRST lists. Each one serves a constituency: check it before writing.
- CERT.br · Computer Emergency Response Team BrazilFIRST
- Apura CSIRT · Apura DFIR / CSIRT TeamFIRSTServes: Companies
- CAIS/RNP · Brazilian Academic and Research Network CSIRTFIRSTServes: Research and education
- CSIRT-INTER · Banco Inter Computer Security Incident Response TeamFIRSTServes: Financial sector
- CSIRT PETROBRASFIRSTServes: Industrial sector
- CSIRT Soow Sigma · CSIRT Soow Sigma - Computer Security Incident Response TeamFIRSTServes: Government, Public and private sectors
- CTIR Gov-BR · Cyber Incident Prevention, Handling and Response Center of Brazilian GovernmentFIRSTServes: Government, Public and private sectors
- NTTDATA-BR-CERTFIRSTServes: Companies
- Nubank CSIRT · Nu CSIRTFIRSTServes: Financial sector
Another country: Argentina · Chile · Colombia · Costa Rica · Dominican Republic · Ecuador · Spain · Guatemala · Mexico · Panama · Peru · Portugal · El Salvador · Uruguay · Venezuela
Source: ENISA and FIRST lists · updated on 16 Nov 2026
Variants
No variant cataloged.
Extensions and ransom notes
No extension or note cataloged.
Groups using the family
Victims of the groups
3 known victims of the groups that operate or use the family, 1 in Brazil.
The leak site publishes the victim with the group, not the family. A group that runs more than one family shows up on all of them: the victim belongs to the group, and the family used in that attack is not reported.
Here, the victims' names are hidden: the list shows the group, the sector, the country and the attack date.
These plans unlock the raw intelligence that stays closed on the site:
- the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
- the victims' names;
- the full negotiation chat;
- each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
- the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.
They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.
See the plansFinancial Services (1) · Government & Defense (1) · Technology (1)
Detection
The detection packages of the groups that operate or use the family: the indicators (IOCs) and YARA rules from open intelligence, to hunt for the group in your own environment. The package is published per group, not per family.
- REvil: 1 YARA rule(s) — see the group's detection
Source: open intelligence on the groups. The YARA rules and the full package are on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans.
Techniques (MITRE ATT&CK) 35
The techniques MITRE ATT&CK documents for this family. Each links to the technique page on ATT&CK, with detection and mitigation guidance.
ATT&CK 20.1. © The MITRE Corporation. S0496
U.S. Treasury sanctions (OFAC)
OFAC press releases that sanction people or companies and tie them, in the text itself, to this family or to the groups that operate or use it.
- 20 Feb 2024 · United States Sanctions Affiliates of Russia-Based LockBit Ransomware GroupIvan Gennadievich Kondratiev (Bassterlord), Artur SungatovFrom the press release: “Artur Sungatov, a Russian national, is a Lockbit ransomware group affiliate and has actively engaged in LockBit ransomware attacks.” “he also has ties to REvil, RansomEXX and Avaddon ransomware groups”
- 23 Jan 2024 · United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom Sanction Russian Cyber Actor Responsible for the Medibank HackAlexander ErmakovFrom the press release: “Ermakov and the other actors behind the Medibank hack are believed to be linked to the Russia-backed cybercrime gang REvil.”
- 06 May 2022 · U.S. Treasury Issues First-Ever Sanctions on a Virtual Currency Mixer, Targets DPRK Cyber ThreatsBlender.ioFrom the press release: “Blender's facilitation of money-laundering for, among others, Russian-linked malign ransomware groups including Trickbot, Conti, Ryuk, Sodinokibi, and Gandcrab.”
- 05 Apr 2022 · Treasury Sanctions Russia-Based Hydra, World's Largest Darknet Market, and Ransomware-Enabling Virtual Currency Exchange GarantexHydra Market (Hydra), GarantexFrom the press release: “approximately $8 million in ransomware proceeds that transited Hydra's virtual currency accounts, including from the Ryuk, Sodinokibi, and Conti ransomware variants” “over $100 million in transactions are associated with illicit actors and darknet markets, including nearly $6 million from Russian RaaS gang Conti”
- 08 Nov 2021 · Treasury Continues to Counter Ransomware as Part of Whole-of-Government Effort; Sanctions Ransomware Operators and Virtual Currency ExchangeYaroslav Vasinskyi, Yevgeniy PolyaninFrom the press release: “OFAC is designating Ukrainian Yaroslav Vasinskyi (Vasinskyi) and Russian Yevgeniy Polyanin (Polyanin) for their part in perpetuating Sodinokibi/REvil ransomware incidents against the United States.”
According to OFAC, facilitating a ransom payment to sanctioned people or companies may violate U.S. sanctions. OFAC advisory. Not legal advice.
Related families
Code lineage: GandCrab → Sodinokibi
- Sodinokibi is a variant of GandCrab · corroborated, medium confidence
"Variant of" means one family's code derives from the other's, per the source of each link. It does not mean the operators are the same.
CVEs exploited by the groups
These CVEs belong to the group (source and confidence alongside), not necessarily to this family.
- CVE-2021-31207 · KEV · FIN7 (mitre, high confidence)
- CVE-2020-1472 · KEV · FIN7 (mitre, high confidence)
- CVE-2014-7169 · KEV · FIN7 (mitre, high confidence)
- CVE-2014-7169 · KEV · REvil (mitre, high confidence)
- CVE-2017-0176 · FIN7 (mitre, high confidence)
- CVE-2016-6662 · FIN7 (mitre, high confidence)
- CVE-2016-6662 · REvil (mitre, high confidence)
Indicators
No indicator linked to this family.