RansomwareApunta a BrasilG1024

Akira

También conocido como: GOLD SAHARA, Howling Scorpius, PUNK SPIDER

Aviso por correo de CVE nueva atribuida, víctima nueva en Brasil e incidente verificado.

Sobre el grupo

Akira is a ransomware variant and ransomware deployment entity active since at least March 2023. Akira uses compromised credentials to access single-factor external access mechanisms such as VPNs for initial access, then various publicly-available tools and techniques for lateral movement. Akira operations are associated with "double extortion" ransomware activity, where data is exfiltrated from victim environments prior to encryption, with threats to publish files if a ransom is not paid. Technical analysis of Akira ransomware indicates variants capable of targeting Windows or VMWare ESXi hypervisors and multiple overlaps with Conti ransomware.

Cadena de ataque

Escenario plausible montado a partir de las técnicas reales del grupo, ordenadas por las fases de un ataque. Cada etapa muestra cómo suele actuar el grupo.

Severidad del arsenal67
Impacto: Crítico
T1059.001T1133T1558T1018T1213.002T1567.002EXECEjecuciónPowerShellPERSPersistenciaExternal RemoteServicesCREDAcceso a credencialesSteal or ForgeKerberos TicketsDISCDescubrimientoRemote SystemDiscoveryCOLLRecolecciónSharepointEXFILExfiltraciónExfiltration toCloud StorageIMPACTImpactoData Encrypted forImpact

Cadena ilustrativa derivada de las técnicas documentadas en MITRE ATT&CK — no representa un ataque específico ya ocurrido. La severidad resume el arsenal conocido (cobertura de la cadena, CVEs en explotación activa, técnicas).

Técnicas (MITRE ATT&CK) 17

Cómo opera el grupo, mapeado por la matriz MITRE ATT&CK y organizado por las fases de un ataque.

Arsenal y tácticas

Lo que el grupo usa y cómo ataca, según el perfil público del grupo, compilado a partir de informes públicos. Las CVE de ese perfil están en la sección de CVE, con la fuente al lado.

Herramientas

Herramientas ofensivas
CrackMapExecImpacketNetExec
Robo de credenciales
DonPAPILaZagneMimikatz
Descubrimiento y mapeo de la red
Advanced IP ScannerAdvanced Port ScannerBloodhoundMasscanReconFTWShareFinderSharpHoundSharpSharesSoftPerfect NetScanldapdomaindump
Evasión de defensas
PowerToolThrottleStop driverZemana Anti-Rootkit driverchurchill_driver.sys / fidget.sysconsent.exe (msimg32.dll / wmsgapi.dll)icardagt.exe (version.dll DLL sideload)mfpmp.exe (rtworkq.dll DLL sideload)
Herramientas del propio sistema (LOLBAS)
netnetshnltestvssadmin
Acceso remoto (RMM)
AnyDeskMeshAgentMobaXtermRadminRustDeskTeamViewer
Túneles y red
CloudflaredNgrokOpenSSH
Exfiltración de datos
FileZillaMEGARCloneTemp[.]shWinRARWinSCP

Cómo ataca el grupo

El detalle de cada técnica es el texto de la fuente, en inglés.

  • Initial Access TA0001
    • T1078 Valid Accounts: Utilizes compromised VPN credentials.
    • T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts: Operators use obtained domain accounts for access.
    • T1091 Replication Through Removable Media: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1133 External Remote Services: Actors exploit CVE-2023-20269 remote service vulnerabilities.
    • T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application: Targets vulnerable CISCO devices via CVE-2023-20269.
  • Execution TA0002
    • T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation: Actors may use WMI to continue the attack.
    • T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Accepts parameters for its routines such as "-n 10" (for encryption percentage) or "-s (filename)" (for shared folder encryption).
    • T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell: Operators use PowerShell to launch commands to continue operations.
    • T1059.002 System Services: Service Execution: Akira ransomware uses service execution for persistence.
    • T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell: Operators use CMD to launch commands to continue operations.
  • Persistence TA0003
    • T1136.001 Create Account: Local Account: Upon initial access, Akira operators create a local account on the compromised system.
    • T1136.002 Create Account: Domain Account: Upon initial access, Akira operators create a domain account on the compromised system.
    • T1543 Create or Modify System Process: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
  • Privilege Escalation TA0004
    • T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts: Utilizes valid domain accounts for privilege escalation.
    • T1543 Create or Modify System Process: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
  • Stealth TA0005
    • T1027.001 Obfuscated Files or Information: Binary Padding: [Akira](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024) has used binary padding to obfuscate payloads.(Citation: Cisco Akira Ransomware OCT 2024)
    • T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location: [Akira](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024) has used legitimate names and locations for files to evade defenses.(Citation: Cisco Akira Ransomware OCT 2024)
  • Credential Access TA0006
    • T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory: Uses Mimikatz, LaZagne, or a command line to dump LSASS from memory.
    • T1552 Unsecured Credentials: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1552.001 Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1555 Credentials from Password Stores: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1555.003 Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: [Akira](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024) have used scripts to dump Kerberos authentication credentials.(Citation: Cisco Akira Ransomware OCT 2024)
  • Discovery TA0007
    • T1018 Remote System Discovery: Uses Advanced IP Scanner and MASSCAN to discover remote systems.
    • T1033 System Owner/User Discovery: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1082 System Information Discovery: Uses PCHunter and SharpHound to collect system information.
    • T1083 File and Directory Discovery: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1087.002 Account Discovery: Domain Account: Uses AdFind, Windows net command, and nltest to collect domain information.
    • T1482 Domain Trust Discovery: [Akira](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024) uses the built-in [Nltest](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0359) utility or tools such as [AdFind](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0552) to enumerate Active Directory trusts in victim environments.(Citation: Arctic Wolf Akira 2023)
  • Lateral Movement TA0008
    • T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol: Utilizes remote services for accessing accounts and machines through remote services.
    • T1091 Replication Through Removable Media: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer: Uses RDP to move laterally within the victim's network.
  • Collection TA0009
    • T1005 Data from Local System: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1213.002 Data from Information Repositories: Sharepoint: [Akira](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024) has accessed and downloaded information stored in SharePoint instances as part of data gathering and exfiltration activity.(Citation: Secureworks GOLD SAHARA)
    • T1560.001 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility: Utilizes discovery to gather information for exfiltration.
  • Exfiltration TA0010
    • T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol: Utilizes FileZilla or WinSCP to exfiltrate stolen information via FTP.
    • T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage: Uses RClone to exfiltrate stolen information via a web service.
  • Command and Control TA0011
    • T1071 Application Layer Protocol: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1219 Remote Access Tools: [Akira](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024) uses legitimate utilities such as AnyDesk and PuTTy for maintaining remote access to victim environments.(Citation: Secureworks GOLD SAHARA)(Citation: Arctic Wolf Akira 2023) Also observed: AnyDesk, Radmin, Cloudflare Tunnel, MobaXterm, RustDesk and Ngrok.
  • Impact TA0040
    • T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact: Akira ransomware is used to encrypt files.
    • T1489 Service Stop: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1490 Inhibit System Recovery: Deletes shadow copies to inhibit recovery.
    • T1531 Account Access Removal: [Akira](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024) deletes administrator accounts in victim networks prior to encryption.(Citation: Secureworks GOLD SAHARA)
    • T1657 Financial Theft: [Akira](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024) engages in double-extortion ransomware, exfiltrating files then encrypting them, in order to prompt victims to pay a ransom.(Citation: BushidoToken Akira 2023)(Citation: CISA Akira Ransomware APR 2024)
  • Defense Impairment TA0112
    • T1112 Modify Registry: Uses commands in its operation to modify registries.
    • T1685 Disable or Modify Tools: Usage of PowerTool or a KillAV tool abusing the Zemana AntiMalware driver to terminate AV-related processes was observed. [Akira](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024) has disabled or modified security tools for defense evasion.(Citation: Cisco Akira Ransomware OCT 2024)

Fuente: perfil público del grupo, perfil del grupo · actualizado el 16 nov 2026 · actividad de 12 abr 2023 a 13 nov 2026

Vulnerabilidades explotadas 11

CVE que este grupo es conocido por explotar, con la fuente y la confianza de cada una al lado. Ordenadas por la confianza y la gravedad real.

CVE-2022-40684CRITICALEPSS 100%KEV perfil público del grupo
CVE-2021-21972CRITICALEPSS 100%KEV perfil público del grupo
CVE-2023-48788CRITICALEPSS 98%KEV perfil público del grupo
CVE-2024-40711CRITICALEPSS 90%KEV perfil público del grupo
CVE-2023-27532HIGHEPSS 81%KEV perfil público del grupo
CVE-2020-3259HIGHEPSS 72%KEV perfil público del grupo
CVE-2024-37085MEDIUMEPSS 27%KEV perfil público del grupo
CVE-2023-20269MEDIUMEPSS 27%KEV perfil público del grupo
CVE-2024-40766CRITICALEPSS 18%KEV perfil público del grupo
CVE-2019-6693MEDIUMEPSS 7%KEV perfil público del grupo
CVE-2023-20263MEDIUMEPSS 1% perfil público del grupo

Sitios del grupo

2 sitio(s) conocido(s): 2 en línea, 0 fuera de línea, 0 incautado(s).

TipoEstadoCambió elDirección
negociación (chat)en líneavisto desde 12 nov 2026•••••••• (en el plan SOC)
filtraciónen línea16 nov 2026•••••••• (en el plan SOC)
Disponible en los planes SOC, MSSP y Enterprise

Con el plan, ves la dirección de cada sitio del grupo.

Estos planes entregan el contenido bruto de inteligencia:

  • las direcciones de los sitios de filtración y de negociación de los grupos;
  • el nombre de las víctimas;
  • el chat de negociación completo;
  • las reglas YARA y el paquete de detección completo de cada grupo;
  • los contactos de los criminales (correo, .onion, Tox) sin máscara.

También incluyen las alertas por webhook, Slack y Discord, el MCP para asistentes de IA y más volumen en la API. Enterprise es bajo consulta.

Ver los planes

Fuente: perfil público del grupo · verificado el 16 nov 2026

Notas de rescate 3

El texto que el grupo deja en las máquinas atacadas, de un acervo público de notas de rescate.

¿Tienes una nota de rescate? Compárala en "¿Qué ransomware me atacó?"

akira_readme.txt · 2 contacto(s) enmascarado(s)
Hi friends,



Whatever who you are and what your title is if you're reading this it means the internal infrastructure of your company is fully or partially dead, all your backups - virtual, physical - everything that we managed to reach - are completely removed. Moreover, we have taken a great amount of your corporate data prior to encryption.



Well, for now let's keep all the tears and resentment to ourselves and try to build a constructive dialogue. We're fully aware of what damage we caused by locking your internal sources. At the moment, you have to know:



1. Dealing with us you will save A LOT due to we are not interested in ruining your financially. We will study in depth your finance, bank & income statements, your savings, investments etc. and present our reasonable demand to you. If you have an active cyber insurance, let us know and we will guide you how to properly use it. Also, dragging out the negotiation process will lead to failing of a deal.

2. Paying us you save your TIME, MONEY, EFFORTS and be back on track within 24 hours approximately. Our decryptor works properly on any files or systems, so you will be able to check it by requesting a test decryption service from the beginning of our conversation. If you decide to recover on your own, keep in mind that you can permanently lose access to some files or accidently corrupt them - in this case we won't be able to help.

3. The security report or the exclusive first-hand information that you will receive upon reaching an agreement is of a great value, since NO full audit of your network will show you the vulnerabilities that we've managed to detect and used in order to get into, identify backup solutions and upload your data.

4. As for your data, if we fail to agree, we will try to sell personal information/trade secrets/databases/source codes - generally speaking, everything that has a value on the darkmarket - to multiple threat actors at ones. Then all of this will be published in our blog - [dirección .onion].

5. We're more than negotiable and will definitely find the way to settle this quickly and reach an agreement which will satisfy both of us.



If you're indeed interested in our assistance and the services we provide you can reach out to us following simple instructions:



1. Install TOR Browser to get access to our chat room - [enlace]

2. Paste this link - [dirección .onion].

3. Use this code - [snip] - to log into our chat.



Keep in mind that the faster you will get in touch, the less damage we cause.
akira_readme_2.txt · 2 contacto(s) enmascarado(s)
Hi friends,

Whatever who you are and what your title is, if you're reading this it means the internal infrastructure of your company is fully or partially dead, all your backups - virtual, physical - everything that we managed to reach - are completely removed. Moreover, we have taken a great amount of your corporate data prior to encryption.



ATTENTION! Strictly prohibited:

- Deleting files with .arika extension;

- Replacing or renaming .arika and .akira files;

- Using third party software to recover your systems.

If you violate these rules, we cannot guarantee a successful recovery.



Well, for now let's keep all the tears and resentment to ourselves and try to build a constructive dialogue. We're fully aware of what damage we caused by locking your internal sources. At the moment, you have to know:



1. Dealing with us you will save A LOT due to we are not interested in ruining you financially. We will study in depth your finance, bank & income statements, your savings, investments etc. and present our reasonable demand to you. If you have an active cyber insurance, let us know and we will guide you how to properly use it. Also, dragging out the negotiation process will lead to failing of the deal.

2. Paying us you save your TIME, MONEY, EFFORTS and be back on track within 24 hours approximately. Our decryptor works properly on any files or systems, so you will be able to check it by requesting a test decryption service from the beginning of our conversation. If you decide to recover on your own, keep in mind that you can permanently lose access to some files or accidentally corrupt them - in this case we won't be able to help.

3. The security report or the exclusive first-hand information that you will receive upon reaching an agreement is of great value, since NO full audit of your network will show you the vulnerabilities that we've managed to detect and use in order to get into, identify backup solutions and download your data.

4. As for your data, if we fail to agree, we will try to sell personal information/trade secrets/databases/source codes - generally speaking, everything that has a value on the darkmarket - to multiple threat actors at once. Then all of this will be published in our blog - [dirección .onion].

5. We're more than negotiable and will definitely find a way to settle this quickly and reach an agreement which will satisfy both of us.



If you're indeed interested in our assistance and the services we provide you can reach out to us following simple instructions:



1. Install TOR Browser to get access to our chat room - torproject[.]org/download/.

2. Paste this link - [dirección .onion] .

3. Use this code - [snip] - to log into our chat.



Keep in mind that the faster you will get in touch, the less damage we cause.
akira_readme_3.txt · 2 contacto(s) enmascarado(s)
Hi friends,

Whatever who you are and what your title is, if you're reading this it means the internal infrastructure of your company is fully or partially dead, all your backups - virtual, physical - everything that we managed to reach - are completely removed. Moreover, we have taken a great amount of your corporate data prior to encryption.



ATTENTION! Strictly prohibited:

- Deleting files with .arika extension;

- Replacing or renaming .arika and .akira files;

- Using third party software to recover your systems.

If you violate these rules, we cannot guarantee a successful recovery.



Well, for now let's keep all the tears and resentment to ourselves and try to build a constructive dialogue. We're fully aware of what damage we caused by locking your internal sources. At the moment, you have to know:



1. Dealing with us you will save A LOT due to we are not interested in ruining you financially. We will study in depth your finance, bank & income statements, your savings, investments etc. and present our reasonable demand to you. If you have an active cyber insurance, let us know and we will guide you how to properly use it. Also, dragging out the negotiation process will lead to failing of the deal.

2. Paying us you save your TIME, MONEY, EFFORTS and be back on track within 24 hours approximately. Our decryptor works properly on any files or systems, so you will be able to check it by requesting a test decryption service from the beginning of our conversation. If you decide to recover on your own, keep in mind that you can permanently lose access to some files or accidentally corrupt them - in this case we won't be able to help.

3. The security report or the exclusive first-hand information that you will receive upon reaching an agreement is of great value, since NO full audit of your network will show you the vulnerabilities that we've managed to detect and use in order to get into, identify backup solutions and download your data.

4. As for your data, if we fail to agree, we will try to sell personal information/trade secrets/databases/source codes - generally speaking, everything that has a value on the darkmarket - to multiple threat actors at once. Then all of this will be published in our blog - [dirección .onion].

5. We're more than negotiable and will definitely find a way to settle this quickly and reach an agreement which will satisfy both of us.

6. Negotiations with Akira can only be conducted in a chat room, which you can access using the login details provided below or in the notes (a readme.txt file) in your systems. You should ignore any attempts (such as emails/social media messages, phone calls, etc.) to redirect you to another chat or email address (proton.me is often used by unauthorized individuals) on our behalf.

7. Be careful while working with recovery agencies as they often try to use your cyber incident to stuff their pockets. There are many risks for you to lose money and get nothing in return.



If you're indeed interested in our assistance and the services we provide you can reach out to us following simple instructions:



1. Install TOR Browser to get access to our chat room - torproject[.]org/download/.

2. Paste this link - [dirección .onion] .

3. Use this code - [snip] - to log into our chat.



Keep in mind that the faster you will get in touch, the less damage we cause.
Disponible en los planes SOC, MSSP y Enterprise

Con el plan, ves los contactos de los criminales en las notas, sin máscara.

Estos planes entregan el contenido bruto de inteligencia:

  • las direcciones de los sitios de filtración y de negociación de los grupos;
  • el nombre de las víctimas;
  • el chat de negociación completo;
  • las reglas YARA y el paquete de detección completo de cada grupo;
  • los contactos de los criminales (correo, .onion, Tox) sin máscara.

También incluyen las alertas por webhook, Slack y Discord, el MCP para asistentes de IA y más volumen en la API. Enterprise es bajo consulta.

Ver los planes

Fuente: acervo público de notas de rescate · actualizado el 12 nov 2026

Detección 369

El paquete que el equipo de seguridad usa para buscar al grupo en su propio entorno: los indicadores (IOC) y las reglas YARA, de inteligencia abierta sobre el grupo.

Indicadores (IOC)
SHA-256 38
  • 0c0e0f9b09b80d87ebc88e2870907b6cacb4cd7703584baf8f2be1fd9438696d
  • 0ee1d284ed663073872012c7bde7fac5ca1121403f1a5d2d5411317df282796c
  • 131da83b521f610819141d5c740313ce46578374abb22ef504a7593955a65f07
  • 1b6af2fbbc636180dd7bae825486ccc45e42aefbb304d5f83fafca4d637c13cc
  • 28cea00267fa30fb63e80a3c3b193bd9cd2a3d46dd9ae6cede5f932ac15c7e2e
  • 2c7aeac07ce7f03b74952e0e243bd52f2bfa60fadc92dd71a6a1fee2d14cdd77
  • 2f629395fdfa11e713ea8bf11d40f6f240acf2f5fcf9a2ac50b6f7fbc7521c83
  • 3298d203c2acb68c474e5fdad8379181890b4403d6491c523c13730129be3f75

y 30 más: míralos todos en la búsqueda de IOC

MD5 320
  • 005c650353052ace090b2a56c2d0023b
  • 01feb8f50b5195328f27195b0e4d82da
  • 0248bf2afb70642288646760bb25a38d
  • 03b9887dee2c3c825b6a6c0df1d104ad
  • 0544137574179494761d395005175510
  • 06ade3c98aa2432458f24966509bd9a9
  • 06e493f1f9a620ecec1a4f32fedd3128
  • 083740c55d0a459674457b8551ed9c6a

y 312 más: míralos todos en la búsqueda de IOC

IP 1
  • 193.242.184.180
Mutex 2
  • C20CD437-BA6D-4ebb-B190-70B43DE3B0F3
  • _SHuassist.mtx

7 indicador(es) quedan solo en el paquete completo: los contactos de los criminales (correo, Tox, Session, Telegram, PGP), las direcciones .onion, los servidores FTP y las billeteras.

Reglas YARA 1 regla(s)

Akira.yar

Disponible en los planes SOC, MSSP y Enterprise

Con el plan, descargas las reglas YARA y el paquete completo, con todos los indicadores.

Estos planes entregan el contenido bruto de inteligencia:

  • las direcciones de los sitios de filtración y de negociación de los grupos;
  • el nombre de las víctimas;
  • el chat de negociación completo;
  • las reglas YARA y el paquete de detección completo de cada grupo;
  • los contactos de los criminales (correo, .onion, Tox) sin máscara.

También incluyen las alertas por webhook, Slack y Discord, el MCP para asistentes de IA y más volumen en la API. Enterprise es bajo consulta.

Ver los planes

Contenido de defensa: úsalo solo en entornos que tienes autorización para analizar. Fuente: inteligencia abierta sobre el grupo · actualizado el 16 nov 2026

Negociación 76

Lo que muestran los chats de negociación filtrados sobre el grupo: cuánto pide al inicio, cuánto acepta y con qué frecuencia hubo pago.

76
Chats filtrados
400 mil US$
Pedido inicial (mediana)
en 62 chat(s)
150 mil US$
Valor negociado (mediana)
en 44 chat(s)
57 %
Descuento (mediana)
en 44 chat(s)
36 %
Hubo pago
27 de 76
42
Mensajes por chat (mediana)

La muestra son solo los chats que se filtraron, no todos los ataques del grupo. Los valores son los que escribió el grupo; las medianas usan solo los valores en dólares.

FechaPedidoNegociadoPagóMensajes
20 mar 2026N/AN/Ano12
15 mar 2026$150,000$44,000no38
24 feb 2026$5,000,000$1,150,000no50
16 feb 2026$150,000$130,000sí77
12 feb 2026$400,000$350,000no26
25 ene 2026$550,000$250,000no52
06 ene 2026$1,100,000$600,000no47
09 sep 2025$250,000$100,000no56
15 ago 2025$600,000$200,000sí65
24 may 2025$250,000$90,000no41
11 may 2025$6,900,000$800,000sí63
28 abr 2025$550,000$100,000sí78
25 abr 2025$290,000$120,000sí83
24 abr 2025$550,000—no12
23 abr 2025$600,000$200,000sí65
21 abr 2025$550,000$100,000sí78
17 abr 2025$200,000$25,000sí59
08 abr 2025$390,000—no12
31 mar 2025N/AN/Ano6
30 mar 2025$390,000—no15
29 mar 2025$850,000$200,000no24
28 mar 2025$850,000$290,000no39
26 mar 2025$150,000$120,000sí63
21 mar 2025$200,000$150,000no25
13 mar 2025$150,000$115,000sí43
12 mar 2025$150,000$115,000sí20
10 mar 2025$850,000$200,000no24
06 mar 2025N/AN/Ano9
27 feb 2025$250,000N/Ano56
22 feb 2025$450,000$400,000no72

y 46 chat(s) más

Disponible en los planes SOC, MSSP y Enterprise

Con el plan, lees el chat completo de cada negociación.

Estos planes entregan el contenido bruto de inteligencia:

  • las direcciones de los sitios de filtración y de negociación de los grupos;
  • el nombre de las víctimas;
  • el chat de negociación completo;
  • las reglas YARA y el paquete de detección completo de cada grupo;
  • los contactos de los criminales (correo, .onion, Tox) sin máscara.

También incluyen las alertas por webhook, Slack y Discord, el MCP para asistentes de IA y más volumen en la API. Enterprise es bajo consulta.

Ver los planes

Fuente: los chats de negociación filtrados · actualizado el 18 nov 2026

Familias de ransomware

El grupo opera la familia cuando su sitio de filtraciones es la misma dirección que la familia lista en las fuentes; usa la familia cuando MITRE ATT&CK dice que la usa. La recuperación es la de la familia, no la de una víctima: la página de la familia muestra las versiones y las condiciones de cada herramienta.

Impacto y víctimas

El grupo Akira tiene 65 víctimas de ransomware conocidas. Ve los sectores y países más afectados y las víctimas recientes.

65víctimas conocidas
24en Brasil
8sectores afectados
Actividad (12 meses)
01
02
08
09
10
Sectores más atacados
Industria11
Servicios profesionales10
Agricultura y alimentos9
Comercio minorista y e-commerce8
Energía y servicios públicos7
Tecnología7
Transporte4
Servicios financieros3
Países más afectados
🇧🇷 Brasil24
🇦🇷 Argentina9
🇲🇽 México9
🇨🇱 Chile6
🇵🇪 Perú4
🇨🇴 Colombia4
🇵🇦 Panamá3
🇪🇨 Ecuador2
Víctimas recientes
Nombre en el plan SOCServicios profesionales · MX · 2026-10-03
Nombre en el plan SOCAgricultura y alimentos · BR · 2026-10-02
Nombre en el plan SOCServicios profesionales · MX · 2026-10-02
Nombre en el plan SOCTecnología · BR · 2026-09-17
Nombre en el plan SOCComercio minorista y e-commerce · BR · 2026-09-17
Nombre en el plan SOCComercio minorista y e-commerce · BR · 2026-09-07
Nombre en el plan SOCAgricultura y alimentos · BR · 2026-08-18
Nombre en el plan SOCIndustria · AR · 2026-02-20
Nombre en el plan SOCServicios profesionales · MX · 2026-01-27
Nombre en el plan SOCIndustria · MX · 2025-06-05
Nombre en el plan SOCServicios financieros · GT · 2025-04-25
Nombre en el plan SOCComercio minorista y e-commerce · BR · 2025-04-24
Nombre en el plan SOCServicios financieros · CL · 2025-04-18
Nombre en el plan SOCTransporte · BR · 2025-04-16
Nombre en el plan SOCOtros · BR · 2025-03-26

Los nombres de las víctimas aparecen en los planes SOC, MSSP y Enterprise. Ver los planes

Infraestructura conocida 482

Indicadores reales (C2, dominios, URLs y hashes) asociados al malware que usa este grupo. Fuente: bases comunitarias de indicadores.

sha256_hash566ef5484da0a93c87dd0cb0a950a7cff4ab013175289cd5fccf9dd7ea430739akirasitio de filtración del grupo
sha256_hash988776358d0e45a4907dc1f4906a916f1b3595a31fa44d8e04e563a32557eb42akirasitio de filtración del grupo
sha256_hash8e9a33809b9062c5033928f82e8adacbef6cd7b40e73da9fcf13ec2493b4544cakirasitio de filtración del grupo
sha256_hashbcae978c17bcddc0bf6419ae978e3471197801c36f73cff2fc88cecbe3d88d1aakirasitio de filtración del grupo
sha256_hash678ec8734367c7547794a604cc65e74a0f42320d85a6dce20c214e3b4536bb33akirasitio de filtración del grupo
sha256_hash6cadab96185dbe6f3a7b95cf2f97d6ac395785607baa6ed7bf363deeb59cc360akirasitio de filtración del grupo
sha256_hash5c62626731856fb5e669473b39ac3deb0052b32981863f8cf697ae01c80512e5akirasitio de filtración del grupo
sha256_hashdfe6fddc67bdc93b9947430b966da2877fda094edf3e21e6f0ba98a84bc53198akirasitio de filtración del grupo
sha256_hasha6b0847cf31ccc3f76538333498f8fef79d444a9d4ecfca0592861cf731ae6cbakirasitio de filtración del grupo
sha256_hash68d5944d0419bd123add4e628c985f9cbe5362ee19597773baea565bff1a6f1aakirasitio de filtración del grupo
sha256_hash8816caf03438cd45d7559961bf36a26f26464bab7a6339ce655b7fbad68bb439akirasitio de filtración del grupo
sha256_hash3298d203c2acb68c474e5fdad8379181890b4403d6491c523c13730129be3f75akirasitio de filtración del grupo
ip193.242.184.180akirasitio de filtración del grupo
md5_hash4d43e35962c8c7fdca5f64da8f561f5aakirasitio de filtración del grupo
md5_hash27182f9017d8e4212fbc32e954e19d37akirasitio de filtración del grupo
md5_hash4d79fb750955ec8702cb79cfdb36e66bakirasitio de filtración del grupo
md5_hashe72e0069e1fb4328e2704bda97fb4a40akirasitio de filtración del grupo
md5_hash7a99bd570caf0d33464ecfd64d4da58dakirasitio de filtración del grupo
md5_hash32948677d3fa60b7b755a20c4412658bakirasitio de filtración del grupo
md5_hash5700eef6f154fdae3a22985674b41168akirasitio de filtración del grupo
md5_hash0fe4937a7dfa8f212f21f65a496d7713akirasitio de filtración del grupo
md5_hash64e4753cab78dcba6072a7c0ba9eeb89akirasitio de filtración del grupo
md5_hash43b0adfed2c14c240931d8e0a3986d9eakirasitio de filtración del grupo
md5_hash205589629ead5d3c1d9e914b49c08589akirasitio de filtración del grupo
md5_hashd37594e06b180d71d1612e6fd61e02a2akirasitio de filtración del grupo
md5_hashdf0dcae2fbd51e2319f9ea46517f4398akirasitio de filtración del grupo
md5_hash74f27fb712ad76c9b39398c93e5d94a8akirasitio de filtración del grupo
md5_hash2fe02e961381dd0e8304625bcacbe24aakirasitio de filtración del grupo
md5_hash834f137f9039041bccb4b414154a596cakirasitio de filtración del grupo
sha256_hashe3fa93dad8fb8c3a6d9b35d02ce97c22035b409e0efc9f04372f4c1d6280a481akirasitio de filtración del grupo

+482 indicadores en total. Míralos todos en la página de IOCs.

Referencias

El grupo Akira usa técnicas y explota fallas reales. El Pentest Autónomo con IA de TrueHacking simula esos ataques en tu infraestructura y aporta más seguridad a tu aplicación.

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