RansomwareMira o BrasilG1024

Akira

Também conhecido como: GOLD SAHARA, Howling Scorpius, PUNK SPIDER

Aviso por e-mail de CVE nova atribuída, vítima nova no Brasil e incidente verificado.

Análise Vexday

Akira é uma entidade de implantação de ransomware ativa desde pelo menos março de 2023, rastreada pelo MITRE ATT&CK sob o identificador G1024 e também conhecida pelos nomes GOLD SAHARA, PUNK SPIDER e Howling Scorpius. O grupo utiliza credenciais comprometidas para acessar mecanismos de acesso externo com fator único de autenticação, como VPNs, e emprega ferramentas publicamente disponíveis para movimentação lateral nos ambientes comprometidos. Suas operações seguem o modelo de "dupla extorsão", no qual dados são exfiltrados antes da criptografia e a publicação dos arquivos é ameaçada caso o resgate não seja pago; variantes do ransomware são capazes de atingir sistemas Windows e hipervisores VMware ESXi. Com 17 técnicas documentadas no MITRE ATT&CK e 19 vítimas identificadas no Brasil, o grupo representa uma ameaça concreta ao ambiente corporativo brasileiro.

Cadeia de ataque

Cenário plausível montado a partir das técnicas reais do grupo, ordenadas pelas fases de um ataque. Cada etapa mostra como o grupo costuma agir.

Severidade do arsenal67
Impacto: Crítico
T1059.001T1133T1558T1018T1213.002T1567.002EXECExecuçãoPowerShellPERSPersistênciaExternal RemoteServicesCREDAcesso a credenciaisSteal or ForgeKerberos TicketsDISCDescobertaRemote SystemDiscoveryCOLLColetaSharepointEXFILExfiltraçãoExfiltration toCloud StorageIMPACTImpactoData Encrypted forImpact

Cadeia ilustrativa derivada das técnicas documentadas no MITRE ATT&CK — não representa um ataque específico já ocorrido. A severidade resume o arsenal conhecido (cobertura da cadeia, CVEs em exploração ativa, técnicas).

Técnicas (MITRE ATT&CK) 17

Como o grupo opera, mapeado pela matriz MITRE ATT&CK e organizado pelas fases de um ataque.

Arsenal e táticas

O que o grupo usa e como ataca, pelo perfil público do grupo, compilado a partir de relatórios públicos. As CVEs desse perfil estão na seção de CVEs, com a fonte ao lado.

Ferramentas

Ferramentas ofensivas
CrackMapExecImpacketNetExec
Roubo de credenciais
DonPAPILaZagneMimikatz
Descoberta e mapeamento da rede
Advanced IP ScannerAdvanced Port ScannerBloodhoundMasscanReconFTWShareFinderSharpHoundSharpSharesSoftPerfect NetScanldapdomaindump
Evasão de defesas
PowerToolThrottleStop driverZemana Anti-Rootkit driverchurchill_driver.sys / fidget.sysconsent.exe (msimg32.dll / wmsgapi.dll)icardagt.exe (version.dll DLL sideload)mfpmp.exe (rtworkq.dll DLL sideload)
Ferramentas do próprio sistema (LOLBAS)
netnetshnltestvssadmin
Acesso remoto (RMM)
AnyDeskMeshAgentMobaXtermRadminRustDeskTeamViewer
Túneis e rede
CloudflaredNgrokOpenSSH
Exfiltração de dados
FileZillaMEGARCloneTemp[.]shWinRARWinSCP

Como o grupo ataca

O detalhe de cada técnica é o texto da fonte, em inglês.

  • Initial Access TA0001
    • T1078 Valid Accounts: Utilizes compromised VPN credentials.
    • T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts: Operators use obtained domain accounts for access.
    • T1091 Replication Through Removable Media: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1133 External Remote Services: Actors exploit CVE-2023-20269 remote service vulnerabilities.
    • T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application: Targets vulnerable CISCO devices via CVE-2023-20269.
  • Execution TA0002
    • T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation: Actors may use WMI to continue the attack.
    • T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Accepts parameters for its routines such as "-n 10" (for encryption percentage) or "-s (filename)" (for shared folder encryption).
    • T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell: Operators use PowerShell to launch commands to continue operations.
    • T1059.002 System Services: Service Execution: Akira ransomware uses service execution for persistence.
    • T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell: Operators use CMD to launch commands to continue operations.
  • Persistence TA0003
    • T1136.001 Create Account: Local Account: Upon initial access, Akira operators create a local account on the compromised system.
    • T1136.002 Create Account: Domain Account: Upon initial access, Akira operators create a domain account on the compromised system.
    • T1543 Create or Modify System Process: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
  • Privilege Escalation TA0004
    • T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts: Utilizes valid domain accounts for privilege escalation.
    • T1543 Create or Modify System Process: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
  • Stealth TA0005
    • T1027.001 Obfuscated Files or Information: Binary Padding: [Akira](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024) has used binary padding to obfuscate payloads.(Citation: Cisco Akira Ransomware OCT 2024)
    • T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location: [Akira](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024) has used legitimate names and locations for files to evade defenses.(Citation: Cisco Akira Ransomware OCT 2024)
  • Credential Access TA0006
    • T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory: Uses Mimikatz, LaZagne, or a command line to dump LSASS from memory.
    • T1552 Unsecured Credentials: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1552.001 Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1555 Credentials from Password Stores: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1555.003 Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: [Akira](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024) have used scripts to dump Kerberos authentication credentials.(Citation: Cisco Akira Ransomware OCT 2024)
  • Discovery TA0007
    • T1018 Remote System Discovery: Uses Advanced IP Scanner and MASSCAN to discover remote systems.
    • T1033 System Owner/User Discovery: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1082 System Information Discovery: Uses PCHunter and SharpHound to collect system information.
    • T1083 File and Directory Discovery: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1087.002 Account Discovery: Domain Account: Uses AdFind, Windows net command, and nltest to collect domain information.
    • T1482 Domain Trust Discovery: [Akira](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024) uses the built-in [Nltest](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0359) utility or tools such as [AdFind](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0552) to enumerate Active Directory trusts in victim environments.(Citation: Arctic Wolf Akira 2023)
  • Lateral Movement TA0008
    • T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol: Utilizes remote services for accessing accounts and machines through remote services.
    • T1091 Replication Through Removable Media: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer: Uses RDP to move laterally within the victim's network.
  • Collection TA0009
    • T1005 Data from Local System: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1213.002 Data from Information Repositories: Sharepoint: [Akira](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024) has accessed and downloaded information stored in SharePoint instances as part of data gathering and exfiltration activity.(Citation: Secureworks GOLD SAHARA)
    • T1560.001 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility: Utilizes discovery to gather information for exfiltration.
  • Exfiltration TA0010
    • T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol: Utilizes FileZilla or WinSCP to exfiltrate stolen information via FTP.
    • T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage: Uses RClone to exfiltrate stolen information via a web service.
  • Command and Control TA0011
    • T1071 Application Layer Protocol: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1219 Remote Access Tools: [Akira](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024) uses legitimate utilities such as AnyDesk and PuTTy for maintaining remote access to victim environments.(Citation: Secureworks GOLD SAHARA)(Citation: Arctic Wolf Akira 2023) Also observed: AnyDesk, Radmin, Cloudflare Tunnel, MobaXterm, RustDesk and Ngrok.
  • Impact TA0040
    • T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact: Akira ransomware is used to encrypt files.
    • T1489 Service Stop: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1490 Inhibit System Recovery: Deletes shadow copies to inhibit recovery.
    • T1531 Account Access Removal: [Akira](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024) deletes administrator accounts in victim networks prior to encryption.(Citation: Secureworks GOLD SAHARA)
    • T1657 Financial Theft: [Akira](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024) engages in double-extortion ransomware, exfiltrating files then encrypting them, in order to prompt victims to pay a ransom.(Citation: BushidoToken Akira 2023)(Citation: CISA Akira Ransomware APR 2024)
  • Defense Impairment TA0112
    • T1112 Modify Registry: Uses commands in its operation to modify registries.
    • T1685 Disable or Modify Tools: Usage of PowerTool or a KillAV tool abusing the Zemana AntiMalware driver to terminate AV-related processes was observed. [Akira](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024) has disabled or modified security tools for defense evasion.(Citation: Cisco Akira Ransomware OCT 2024)

Fonte: perfil público do grupo, perfil do grupo · atualizado em 16 nov 2026 · atividade de 12 abr 2023 a 13 nov 2026

Vulnerabilidades exploradas 11

CVEs que este grupo é conhecido por explorar, com a fonte e a confiança de cada uma ao lado. Ordenadas pela confiança e pela gravidade real.

CVE-2022-40684CRITICALEPSS 100%KEV perfil público do grupo
CVE-2021-21972CRITICALEPSS 100%KEV perfil público do grupo
CVE-2023-48788CRITICALEPSS 98%KEV perfil público do grupo
CVE-2024-40711CRITICALEPSS 90%KEV perfil público do grupo
CVE-2023-27532HIGHEPSS 81%KEV perfil público do grupo
CVE-2020-3259HIGHEPSS 72%KEV perfil público do grupo
CVE-2024-37085MEDIUMEPSS 27%KEV perfil público do grupo
CVE-2023-20269MEDIUMEPSS 27%KEV perfil público do grupo
CVE-2024-40766CRITICALEPSS 18%KEV perfil público do grupo
CVE-2019-6693MEDIUMEPSS 7%KEV perfil público do grupo
CVE-2023-20263MEDIUMEPSS 1% perfil público do grupo

Sites do grupo

2 site(s) conhecido(s): 2 no ar, 0 fora do ar, 0 apreendido(s).

TipoSituaçãoMudou emEndereço
negociação (chat)no arvisto desde 12 nov 2026•••••••• (no plano SOC)
vazamentono ar16 nov 2026•••••••• (no plano SOC)
Disponível nos planos SOC, MSSP e Enterprise

Com o plano, você vê o endereço de cada site do grupo.

Estes planos entregam o conteúdo bruto de inteligência:

  • os endereços dos sites de vazamento e de negociação dos grupos;
  • o nome das vítimas;
  • o chat de negociação inteiro;
  • as regras YARA e o pacote de detecção completo de cada grupo;
  • os contatos dos criminosos (e-mail, .onion, Tox) sem máscara.

Também incluem os alertas por webhook, Slack e Discord, o MCP para assistentes de IA e mais volume na API. O Enterprise é sob consulta.

Ver os planos

Fonte: perfil público do grupo · conferido em 16 nov 2026

Notas de resgate 3

O texto que o grupo deixa nas máquinas atacadas, de um acervo público de notas de resgate.

Tem uma nota de resgate? Compare em "Qual ransomware me atacou?"

akira_readme.txt · 2 contato(s) mascarado(s)
Hi friends,



Whatever who you are and what your title is if you're reading this it means the internal infrastructure of your company is fully or partially dead, all your backups - virtual, physical - everything that we managed to reach - are completely removed. Moreover, we have taken a great amount of your corporate data prior to encryption.



Well, for now let's keep all the tears and resentment to ourselves and try to build a constructive dialogue. We're fully aware of what damage we caused by locking your internal sources. At the moment, you have to know:



1. Dealing with us you will save A LOT due to we are not interested in ruining your financially. We will study in depth your finance, bank & income statements, your savings, investments etc. and present our reasonable demand to you. If you have an active cyber insurance, let us know and we will guide you how to properly use it. Also, dragging out the negotiation process will lead to failing of a deal.

2. Paying us you save your TIME, MONEY, EFFORTS and be back on track within 24 hours approximately. Our decryptor works properly on any files or systems, so you will be able to check it by requesting a test decryption service from the beginning of our conversation. If you decide to recover on your own, keep in mind that you can permanently lose access to some files or accidently corrupt them - in this case we won't be able to help.

3. The security report or the exclusive first-hand information that you will receive upon reaching an agreement is of a great value, since NO full audit of your network will show you the vulnerabilities that we've managed to detect and used in order to get into, identify backup solutions and upload your data.

4. As for your data, if we fail to agree, we will try to sell personal information/trade secrets/databases/source codes - generally speaking, everything that has a value on the darkmarket - to multiple threat actors at ones. Then all of this will be published in our blog - [endereço .onion].

5. We're more than negotiable and will definitely find the way to settle this quickly and reach an agreement which will satisfy both of us.



If you're indeed interested in our assistance and the services we provide you can reach out to us following simple instructions:



1. Install TOR Browser to get access to our chat room - [link]

2. Paste this link - [endereço .onion].

3. Use this code - [snip] - to log into our chat.



Keep in mind that the faster you will get in touch, the less damage we cause.
akira_readme_2.txt · 2 contato(s) mascarado(s)
Hi friends,

Whatever who you are and what your title is, if you're reading this it means the internal infrastructure of your company is fully or partially dead, all your backups - virtual, physical - everything that we managed to reach - are completely removed. Moreover, we have taken a great amount of your corporate data prior to encryption.



ATTENTION! Strictly prohibited:

- Deleting files with .arika extension;

- Replacing or renaming .arika and .akira files;

- Using third party software to recover your systems.

If you violate these rules, we cannot guarantee a successful recovery.



Well, for now let's keep all the tears and resentment to ourselves and try to build a constructive dialogue. We're fully aware of what damage we caused by locking your internal sources. At the moment, you have to know:



1. Dealing with us you will save A LOT due to we are not interested in ruining you financially. We will study in depth your finance, bank & income statements, your savings, investments etc. and present our reasonable demand to you. If you have an active cyber insurance, let us know and we will guide you how to properly use it. Also, dragging out the negotiation process will lead to failing of the deal.

2. Paying us you save your TIME, MONEY, EFFORTS and be back on track within 24 hours approximately. Our decryptor works properly on any files or systems, so you will be able to check it by requesting a test decryption service from the beginning of our conversation. If you decide to recover on your own, keep in mind that you can permanently lose access to some files or accidentally corrupt them - in this case we won't be able to help.

3. The security report or the exclusive first-hand information that you will receive upon reaching an agreement is of great value, since NO full audit of your network will show you the vulnerabilities that we've managed to detect and use in order to get into, identify backup solutions and download your data.

4. As for your data, if we fail to agree, we will try to sell personal information/trade secrets/databases/source codes - generally speaking, everything that has a value on the darkmarket - to multiple threat actors at once. Then all of this will be published in our blog - [endereço .onion].

5. We're more than negotiable and will definitely find a way to settle this quickly and reach an agreement which will satisfy both of us.



If you're indeed interested in our assistance and the services we provide you can reach out to us following simple instructions:



1. Install TOR Browser to get access to our chat room - torproject[.]org/download/.

2. Paste this link - [endereço .onion] .

3. Use this code - [snip] - to log into our chat.



Keep in mind that the faster you will get in touch, the less damage we cause.
akira_readme_3.txt · 2 contato(s) mascarado(s)
Hi friends,

Whatever who you are and what your title is, if you're reading this it means the internal infrastructure of your company is fully or partially dead, all your backups - virtual, physical - everything that we managed to reach - are completely removed. Moreover, we have taken a great amount of your corporate data prior to encryption.



ATTENTION! Strictly prohibited:

- Deleting files with .arika extension;

- Replacing or renaming .arika and .akira files;

- Using third party software to recover your systems.

If you violate these rules, we cannot guarantee a successful recovery.



Well, for now let's keep all the tears and resentment to ourselves and try to build a constructive dialogue. We're fully aware of what damage we caused by locking your internal sources. At the moment, you have to know:



1. Dealing with us you will save A LOT due to we are not interested in ruining you financially. We will study in depth your finance, bank & income statements, your savings, investments etc. and present our reasonable demand to you. If you have an active cyber insurance, let us know and we will guide you how to properly use it. Also, dragging out the negotiation process will lead to failing of the deal.

2. Paying us you save your TIME, MONEY, EFFORTS and be back on track within 24 hours approximately. Our decryptor works properly on any files or systems, so you will be able to check it by requesting a test decryption service from the beginning of our conversation. If you decide to recover on your own, keep in mind that you can permanently lose access to some files or accidentally corrupt them - in this case we won't be able to help.

3. The security report or the exclusive first-hand information that you will receive upon reaching an agreement is of great value, since NO full audit of your network will show you the vulnerabilities that we've managed to detect and use in order to get into, identify backup solutions and download your data.

4. As for your data, if we fail to agree, we will try to sell personal information/trade secrets/databases/source codes - generally speaking, everything that has a value on the darkmarket - to multiple threat actors at once. Then all of this will be published in our blog - [endereço .onion].

5. We're more than negotiable and will definitely find a way to settle this quickly and reach an agreement which will satisfy both of us.

6. Negotiations with Akira can only be conducted in a chat room, which you can access using the login details provided below or in the notes (a readme.txt file) in your systems. You should ignore any attempts (such as emails/social media messages, phone calls, etc.) to redirect you to another chat or email address (proton.me is often used by unauthorized individuals) on our behalf.

7. Be careful while working with recovery agencies as they often try to use your cyber incident to stuff their pockets. There are many risks for you to lose money and get nothing in return.



If you're indeed interested in our assistance and the services we provide you can reach out to us following simple instructions:



1. Install TOR Browser to get access to our chat room - torproject[.]org/download/.

2. Paste this link - [endereço .onion] .

3. Use this code - [snip] - to log into our chat.



Keep in mind that the faster you will get in touch, the less damage we cause.
Disponível nos planos SOC, MSSP e Enterprise

Com o plano, você vê os contatos dos criminosos nas notas, sem máscara.

Estes planos entregam o conteúdo bruto de inteligência:

  • os endereços dos sites de vazamento e de negociação dos grupos;
  • o nome das vítimas;
  • o chat de negociação inteiro;
  • as regras YARA e o pacote de detecção completo de cada grupo;
  • os contatos dos criminosos (e-mail, .onion, Tox) sem máscara.

Também incluem os alertas por webhook, Slack e Discord, o MCP para assistentes de IA e mais volume na API. O Enterprise é sob consulta.

Ver os planos

Fonte: acervo público de notas de resgate · atualizado em 12 nov 2026

Detecção 369

O pacote que o time de segurança usa para procurar o grupo no próprio ambiente: os indicadores (IOCs) e as regras YARA, de inteligência aberta sobre o grupo.

Indicadores (IOCs)
SHA-256 38
  • 0c0e0f9b09b80d87ebc88e2870907b6cacb4cd7703584baf8f2be1fd9438696d
  • 0ee1d284ed663073872012c7bde7fac5ca1121403f1a5d2d5411317df282796c
  • 131da83b521f610819141d5c740313ce46578374abb22ef504a7593955a65f07
  • 1b6af2fbbc636180dd7bae825486ccc45e42aefbb304d5f83fafca4d637c13cc
  • 28cea00267fa30fb63e80a3c3b193bd9cd2a3d46dd9ae6cede5f932ac15c7e2e
  • 2c7aeac07ce7f03b74952e0e243bd52f2bfa60fadc92dd71a6a1fee2d14cdd77
  • 2f629395fdfa11e713ea8bf11d40f6f240acf2f5fcf9a2ac50b6f7fbc7521c83
  • 3298d203c2acb68c474e5fdad8379181890b4403d6491c523c13730129be3f75

e mais 30: veja todos na busca de IOCs

MD5 320
  • 005c650353052ace090b2a56c2d0023b
  • 01feb8f50b5195328f27195b0e4d82da
  • 0248bf2afb70642288646760bb25a38d
  • 03b9887dee2c3c825b6a6c0df1d104ad
  • 0544137574179494761d395005175510
  • 06ade3c98aa2432458f24966509bd9a9
  • 06e493f1f9a620ecec1a4f32fedd3128
  • 083740c55d0a459674457b8551ed9c6a

e mais 312: veja todos na busca de IOCs

IP 1
  • 193.242.184.180
Mutex 2
  • C20CD437-BA6D-4ebb-B190-70B43DE3B0F3
  • _SHuassist.mtx

7 indicador(es) ficam só no pacote completo: os contatos dos criminosos (e-mail, Tox, Session, Telegram, PGP), os endereços .onion, os servidores FTP e as carteiras.

Regras YARA 1 regra(s)

Akira.yar

Disponível nos planos SOC, MSSP e Enterprise

Com o plano, você baixa as regras YARA e o pacote completo, com todos os indicadores.

Estes planos entregam o conteúdo bruto de inteligência:

  • os endereços dos sites de vazamento e de negociação dos grupos;
  • o nome das vítimas;
  • o chat de negociação inteiro;
  • as regras YARA e o pacote de detecção completo de cada grupo;
  • os contatos dos criminosos (e-mail, .onion, Tox) sem máscara.

Também incluem os alertas por webhook, Slack e Discord, o MCP para assistentes de IA e mais volume na API. O Enterprise é sob consulta.

Ver os planos

Conteúdo de defesa: use só em ambientes que você tem autorização para analisar. Fonte: inteligência aberta sobre o grupo · atualizado em 16 nov 2026

Negociação 76

O que os chats de negociação vazados mostram sobre o grupo: quanto pede de início, quanto aceita e com que frequência houve pagamento.

76
Chats vazados
US$ 400 mil
Pedido inicial (mediana)
em 62 chat(s)
US$ 150 mil
Valor negociado (mediana)
em 44 chat(s)
57%
Desconto (mediana)
em 44 chat(s)
36%
Houve pagamento
27 de 76
42
Mensagens por chat (mediana)

A amostra são só os chats que vazaram, não todos os ataques do grupo. Os valores são os que o grupo escreveu; as medianas usam só os valores em dólar.

DataPedidoNegociadoPagouMensagens
20 mar 2026N/AN/Anão12
15 mar 2026$150,000$44,000não38
24 fev 2026$5,000,000$1,150,000não50
16 fev 2026$150,000$130,000sim77
12 fev 2026$400,000$350,000não26
25 jan 2026$550,000$250,000não52
06 jan 2026$1,100,000$600,000não47
09 set 2025$250,000$100,000não56
15 ago 2025$600,000$200,000sim65
24 mai 2025$250,000$90,000não41
11 mai 2025$6,900,000$800,000sim63
28 abr 2025$550,000$100,000sim78
25 abr 2025$290,000$120,000sim83
24 abr 2025$550,000—não12
23 abr 2025$600,000$200,000sim65
21 abr 2025$550,000$100,000sim78
17 abr 2025$200,000$25,000sim59
08 abr 2025$390,000—não12
31 mar 2025N/AN/Anão6
30 mar 2025$390,000—não15
29 mar 2025$850,000$200,000não24
28 mar 2025$850,000$290,000não39
26 mar 2025$150,000$120,000sim63
21 mar 2025$200,000$150,000não25
13 mar 2025$150,000$115,000sim43
12 mar 2025$150,000$115,000sim20
10 mar 2025$850,000$200,000não24
06 mar 2025N/AN/Anão9
27 fev 2025$250,000N/Anão56
22 fev 2025$450,000$400,000não72

e mais 46 chat(s)

Disponível nos planos SOC, MSSP e Enterprise

Com o plano, você lê o chat inteiro de cada negociação.

Estes planos entregam o conteúdo bruto de inteligência:

  • os endereços dos sites de vazamento e de negociação dos grupos;
  • o nome das vítimas;
  • o chat de negociação inteiro;
  • as regras YARA e o pacote de detecção completo de cada grupo;
  • os contatos dos criminosos (e-mail, .onion, Tox) sem máscara.

Também incluem os alertas por webhook, Slack e Discord, o MCP para assistentes de IA e mais volume na API. O Enterprise é sob consulta.

Ver os planos

Fonte: os chats de negociação que vazaram · atualizado em 18 nov 2026

Famílias de ransomware

O grupo opera a família quando o site de vazamento dele é o mesmo endereço que a família lista nas fontes; usa a família quando o MITRE ATT&CK diz que usa. A recuperação é a da família, não a de uma vítima: a página da família mostra as versões e as condições de cada ferramenta.

Impacto e vítimas

O grupo Akira tem 65 vítimas de ransomware conhecidas. Veja os setores e países mais atingidos e as vítimas recentes.

65vítimas conhecidas
24no Brasil
8setores atingidos
Atividade (12 meses)
01
02
08
09
10
Setores mais atacados
Indústria11
Serviços profissionais10
Agricultura e alimentos9
Varejo e e-commerce8
Energia e serviços públicos7
Tecnologia7
Transporte4
Serviços financeiros3
Países mais atingidos
🇧🇷 Brasil24
🇦🇷 Argentina9
🇲🇽 México9
🇨🇱 Chile6
🇵🇪 Peru4
🇨🇴 Colômbia4
🇵🇦 PA3
🇪🇨 Equador2
Vítimas recentes
Nome no plano SOCServiços profissionais · MX · 2026-10-03
Nome no plano SOCAgricultura e alimentos · BR · 2026-10-02
Nome no plano SOCServiços profissionais · MX · 2026-10-02
Nome no plano SOCTecnologia · BR · 2026-09-17
Nome no plano SOCVarejo e e-commerce · BR · 2026-09-17
Nome no plano SOCVarejo e e-commerce · BR · 2026-09-07
Nome no plano SOCAgricultura e alimentos · BR · 2026-08-18
Nome no plano SOCIndústria · AR · 2026-02-20
Nome no plano SOCServiços profissionais · MX · 2026-01-27
Nome no plano SOCIndústria · MX · 2025-06-05
Nome no plano SOCServiços financeiros · GT · 2025-04-25
Nome no plano SOCVarejo e e-commerce · BR · 2025-04-24
Nome no plano SOCServiços financeiros · CL · 2025-04-18
Nome no plano SOCTransporte · BR · 2025-04-16
Nome no plano SOCOutros · BR · 2025-03-26

Os nomes das vítimas aparecem nos planos SOC, MSSP e Enterprise. Ver os planos

Infraestrutura conhecida 482

Indicadores reais (C2, domínios, URLs e hashes) associados ao malware que este grupo utiliza. Fonte: bases comunitárias de indicadores.

sha256_hash566ef5484da0a93c87dd0cb0a950a7cff4ab013175289cd5fccf9dd7ea430739akirasite de vazamento do grupo
sha256_hash988776358d0e45a4907dc1f4906a916f1b3595a31fa44d8e04e563a32557eb42akirasite de vazamento do grupo
sha256_hash8e9a33809b9062c5033928f82e8adacbef6cd7b40e73da9fcf13ec2493b4544cakirasite de vazamento do grupo
sha256_hashbcae978c17bcddc0bf6419ae978e3471197801c36f73cff2fc88cecbe3d88d1aakirasite de vazamento do grupo
sha256_hash678ec8734367c7547794a604cc65e74a0f42320d85a6dce20c214e3b4536bb33akirasite de vazamento do grupo
sha256_hash6cadab96185dbe6f3a7b95cf2f97d6ac395785607baa6ed7bf363deeb59cc360akirasite de vazamento do grupo
sha256_hash5c62626731856fb5e669473b39ac3deb0052b32981863f8cf697ae01c80512e5akirasite de vazamento do grupo
sha256_hashdfe6fddc67bdc93b9947430b966da2877fda094edf3e21e6f0ba98a84bc53198akirasite de vazamento do grupo
sha256_hasha6b0847cf31ccc3f76538333498f8fef79d444a9d4ecfca0592861cf731ae6cbakirasite de vazamento do grupo
sha256_hash68d5944d0419bd123add4e628c985f9cbe5362ee19597773baea565bff1a6f1aakirasite de vazamento do grupo
sha256_hash8816caf03438cd45d7559961bf36a26f26464bab7a6339ce655b7fbad68bb439akirasite de vazamento do grupo
sha256_hash3298d203c2acb68c474e5fdad8379181890b4403d6491c523c13730129be3f75akirasite de vazamento do grupo
ip193.242.184.180akirasite de vazamento do grupo
md5_hash4d43e35962c8c7fdca5f64da8f561f5aakirasite de vazamento do grupo
md5_hash27182f9017d8e4212fbc32e954e19d37akirasite de vazamento do grupo
md5_hash4d79fb750955ec8702cb79cfdb36e66bakirasite de vazamento do grupo
md5_hashe72e0069e1fb4328e2704bda97fb4a40akirasite de vazamento do grupo
md5_hash7a99bd570caf0d33464ecfd64d4da58dakirasite de vazamento do grupo
md5_hash32948677d3fa60b7b755a20c4412658bakirasite de vazamento do grupo
md5_hash5700eef6f154fdae3a22985674b41168akirasite de vazamento do grupo
md5_hash0fe4937a7dfa8f212f21f65a496d7713akirasite de vazamento do grupo
md5_hash64e4753cab78dcba6072a7c0ba9eeb89akirasite de vazamento do grupo
md5_hash43b0adfed2c14c240931d8e0a3986d9eakirasite de vazamento do grupo
md5_hash205589629ead5d3c1d9e914b49c08589akirasite de vazamento do grupo
md5_hashd37594e06b180d71d1612e6fd61e02a2akirasite de vazamento do grupo
md5_hashdf0dcae2fbd51e2319f9ea46517f4398akirasite de vazamento do grupo
md5_hash74f27fb712ad76c9b39398c93e5d94a8akirasite de vazamento do grupo
md5_hash2fe02e961381dd0e8304625bcacbe24aakirasite de vazamento do grupo
md5_hash834f137f9039041bccb4b414154a596cakirasite de vazamento do grupo
sha256_hashe3fa93dad8fb8c3a6d9b35d02ce97c22035b409e0efc9f04372f4c1d6280a481akirasite de vazamento do grupo

+482 indicadores no total. Veja todos na página de IOCs.

Referências

O grupo Akira usa técnicas e explora falhas reais. O Pentest Autônomo com IA da TrueHacking simula esses ataques na sua infraestrutura e traz mais segurança para sua aplicação.

Conhecer o Pentest Autônomo com IA →