RansomwareTargets BrazilG1024

Akira

Also known as: GOLD SAHARA, Howling Scorpius, PUNK SPIDER

E-mail alert on newly attributed CVEs, new victims in Brazil and verified incidents.

About the group

Akira is a ransomware variant and ransomware deployment entity active since at least March 2023. Akira uses compromised credentials to access single-factor external access mechanisms such as VPNs for initial access, then various publicly-available tools and techniques for lateral movement. Akira operations are associated with "double extortion" ransomware activity, where data is exfiltrated from victim environments prior to encryption, with threats to publish files if a ransom is not paid. Technical analysis of Akira ransomware indicates variants capable of targeting Windows or VMWare ESXi hypervisors and multiple overlaps with Conti ransomware.

Attack chain

Plausible scenario built from the group's real techniques, ordered by the phases of an attack. Each step shows how the group typically operates.

Arsenal severity67
Impact: Critical
T1059.001T1133T1558T1018T1213.002T1567.002EXECExecutionPowerShellPERSPersistenceExternal RemoteServicesCREDCredential accessSteal or ForgeKerberos TicketsDISCDiscoveryRemote SystemDiscoveryCOLLCollectionSharepointEXFILExfiltrationExfiltration toCloud StorageIMPACTImpactData Encrypted forImpact

Illustrative chain derived from techniques documented in MITRE ATT&CK — it does not represent a specific past attack. Severity summarizes the known arsenal (kill-chain coverage, actively exploited CVEs, techniques).

Techniques (MITRE ATT&CK) 17

How the group operates, mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK matrix and organized by the phases of an attack.

Arsenal and tactics

What the group uses and how it attacks, from the group's public profile, compiled from public reporting. The CVEs in that profile are in the CVEs section, with the source next to them.

Tools

Offensive tools
CrackMapExecImpacketNetExec
Credential theft
DonPAPILaZagneMimikatz
Discovery
Advanced IP ScannerAdvanced Port ScannerBloodhoundMasscanReconFTWShareFinderSharpHoundSharpSharesSoftPerfect NetScanldapdomaindump
Defense evasion
PowerToolThrottleStop driverZemana Anti-Rootkit driverchurchill_driver.sys / fidget.sysconsent.exe (msimg32.dll / wmsgapi.dll)icardagt.exe (version.dll DLL sideload)mfpmp.exe (rtworkq.dll DLL sideload)
Built-in system tools (LOLBAS)
netnetshnltestvssadmin
Remote access (RMM)
AnyDeskMeshAgentMobaXtermRadminRustDeskTeamViewer
Tunneling and networking
CloudflaredNgrokOpenSSH
Exfiltration
FileZillaMEGARCloneTemp[.]shWinRARWinSCP

How the group attacks

  • Initial Access TA0001
    • T1078 Valid Accounts: Utilizes compromised VPN credentials.
    • T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts: Operators use obtained domain accounts for access.
    • T1091 Replication Through Removable Media: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1133 External Remote Services: Actors exploit CVE-2023-20269 remote service vulnerabilities.
    • T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application: Targets vulnerable CISCO devices via CVE-2023-20269.
  • Execution TA0002
    • T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation: Actors may use WMI to continue the attack.
    • T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Accepts parameters for its routines such as "-n 10" (for encryption percentage) or "-s (filename)" (for shared folder encryption).
    • T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell: Operators use PowerShell to launch commands to continue operations.
    • T1059.002 System Services: Service Execution: Akira ransomware uses service execution for persistence.
    • T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell: Operators use CMD to launch commands to continue operations.
  • Persistence TA0003
    • T1136.001 Create Account: Local Account: Upon initial access, Akira operators create a local account on the compromised system.
    • T1136.002 Create Account: Domain Account: Upon initial access, Akira operators create a domain account on the compromised system.
    • T1543 Create or Modify System Process: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
  • Privilege Escalation TA0004
    • T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts: Utilizes valid domain accounts for privilege escalation.
    • T1543 Create or Modify System Process: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
  • Stealth TA0005
    • T1027.001 Obfuscated Files or Information: Binary Padding: [Akira](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024) has used binary padding to obfuscate payloads.(Citation: Cisco Akira Ransomware OCT 2024)
    • T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location: [Akira](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024) has used legitimate names and locations for files to evade defenses.(Citation: Cisco Akira Ransomware OCT 2024)
  • Credential Access TA0006
    • T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory: Uses Mimikatz, LaZagne, or a command line to dump LSASS from memory.
    • T1552 Unsecured Credentials: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1552.001 Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1555 Credentials from Password Stores: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1555.003 Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: [Akira](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024) have used scripts to dump Kerberos authentication credentials.(Citation: Cisco Akira Ransomware OCT 2024)
  • Discovery TA0007
    • T1018 Remote System Discovery: Uses Advanced IP Scanner and MASSCAN to discover remote systems.
    • T1033 System Owner/User Discovery: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1082 System Information Discovery: Uses PCHunter and SharpHound to collect system information.
    • T1083 File and Directory Discovery: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1087.002 Account Discovery: Domain Account: Uses AdFind, Windows net command, and nltest to collect domain information.
    • T1482 Domain Trust Discovery: [Akira](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024) uses the built-in [Nltest](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0359) utility or tools such as [AdFind](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0552) to enumerate Active Directory trusts in victim environments.(Citation: Arctic Wolf Akira 2023)
  • Lateral Movement TA0008
    • T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol: Utilizes remote services for accessing accounts and machines through remote services.
    • T1091 Replication Through Removable Media: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer: Uses RDP to move laterally within the victim's network.
  • Collection TA0009
    • T1005 Data from Local System: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1213.002 Data from Information Repositories: Sharepoint: [Akira](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024) has accessed and downloaded information stored in SharePoint instances as part of data gathering and exfiltration activity.(Citation: Secureworks GOLD SAHARA)
    • T1560.001 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility: Utilizes discovery to gather information for exfiltration.
  • Exfiltration TA0010
    • T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol: Utilizes FileZilla or WinSCP to exfiltrate stolen information via FTP.
    • T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage: Uses RClone to exfiltrate stolen information via a web service.
  • Command and Control TA0011
    • T1071 Application Layer Protocol: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1219 Remote Access Tools: [Akira](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024) uses legitimate utilities such as AnyDesk and PuTTy for maintaining remote access to victim environments.(Citation: Secureworks GOLD SAHARA)(Citation: Arctic Wolf Akira 2023) Also observed: AnyDesk, Radmin, Cloudflare Tunnel, MobaXterm, RustDesk and Ngrok.
  • Impact TA0040
    • T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact: Akira ransomware is used to encrypt files.
    • T1489 Service Stop: Observed during Cohesity REDLab detonation (November 2026 newsletter)
    • T1490 Inhibit System Recovery: Deletes shadow copies to inhibit recovery.
    • T1531 Account Access Removal: [Akira](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024) deletes administrator accounts in victim networks prior to encryption.(Citation: Secureworks GOLD SAHARA)
    • T1657 Financial Theft: [Akira](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024) engages in double-extortion ransomware, exfiltrating files then encrypting them, in order to prompt victims to pay a ransom.(Citation: BushidoToken Akira 2023)(Citation: CISA Akira Ransomware APR 2024)
  • Defense Impairment TA0112
    • T1112 Modify Registry: Uses commands in its operation to modify registries.
    • T1685 Disable or Modify Tools: Usage of PowerTool or a KillAV tool abusing the Zemana AntiMalware driver to terminate AV-related processes was observed. [Akira](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024) has disabled or modified security tools for defense evasion.(Citation: Cisco Akira Ransomware OCT 2024)

Source: public group profile, group profile · updated on 16 Nov 2026 · active from 12 Apr 2023 to 13 Nov 2026

Exploited vulnerabilities 11

CVEs this group is known to exploit, with the source and confidence of each next to it. Ordered by confidence and real-world severity.

CVE-2023-27532HIGHEPSS 81%KEV public group profile
CVE-2020-3259HIGHEPSS 72%KEV public group profile
CVE-2024-37085MEDIUMEPSS 27%KEV public group profile
CVE-2023-20269MEDIUMEPSS 27%KEV public group profile
CVE-2019-6693MEDIUMEPSS 7%KEV public group profile
CVE-2023-20263MEDIUMEPSS 1% public group profile

The group's sites

2 known site(s): 2 online, 0 offline, 0 seized.

TypeStatusChanged onAddress
negotiation (chat)onlineseen since 12 Nov 2026•••••••• (on the SOC plan)
leak siteonline16 Nov 2026•••••••• (on the SOC plan)
Available on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans

With the plan, you see the address of each of the group's sites.

These plans deliver the raw intelligence:

  • the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
  • the victims' names;
  • the full negotiation chat;
  • each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
  • the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.

They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.

See the plans

Source: public group profile · checked on 16 Nov 2026

Ransom notes 3

The text the group leaves on attacked machines, from a public ransom-note collection.

Have a ransom note? Compare it in "Which ransomware hit me?"

akira_readme.txt · 2 contact(s) masked
Hi friends,



Whatever who you are and what your title is if you're reading this it means the internal infrastructure of your company is fully or partially dead, all your backups - virtual, physical - everything that we managed to reach - are completely removed. Moreover, we have taken a great amount of your corporate data prior to encryption.



Well, for now let's keep all the tears and resentment to ourselves and try to build a constructive dialogue. We're fully aware of what damage we caused by locking your internal sources. At the moment, you have to know:



1. Dealing with us you will save A LOT due to we are not interested in ruining your financially. We will study in depth your finance, bank & income statements, your savings, investments etc. and present our reasonable demand to you. If you have an active cyber insurance, let us know and we will guide you how to properly use it. Also, dragging out the negotiation process will lead to failing of a deal.

2. Paying us you save your TIME, MONEY, EFFORTS and be back on track within 24 hours approximately. Our decryptor works properly on any files or systems, so you will be able to check it by requesting a test decryption service from the beginning of our conversation. If you decide to recover on your own, keep in mind that you can permanently lose access to some files or accidently corrupt them - in this case we won't be able to help.

3. The security report or the exclusive first-hand information that you will receive upon reaching an agreement is of a great value, since NO full audit of your network will show you the vulnerabilities that we've managed to detect and used in order to get into, identify backup solutions and upload your data.

4. As for your data, if we fail to agree, we will try to sell personal information/trade secrets/databases/source codes - generally speaking, everything that has a value on the darkmarket - to multiple threat actors at ones. Then all of this will be published in our blog - [.onion address].

5. We're more than negotiable and will definitely find the way to settle this quickly and reach an agreement which will satisfy both of us.



If you're indeed interested in our assistance and the services we provide you can reach out to us following simple instructions:



1. Install TOR Browser to get access to our chat room - [link]

2. Paste this link - [.onion address].

3. Use this code - [snip] - to log into our chat.



Keep in mind that the faster you will get in touch, the less damage we cause.
akira_readme_2.txt · 2 contact(s) masked
Hi friends,

Whatever who you are and what your title is, if you're reading this it means the internal infrastructure of your company is fully or partially dead, all your backups - virtual, physical - everything that we managed to reach - are completely removed. Moreover, we have taken a great amount of your corporate data prior to encryption.



ATTENTION! Strictly prohibited:

- Deleting files with .arika extension;

- Replacing or renaming .arika and .akira files;

- Using third party software to recover your systems.

If you violate these rules, we cannot guarantee a successful recovery.



Well, for now let's keep all the tears and resentment to ourselves and try to build a constructive dialogue. We're fully aware of what damage we caused by locking your internal sources. At the moment, you have to know:



1. Dealing with us you will save A LOT due to we are not interested in ruining you financially. We will study in depth your finance, bank & income statements, your savings, investments etc. and present our reasonable demand to you. If you have an active cyber insurance, let us know and we will guide you how to properly use it. Also, dragging out the negotiation process will lead to failing of the deal.

2. Paying us you save your TIME, MONEY, EFFORTS and be back on track within 24 hours approximately. Our decryptor works properly on any files or systems, so you will be able to check it by requesting a test decryption service from the beginning of our conversation. If you decide to recover on your own, keep in mind that you can permanently lose access to some files or accidentally corrupt them - in this case we won't be able to help.

3. The security report or the exclusive first-hand information that you will receive upon reaching an agreement is of great value, since NO full audit of your network will show you the vulnerabilities that we've managed to detect and use in order to get into, identify backup solutions and download your data.

4. As for your data, if we fail to agree, we will try to sell personal information/trade secrets/databases/source codes - generally speaking, everything that has a value on the darkmarket - to multiple threat actors at once. Then all of this will be published in our blog - [.onion address].

5. We're more than negotiable and will definitely find a way to settle this quickly and reach an agreement which will satisfy both of us.



If you're indeed interested in our assistance and the services we provide you can reach out to us following simple instructions:



1. Install TOR Browser to get access to our chat room - torproject[.]org/download/.

2. Paste this link - [.onion address] .

3. Use this code - [snip] - to log into our chat.



Keep in mind that the faster you will get in touch, the less damage we cause.
akira_readme_3.txt · 2 contact(s) masked
Hi friends,

Whatever who you are and what your title is, if you're reading this it means the internal infrastructure of your company is fully or partially dead, all your backups - virtual, physical - everything that we managed to reach - are completely removed. Moreover, we have taken a great amount of your corporate data prior to encryption.



ATTENTION! Strictly prohibited:

- Deleting files with .arika extension;

- Replacing or renaming .arika and .akira files;

- Using third party software to recover your systems.

If you violate these rules, we cannot guarantee a successful recovery.



Well, for now let's keep all the tears and resentment to ourselves and try to build a constructive dialogue. We're fully aware of what damage we caused by locking your internal sources. At the moment, you have to know:



1. Dealing with us you will save A LOT due to we are not interested in ruining you financially. We will study in depth your finance, bank & income statements, your savings, investments etc. and present our reasonable demand to you. If you have an active cyber insurance, let us know and we will guide you how to properly use it. Also, dragging out the negotiation process will lead to failing of the deal.

2. Paying us you save your TIME, MONEY, EFFORTS and be back on track within 24 hours approximately. Our decryptor works properly on any files or systems, so you will be able to check it by requesting a test decryption service from the beginning of our conversation. If you decide to recover on your own, keep in mind that you can permanently lose access to some files or accidentally corrupt them - in this case we won't be able to help.

3. The security report or the exclusive first-hand information that you will receive upon reaching an agreement is of great value, since NO full audit of your network will show you the vulnerabilities that we've managed to detect and use in order to get into, identify backup solutions and download your data.

4. As for your data, if we fail to agree, we will try to sell personal information/trade secrets/databases/source codes - generally speaking, everything that has a value on the darkmarket - to multiple threat actors at once. Then all of this will be published in our blog - [.onion address].

5. We're more than negotiable and will definitely find a way to settle this quickly and reach an agreement which will satisfy both of us.

6. Negotiations with Akira can only be conducted in a chat room, which you can access using the login details provided below or in the notes (a readme.txt file) in your systems. You should ignore any attempts (such as emails/social media messages, phone calls, etc.) to redirect you to another chat or email address (proton.me is often used by unauthorized individuals) on our behalf.

7. Be careful while working with recovery agencies as they often try to use your cyber incident to stuff their pockets. There are many risks for you to lose money and get nothing in return.



If you're indeed interested in our assistance and the services we provide you can reach out to us following simple instructions:



1. Install TOR Browser to get access to our chat room - torproject[.]org/download/.

2. Paste this link - [.onion address] .

3. Use this code - [snip] - to log into our chat.



Keep in mind that the faster you will get in touch, the less damage we cause.
Available on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans

With the plan, you see the criminals' contacts in the notes, unmasked.

These plans deliver the raw intelligence:

  • the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
  • the victims' names;
  • the full negotiation chat;
  • each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
  • the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.

They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.

See the plans

Source: public ransom-note collection · updated on 12 Nov 2026

Detection 369

The package a security team uses to hunt for the group in its own environment: the indicators (IOCs) and the YARA rules, from open intelligence on the group.

Indicators (IOCs)
SHA-256 38
  • 0c0e0f9b09b80d87ebc88e2870907b6cacb4cd7703584baf8f2be1fd9438696d
  • 0ee1d284ed663073872012c7bde7fac5ca1121403f1a5d2d5411317df282796c
  • 131da83b521f610819141d5c740313ce46578374abb22ef504a7593955a65f07
  • 1b6af2fbbc636180dd7bae825486ccc45e42aefbb304d5f83fafca4d637c13cc
  • 28cea00267fa30fb63e80a3c3b193bd9cd2a3d46dd9ae6cede5f932ac15c7e2e
  • 2c7aeac07ce7f03b74952e0e243bd52f2bfa60fadc92dd71a6a1fee2d14cdd77
  • 2f629395fdfa11e713ea8bf11d40f6f240acf2f5fcf9a2ac50b6f7fbc7521c83
  • 3298d203c2acb68c474e5fdad8379181890b4403d6491c523c13730129be3f75

and 30 more: see them all in the IOC search

MD5 320
  • 005c650353052ace090b2a56c2d0023b
  • 01feb8f50b5195328f27195b0e4d82da
  • 0248bf2afb70642288646760bb25a38d
  • 03b9887dee2c3c825b6a6c0df1d104ad
  • 0544137574179494761d395005175510
  • 06ade3c98aa2432458f24966509bd9a9
  • 06e493f1f9a620ecec1a4f32fedd3128
  • 083740c55d0a459674457b8551ed9c6a

and 312 more: see them all in the IOC search

IP 1
  • 193.242.184.180
Mutex 2
  • C20CD437-BA6D-4ebb-B190-70B43DE3B0F3
  • _SHuassist.mtx

7 indicator(s) are only in the full package: the criminals' contacts (email, Tox, Session, Telegram, PGP), .onion addresses, FTP servers and wallets.

YARA rules 1 rule(s)

Akira.yar

Available on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans

With the plan, you download the YARA rules and the full package, with every indicator.

These plans deliver the raw intelligence:

  • the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
  • the victims' names;
  • the full negotiation chat;
  • each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
  • the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.

They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.

See the plans

Defensive content: use it only in environments you are authorized to analyze. Source: open intelligence on the group · updated on 16 Nov 2026

Negotiation 76

What the leaked negotiation chats show about the group: how much it asks at first, how much it accepts and how often a payment happened.

76
Leaked chats
$400K
Initial demand (median)
in 62 chat(s)
$150K
Negotiated amount (median)
in 44 chat(s)
57%
Discount (median)
in 44 chat(s)
36%
Payment happened
27 of 76
42
Messages per chat (median)

The sample is only the chats that leaked, not every attack by the group. Amounts are as the group wrote them; the medians use only the dollar amounts.

DateDemandNegotiatedPaidMessages
20 Mar 2026N/AN/Ano12
15 Mar 2026$150,000$44,000no38
24 Feb 2026$5,000,000$1,150,000no50
16 Feb 2026$150,000$130,000yes77
12 Feb 2026$400,000$350,000no26
25 Jan 2026$550,000$250,000no52
06 Jan 2026$1,100,000$600,000no47
09 Sep 2025$250,000$100,000no56
15 Aug 2025$600,000$200,000yes65
24 May 2025$250,000$90,000no41
11 May 2025$6,900,000$800,000yes63
28 Apr 2025$550,000$100,000yes78
25 Apr 2025$290,000$120,000yes83
24 Apr 2025$550,000—no12
23 Apr 2025$600,000$200,000yes65
21 Apr 2025$550,000$100,000yes78
17 Apr 2025$200,000$25,000yes59
08 Apr 2025$390,000—no12
31 Mar 2025N/AN/Ano6
30 Mar 2025$390,000—no15
29 Mar 2025$850,000$200,000no24
28 Mar 2025$850,000$290,000no39
26 Mar 2025$150,000$120,000yes63
21 Mar 2025$200,000$150,000no25
13 Mar 2025$150,000$115,000yes43
12 Mar 2025$150,000$115,000yes20
10 Mar 2025$850,000$200,000no24
06 Mar 2025N/AN/Ano9
27 Feb 2025$250,000N/Ano56
22 Feb 2025$450,000$400,000no72

and 46 more chat(s)

Available on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans

With the plan, you read the full chat of each negotiation.

These plans deliver the raw intelligence:

  • the addresses of the groups' leak and negotiation sites;
  • the victims' names;
  • the full negotiation chat;
  • each group's YARA rules and full detection package;
  • the criminals' contacts (email, .onion, Tox) unmasked.

They also include webhook, Slack and Discord alerts, the MCP for AI assistants and more API volume. Enterprise is by request.

See the plans

Source: leaked negotiation chats · updated on 18 Nov 2026

Ransomware families

The group operates the family when its leak site is the same address the family lists in the sources; it uses the family when MITRE ATT&CK says so. Recovery refers to the family, not to any victim: the family page shows the versions and conditions of each tool.

Impact and victims

The group Akira has 65 known ransomware victims. See the most affected sectors and countries and recent victims.

65known victims
24in Brazil
8sectors hit
Activity (12 months)
01
02
08
09
10
Most attacked sectors
Manufacturing11
Professional Services10
Agriculture and Food Production9
Retail & E-Commerce8
Energy & Utilities7
Technology7
Transportation4
Financial Services3
Most affected countries
🇧🇷 Brazil24
🇦🇷 Argentina9
🇲🇽 Mexico9
🇨🇱 Chile6
🇵🇪 Peru4
🇨🇴 Colombia4
🇵🇦 Panama3
🇪🇨 Ecuador2
Recent victims
Name on the SOC planProfessional Services · MX · 2026-10-03
Name on the SOC planAgriculture and Food Production · BR · 2026-10-02
Name on the SOC planProfessional Services · MX · 2026-10-02
Name on the SOC planTechnology · BR · 2026-09-17
Name on the SOC planRetail & E-Commerce · BR · 2026-09-17
Name on the SOC planRetail & E-Commerce · BR · 2026-09-07
Name on the SOC planAgriculture and Food Production · BR · 2026-08-18
Name on the SOC planManufacturing · AR · 2026-02-20
Name on the SOC planProfessional Services · MX · 2026-01-27
Name on the SOC planManufacturing · MX · 2025-06-05
Name on the SOC planFinancial Services · GT · 2025-04-25
Name on the SOC planRetail & E-Commerce · BR · 2025-04-24
Name on the SOC planFinancial Services · CL · 2025-04-18
Name on the SOC planTransportation · BR · 2025-04-16
Name on the SOC planOther · BR · 2025-03-26

Victims' names show on the SOC, MSSP and Enterprise plans. See the plans

Known infrastructure 482

Real indicators (C2, domains, URLs and hashes) associated with the malware this group uses. Source: community indicator feeds.

sha256_hash566ef5484da0a93c87dd0cb0a950a7cff4ab013175289cd5fccf9dd7ea430739akiragroup leak site
sha256_hash988776358d0e45a4907dc1f4906a916f1b3595a31fa44d8e04e563a32557eb42akiragroup leak site
sha256_hash8e9a33809b9062c5033928f82e8adacbef6cd7b40e73da9fcf13ec2493b4544cakiragroup leak site
sha256_hashbcae978c17bcddc0bf6419ae978e3471197801c36f73cff2fc88cecbe3d88d1aakiragroup leak site
sha256_hash678ec8734367c7547794a604cc65e74a0f42320d85a6dce20c214e3b4536bb33akiragroup leak site
sha256_hash6cadab96185dbe6f3a7b95cf2f97d6ac395785607baa6ed7bf363deeb59cc360akiragroup leak site
sha256_hash5c62626731856fb5e669473b39ac3deb0052b32981863f8cf697ae01c80512e5akiragroup leak site
sha256_hashdfe6fddc67bdc93b9947430b966da2877fda094edf3e21e6f0ba98a84bc53198akiragroup leak site
sha256_hasha6b0847cf31ccc3f76538333498f8fef79d444a9d4ecfca0592861cf731ae6cbakiragroup leak site
sha256_hash68d5944d0419bd123add4e628c985f9cbe5362ee19597773baea565bff1a6f1aakiragroup leak site
sha256_hash8816caf03438cd45d7559961bf36a26f26464bab7a6339ce655b7fbad68bb439akiragroup leak site
sha256_hash3298d203c2acb68c474e5fdad8379181890b4403d6491c523c13730129be3f75akiragroup leak site
ip193.242.184.180akiragroup leak site
md5_hash4d43e35962c8c7fdca5f64da8f561f5aakiragroup leak site
md5_hash27182f9017d8e4212fbc32e954e19d37akiragroup leak site
md5_hash4d79fb750955ec8702cb79cfdb36e66bakiragroup leak site
md5_hashe72e0069e1fb4328e2704bda97fb4a40akiragroup leak site
md5_hash7a99bd570caf0d33464ecfd64d4da58dakiragroup leak site
md5_hash32948677d3fa60b7b755a20c4412658bakiragroup leak site
md5_hash5700eef6f154fdae3a22985674b41168akiragroup leak site
md5_hash0fe4937a7dfa8f212f21f65a496d7713akiragroup leak site
md5_hash64e4753cab78dcba6072a7c0ba9eeb89akiragroup leak site
md5_hash43b0adfed2c14c240931d8e0a3986d9eakiragroup leak site
md5_hash205589629ead5d3c1d9e914b49c08589akiragroup leak site
md5_hashd37594e06b180d71d1612e6fd61e02a2akiragroup leak site
md5_hashdf0dcae2fbd51e2319f9ea46517f4398akiragroup leak site
md5_hash74f27fb712ad76c9b39398c93e5d94a8akiragroup leak site
md5_hash2fe02e961381dd0e8304625bcacbe24aakiragroup leak site
md5_hash834f137f9039041bccb4b414154a596cakiragroup leak site
sha256_hashe3fa93dad8fb8c3a6d9b35d02ce97c22035b409e0efc9f04372f4c1d6280a481akiragroup leak site

+482 indicators in total. See them all on the IOCs page.

References

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